Caretaker conventions in Australasia: minding the shop for government by Anne Tiernan & Jennifer Menzies
Caretaker Conventions  
in Australasia
Minding the Shop for Government

Caretaker Conventions  
in Australasia
Minding the Shop for Government
Anne Tiernan and Jennifer Menzies 
Centre for Governance and Public Policy 
Griffith University                 
 
 
 
 
Published by ANU E Press 
The Australian National University 
Canberra ACT 0200, Australia 
Email: anuepress@anu.edu.au 
This title is also available online at: http://epress.anu.edu.au/caretaker_citation.html
National Library of Australia 
Cataloguing-in-Publication entry 
  Tiernan, Anne, 1968- .
  Caretaker conventions in Australasia : minding the shop for
  government.
 
  Bibliography.
  ISBN 9781921313493 (pbk.).
  ISBN 9781921313509 (web).
  1. Public administration - Australia - Decision making.  2.
  Public administration - New Zealand - Decision making.  3.
  Public administration - Australia.  4. Public
  administration - New Zealand.  5. Elections - Australia.  6.
  Elections - New Zealand.  7. Australia - Politics and
  government - 2001-.  8. New Zealand - Politics and
  government - 21st century.  I. Menzies, Jennifer.  II.
  Title.  (Series : ANZSOG series).
  
  328.9
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a 
retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, 
photocopying or otherwise, without the prior permission of the publisher.
Cover design by John Butcher.
Printed by University Printing Services, ANU
Funding for this monograph series has been provided by the Australia and New 
Zealand School of Government Research Program.
This edition © 2007 ANU E Press 
John Wanna, Series Editor
Professor John Wanna is the Sir John Bunting Chair of 
Public Administration at the Research School of Social 
Sciences at The Australian National University. He is 
the director of research for the Australian and New 
Zealand School of Government (ANZSOG). He is also 
a joint appointment with the Department of Politics 
and Public Policy at Griffith University and a principal 
researcher with two research centres: the Governance 
and Public Policy Research Centre and the nationally-
funded Key Centre in Ethics, Law, Justice and 
Governance at Griffith University. Professor Wanna has produced around 17 
books including two national text books on policy and public management. He 
has produced a number of research-based studies on budgeting and financial 
management including: Budgetary Management and Control (1990); Managing 
Public Expenditure (2000), From Accounting to Accountability (2001) and, most 
recently, Controlling Public Expenditure (2003). He has just completed a study 
of state level leadership covering all the state and territory leaders — entitled 
Yes Premier: Labor leadership in Australia’s states and territories — and has 
edited a book on Westminster Legacies in Asia and the Pacific — Westminster 
Legacies: Democracy and responsible government in Asia and the Pacific. He 
was a chief investigator in a major Australian Research Council funded study 
of the Future of Governance in Australia (1999-2001) involving Griffith and 
the ANU. His research interests include Australian and comparative politics, 
public expenditure and budgeting, and government-business relations. He 
also writes on Australian politics in newspapers such as The Australian, 
Courier-Mail and The Canberra Times and has been a regular state political 
commentator on ABC radio and TV. 

Table of Contents
Author Proles ix
Acknowledgements xi
Foreword xiii
List of abbreviations and acronyms xv
Chapter 1. Introduction 1
Chapter 2. What are conventions? 7
Chapter 3. Origins of caretaker conventions 13
Chapter 4. When do the conventions apply? 25
Chapter 5. Caretaker conventions: an overview of Australian
jurisdictions 33
Chapter 6. Caretaker conventions: an overview of New Zealand and local
government arrangements 53
Chapter 7. Forces inuencing the observance of caretaker conventions 59
Chapter 8. A changing practice? 63
Chapter 9. Caretaker conventions and the future of responsible
government 71
Glossary 75
References 77
Appendix A. Dierent approaches – what the jurisdictional guidances say 83
vii

Author Profiles
Dr Anne Tiernan is an Australian Research Council (ARC) Postdoctoral Fellow
at the Centre for Governance and Public Policy at Griffith University, and the
Australia and New Zealand School of Government (ANZSOG) Research Program.
She has worked in policy roles in both the Commonwealth and Queensland
public sectors, and as a policy and research consultant. Dr Tiernan’s research
interests include: executive advisory arrangements — particularly ministerial
staffing arrangements and relations between ministerial offices and the public
service, policy influence and public policy agenda-setting. Her book, Power
Without Responsibility: Ministerial Staffers in Australian Governments from
Whitlam to Howard published recently by UNSW Press, examines the
implications of the growth of ministerial staffing arrangements, especially its
impact on the quality of information and advice to decision-makers. Dr Tiernan
is currently working on a major ARC-funded research project investigating the
policy advisory capacity of the Australian Public Service (APS) and its ability
to support decision-makers through its policy advising functions.
Jennifer Menzies is a Director with the consultancy Policy Futures. A former
senior executive and Cabinet Secretary within the Queensland Department of
the Premier and Cabinet, she was responsible for the development of the
government’s priorities and the implementation of the government’s agenda in
all departments. Menzies has had extensive experience in policy development
at the State and Commonwealth levels including the latest iteration of the Smart
State Policy, the Capital City Policy and the E-Democracy Policy Framework.
She is an M.Phil candidate in the School of Politics and Public Policy at Griffith
University. Her topic is contemporary political leadership.
ix

Acknowledgements
For an issue that so engages the attention of politicians and public servants for
an intense period of about a month every few years, surprisingly little has been
published on the topic of caretaker conventions. This monograph draws together
research — and the guidance documents developed by public service central
agencies — to address matters of practical concern in managing the business of
government during an election campaign.
As we show in this monograph, conventions are dynamic. They evolve through
experience and political practice. This monograph addresses the theoretical
underpinnings of the caretaker principles, traces their progressive
institutionalisation in recent decades and examines some contemporary challenges
for their interpretation and observance. It is important to note, however, that
while our treatment of the guidance documents is currently accurate, they are
‘live’ documents that will adapt and change as experience and events dictate.
It will, therefore, be necessary for practitioners and others with an interest in
the trajectory of the caretaker conventions to monitor such changes and to
consider them in the context of our arguments as laid out here.
Our research and understanding of the issues canvassed in this monograph has
been assisted by the many Commonwealth, State and Territory officials who
generously spoke to us about their experience of the caretaker conventions and
reviewed sections of the manuscript. The 2006 Queensland election provided
an opportunity to test some of our ideas and arguments through workshops
organised by the Institute for Public Administration Australia (IPAA) Queensland
Division. Thanks to IPAA and the Department of the Premier and Cabinet.
We are grateful to Professor John Wanna of the ANZSOG research program,
who engaged us to undertake this research with a practitioner readership in
mind and helped conceptualise and shape the manuscript. Special thanks to John
Nethercote and Jonathan Boston for helpful comments on the draft and to John
Butcher for his editing and deft management of the production process. Finally,
we would like to acknowledge the generous support of the Centre for Governance
and Public Policy at Griffith University for allowing us to complete this work
alongside other research commitments.
Anne Tiernan and Jennifer Menzies
September 2007
xi

Foreword
Andrew Podger
National President
Institute of Public Administration Australia
This monograph is the first of a planned series over the next few years as a joint
venture between IPAA and ANZSOG.
ANZSOG is a unique collaboration amongst Australasian governments and higher
education institutions to develop emerging leaders in the public sector and to
support research on contemporary public policy and management issues. IPAA
is the national association of those whose profession is public administration,
promoting high standards and continuous professional development and
disseminating research and practitioner experience through its journals and its
seminars and conferences.
The two organisations are natural partners. Participants in ANZSOG programs
are encouraged to be members and supporters of IPAA. Both are keen to promote
research and to share lessons from practical experience.
IPAA is particularly keen to sponsor work that provides guidance on professional
standards in public administration. IPAA’s Queensland Division has been taking
the lead in developing some initial documents canvassing the standards that
might apply today in such fields as values-based management and whistleblower
arrangements.
This monograph by Anne Tiernan and Jennifer Menzies represents a substantial
review of the rules and conventions applying in the lead-up to elections.
Standards of behaviour at these times, including processes of decision-making,
are important to our democratic system. They protect the apolitical and
professional nature of the public service, ensuring it is well placed to serve
whichever party wins the ensuing election and they ensure the incoming
government has maximum capacity to pursue its mandate without being unduly
constrained by decisions taken immediately before the election.
Guidance has long been available to public servants working for the Australian
Government but has not been so widely known at State and local government
levels. This monograph provides guidance on appropriate professional standards
for those working at all levels of government in Australia (and New Zealand).
IPAA is pleased to co-sponsor this research with ANZSOG and looks forward to
cooperating on further monographs that promote high standards in public
administration.
xiii

List of abbreviations and acronyms
Australian Capital TerritoryACT
Australian Federal PoliceAFP
Australian Financial ReviewAFR
Australian Government Information Management OfficeAGIMO
Australian Labor PartyALP
Australian Public ServiceAPS
Australian Public Service CommissionAPSC
Chief Executive OfficerCEO
Crime and Misconduct Commission (Queensland)CMC
Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet (Australia)DPM&C
Mixed Member ProportionalMMP
New ZealandNZ
New Zealand Department of the Prime Minister and CabinetNZDPM&C
New Zealand State Services CommissionNZSSC
Royal Commission on Australian Government AdministrationRCAGA
Special Air ServiceSAS
Senate Standing Committee on Finance and Public
Administration
SSCF&PA
Sydney Morning HeraldSMH
xv

Chapter 1. Introduction
In 2004, elections were held in the Australian Commonwealth and in the state
of Queensland. During the course of both campaigns, incumbent governments
were accused of breaching ‘caretaker conventions’ — the principles and practices
that guide the conduct of ministers and officials during an election campaign.
Caretaker conventions have evolved as a check on executive power in
circumstances where there is no parliament to which it can be held accountable.
They are observed during an election period, in a situation where, for example,
a government has lost the support of the legislature, or there is a delay in forming
a government after an election. Although the business of government continues,
because of the potential for a change of government, caretaker arrangements
require that no new policy decisions be taken, no major contracts should be
entered into, and that significant appointments should not be made. Caretaker
conventions are based on shared understandings of how politicians should
behave. They are not law and are not adjudicated by the courts.
The Federal election on October 9 2004 was a bitter contest between the Coalition
Government led by Prime Minister John Howard, and the Australian Labor
Party under the leadership of Mark Latham. It was an unusually long campaign
of 39 days duration; the usual length in recent years has been 33 days. The
election was called on Sunday 29 August, although the caretaker period
commenced formally following the issuing of writs at around 6 pm on Tuesday
31 August. The result was clear on election night, with the Government returned
and normal business resuming on Monday 11 October.
Opposition complaints during the Federal campaign included claims that caretaker
conventions had been breached by actions including:
• The posting of ministerial press releases and transcripts on departmental
websites. The Departments of Defence and Foreign Affairs and Trade were
the subject of specific complaints from Opposition Finance spokesman, Bob
McMullan MP (Kerin 2004).
• The Prime Minister’s failure to consult the Opposition Leader over a decision
to deploy a ‘contingency team’ to Iraq in response to reports that two
Australian nationals had been taken hostage by insurgents. Latham accused
the Government of ‘playing politics while Australians could be at risk’ and
attacked his opponent for not involving Labor in the decision, nor briefing
it about the team’s activities (Sydney Morning Herald 16 September 2004).
Howard rejected the claims, arguing the decision was consistent with
contingency arrangements for hostage situations agreed by the National
Security Committee of Cabinet in August 2004, before the commencement
of the caretaker period. He accused Latham of trying to convert the caretaker
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convention into a form of ‘dual government’, noting his Government was
‘not obliged to talk to them [the Opposition] every minute of the day’
(Australian Financial Review 16 September 2004).
• The announcement by ministers and government MPs of grants and new
facilities in marginal electorates during the election campaign. Particular
controversy surrounded grants made under the Regional Partnerships
Program – a Senate inquiry found that 50% of the grant approvals under
the program occurred in the three months leading up to the 2004 election,
fuelling perceptions of ‘pork-barrelling’ (SSCF&PA 2005).
• Government advertising campaigns, notably saturation television, radio and
print advertising for the ‘Help Protect Australia from Terrorism’ campaign,
begrudgingly approved by Labor, since it was run during the caretaker
period (The Australian, 5 October 2004). Centrelink’s decision to proceed
with a mail-out to families on the government’s $600 family tax benefit
during the caretaker period was also controversial (Canberra Times, 24
October 2004). The Joint Standing Committee on Electoral Matters inquiry
into the conduct of the 2004 election campaign heard evidence of significantly
increased government expenditure on advertising in the months leading up
to the calling of the election (Young 2005), prompting the Committee to
recommend that the ‘blackout’ on advertising being extended to apply from
1 July preceding the likely date of the election in the House of
Representatives (JSCEM 2005, p. 424).
Occasionally, ministers have complained that shadow ministers had also misused
the conventions relating to consultation between the Opposition and the public
service in the pre-election period. Specifically, they have expressed concerns
that requests for information from government departments and agencies have
been used as a basis for political attacks rather than as part of their legitimate
preparation for government.
In the case of the 2004 Queensland State election, controversy over caretaker
conventions erupted after an announcement by then Premier Peter Beattie of a
proposed new route for the Tugun Bypass motoway at the southern end of the
Gold Coast. The announcement came just two days before polling day – some
24 days into the caretaker period. Long a controversial political issue, the
proposed new route would require the compulsory resumption of 14 privately
owned dwellings. Officers of the Department of Main Roads were advised of the
announcement on 4 February 2004, the night before the Premier’s announcement,
and asked by their minister to inform affected residents and discuss with them
the impacts on their properties. They did so immediately, hand delivering letters
to each of the residents prior to the Premier’s announcement at 10 am. After the
election, which saw the Beattie government returned, the Queensland Crime
and Misconduct Commission (CMC) received a complaint from the then Leader
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of the Opposition, Lawrence Springborg MP, alleging the announcement of the
Tugun Bypass involved a breach of ‘both the spirit and the letter’ of the caretaker
conventions as set out in the Queensland Cabinet Handbook (CMC 2004, p. vii).
He alleged a lack of impartiality on the part of officers of the Department of Main
Roads, accusing them of ‘acting in a politically partisan manner to implement a
major government decision during an election campaign’ (quoted in CMC 2004,
p. 2).
The CMC accepted Mr Springborg’s complaint, launching an investigation, the
report of which was published in July 2004. It found that the letter from the
Department of Main Roads breached caretaker conventions because it lacked
the impartiality required of public servants during an election campaign (CMC
2004, p. 26). Although it did not recommend disciplinary action against any of
the officers involved, the CMC made 24 recommendations about how the
observation of the caretaker conventions could be strengthened in the future,
and about how public servants should conduct themselves during an election
campaign.
Complaints that incumbent parties have breached caretaker conventions during
election campaigns are legion. Arguably, a more adversarial political context
has made these complaints more frequent and bitter, with the conflict aggravated
through media coverage. Although such complaints rarely gain much popular
traction, they pose significant difficulties for public servants who are expected
to walk the line of impartiality in the heated and intensely partisan atmosphere
of an election campaign.
The 2004 cases offer interesting insights into some of the challenges of applying
and interpreting caretaker conventions, and raise questions about:
• the nature and status of caretaker conventions;
• when they apply;
• some of the forces affecting their nature and observance;
• the consequences that new modes of regulation and oversight might have
for the interpretation and adjudication of the actions of key actors during
the caretaker period; and
• the future of caretaker conventions given pressures on their adjudication
and interpretation.
These questions are explored in this ANZSOG/IPAA research monograph.
A detailed exploration of recently promulgated caretaker conventions highlights
the dilemmas associated with codifying and formalising practices that derive
from shared understandings about what constitutes ‘appropriate’ political
behaviour. It also exposes a fundamental transformation in their scope and intent.
Historically, caretaker conventions were developed as simple guidances for
ministers, reminding them of the need to moderate their conduct during the
3
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election period because of the lack of an operating parliament to which they
were accountable. Over time, responsibility for maintaining and updating the
guidance documents has been taken over by the bureaucracy. As a result, the
focus of guidance documents has shifted from an emphasis on ministerial
constraint to one of supporting bureaucratic decision-making in uncertain times.
This has added complexity to the guidances with the result that they have
become documents that perform dual and potentially irreconcilable functions
— in seeking to provide, on the one hand, guidelines about what constitutes
appropriate political behaviour and, on the other, advice aimed at protecting
the bureaucracy from controversy and claims of partisanship.
The crafting and updating of documents by public servants has added detail on
issues primarily of concern to the bureaucracy. The traditional purpose of the
guidance documents has become conflated with bureaucratic attempts to shield
public servants from potentially inappropriate ministerial demands for
responsiveness during an election campaign. One conservative commentator has
observed that caretaker conventions are a good example of A.F. Davies’ claim
that Australians have a particular ‘talent for bureaucracy’. Instead of ministers
being required to act responsibly during an election campaign, the onus is now
on how the bureaucracy deals with ministerial requests as well as their access
to, and use of, government infrastructure.
This subtle shift of emphasis from the behaviour of ministers to public servants
has created additional constraints on the activities of public administration
during the caretaker period. For example, the original intent of the guidance
not to undertake significant appointments in the caretaker period was directed
towards governments and was aimed at deterring them from ‘stacking’ boards
and statutory authorities with sympathetic appointees, particularly if they were
in danger of losing office. Although guidance was aimed at major appointments,
meaning appointments in which a minister has a role (usually statutory
appointments), some jurisdictions now provide advice to administrators on
limiting the appointment of senior bureaucrats, including down to mid-levels.
Anxious to avoid criticism and controversy, public officials sometimes choose
to constrain their administrative prerogatives, even in areas that are not subject
to ministerial oversight or intervention under normal circumstances. The dual
nature of the conventions has led to continuing confusion over where
responsibility lies in preventing breaches and who should enforce the
conventions. Is it the role of the public service to patrol the boundaries of
acceptable ministerial behaviour or should responsibility for observing the
conventions lie primarily with ministers?
Given the inherent dilemmas of the caretaker period, there has been an increasing
tendency to codify and formalise guidance on the caretaker conventions. As the
comparative overview of caretaker arrangements in Appendix A of this
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monograph demonstrates, there is significant policy transfer and learning between
jurisdictions, although there are local differences in the application of caretaker
principles.
Of course, elections are a fraught time for public administrators in
Westminster-style political systems. For the duration of the ‘caretaker
period’—the period between the calling of an election and the return of the
existing government or the commissioning of a new government—public servants
must tread a careful line: they must be seen to be apolitical; although they may
be required to brief the government’s political opponents, they must maintain
the policy status quo and ensure administrative continuity until the election
result is known. In this context, they must administer policy, provide advice
and manage programs in a highly charged and adversarial political environment
in which key actors—ministers, ministerial staff, shadow ministers, the
Opposition, its staff and journalists—can be expected to have varying degrees
of familiarity and appreciation of the application (and nuances) of the practices
and procedures developed to regulate how a government should operate once
an election is called.
Paradoxically, the application of the caretaker conventions becomes enormously
significant, if only for a short period of time, each three or four years. For the
vast majority of public sector employees this means they only have a sporadic
and limited contact with the conventions and, at any election, many officers are
working in a caretaker environment for the first time.
This monograph collects that knowledge about and explores some of the
judgements that public sector employees might be required to make in order to
give a comprehensive overview of the principles and practice of caretaker
conventions in Australian and New Zealand jurisdictions. It examines what our
caretaker conventions are, where they originated and how they have evolved
and includes a glossary of key terms and concepts. Using cases and examples
from recent elections, it explores some of the pressures on the interpretation and
management of caretaker conventions. This ANZSOG/IPAA monograph collates
and consolidates, for the first time, current guidance documents on the caretaker
period and presents a comparative analysis of caretaker arrangements as they
stand in Australian Commonwealth, State, Territory and local governments, and
New Zealand. The monograph addresses issues of practical concern to politicians
in both government and opposition, as well as to public servants, to assist them
in managing during the caretaker period. It aims to demystify and critically
assess many of the practices that have evolved.
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Chapter 2. What are conventions?
Australia’s political system is founded on the principle of ‘responsible
government’. Its basic tenets are that, subject to the Constitution, Parliament is
supreme; the government is responsible to Parliament; ministers have to be in
Parliament; regular elections will be held; and there is a professional bureaucracy
that is independent but accountable to ministers. Australia, unlike the United
Kingdom, has a written constitution and some of these principles are captured
in that document.1 The provisions of the Constitution comprise the formal rules
of government. But formal rules are only part of the story about how a system
of government operates. In areas about which the Constitution is silent, political
behaviour is guided by ‘well established practice, methods, habits, maxims and
usages’—many of them long-standing— which were inherited from colonial
parliaments, which in turn inherited them from Westminster. It is these practices,
methods and usages which tend to be referred to as ‘conventions of the
Constitution’ (Reid 1977, p. 244).
Conventions have become an integral part of Westminster-style
democracies—filling in the detail and helping political practice to adhere to the
principles of responsible government (Heard 1991, p. 1). For example,
conventions cover:
• rules about the relationship between the Prime Minister or Premier and
Cabinet,
• the role of Cabinet;
• relations between the Crown and the Parliament;
• relations between the two Houses of Parliament (Marshall 1984, p. 4);2
• how budgets are appropriated; and
• ceremonial etiquette and protocols (for example, both the Prime Minister
and Leader of the Opposition are represented at major events, funerals,
openings and military parades during the caretaker period).
New Zealand conventions also rest on a mixture of written and unwritten
constitutional precepts. McLeay (1999, p. 12) reports that:
The conduct of a caretaker government, for example, is guided by: the
Constitution Act 1986 (which defines, among other things, the tenure of
Ministers); the core convention that Parliament is sovereign and that
governments must command the confidence of the House …
There is a range of definitions on what constitutes a constitutional convention.
Most definitions refer to the early work of British scholars A.V. Dicey and Sir
Ivor Jennings who investigated the differences between the law of the
Constitution and the conventions of the Constitution (Heard 1991, p. 4). Jennings
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(1959, p. 159) famously identified three questions to be asked as the precondition
to the existence of a convention. Firstly, what are the precedents? Secondly, did
the actors in the precedents believe they were bound by a rule? And thirdly, is
there a good reason for the rule?
For Jaconelli (2005, p. 151), conventions are ‘social rules that possess a
constitutional — and not merely a political — significance’. He argues that
emphasising their social nature captures two of their fundamental features: their
normative quality in prescribing standards of behaviour, and the fact that they
are not enforced in the courts. Their specific constitutional character ‘bears out,
in addition, the role that they play, akin to that performed by written (and
legally enforceable) constitutions in allocating power and controlling the manner
of its exercise as between the organs of government and political parties’
(Jaconelli 2005, pp. 151-152).
The nature of conventions and their relationships to the law is highly contested.
It is not our intention to rehearse the various debates here. A useful summary
can be found in Marshall (2004, pp. 37-44).
Conventions arise in several ways: through practice acquiring a strong obligatory
character over time; and/or through the explicit agreement of the relevant actors
(Heard 1991 p. 10). Sampford (1987, p. 386) cites as an example of the latter, the
former convention dating from 1952 on the filling of Australian Senate vacancies
(with a member of the same political party). The question of whether this was,
in fact, a convention, was hotly contested, although it had been established
practice since 1952 (Hanks 1977, pp.183-190). Controversy over the ‘breaching’
of this convention by the NSW government in 1975,3  and by the Queensland
government later the same year,4  was the catalyst for an amendment to Section
15 of the Constitution in 1977 to specify more clearly how casual Senate vacancies
should be dealt with by State parliaments.5
Marshall (1984, p. 8) notes that conventions arise from ‘a series of precedents
that are agreed to have given rise to a binding rule of behaviour’. Alternatively,
a convention may derive from some ‘acknowledged principle of government
which provides a reason or justification for it’ (Marshall 1984, p. 9). In practice,
conventions may be confirmed after the event. He observes that many
conventions are negative in form — connoting that political actors should
constrain their behaviour or refrain from certain courses of action.
A key characteristic of conventions is their flexibility. Since they are not subject
to judicial interpretation, they evolve in response to changing circumstances
and political values. This lack of legal definition permits ‘the adaptation of
constitutional rules to changes in the general political principles and values of
the day, without the need for formal amendment to existing positive law’ (Cooray
1979, p. 5). Rhodes et al. (forthcoming, Chapter 3) note that Australian politicians
have consistently rejected proposals to codify many constitutional conventions,
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preferring to rely instead on the resilient and evolving traditions of responsible
government.6
Morality, obligation and reciprocity
Conventions have been described by Marshall (1984) as the ‘critical morality’
of the Constitution. They impose a series of obligations that are morally and
politically binding rather than legally imposed (Marshall 1984, p. 17). The courts
can recognise the existence of conventions and refer to them in judicial
interpretation of laws, but they are not enforceable through the legal system.7
They operate as a normative force for political actors to conduct themselves in
specific ways (Jaconelli 2005, p. 151). Political actors recognise and abide by
conventions because ‘they are believed to formulate valid rules of obligation’
(Marshall, cited in Jaconelli 2005, p. 150) and they are regarded by all sides of
politics as useful and generally worth observing. They are observed because
political actors find them helpful and functional. For example, it is generally
accepted that responsible parliamentary government in Australia is underpinned
by adherence to a number of key conventions, including:
• governments recognise a loyal opposition;
• ministers must answer for their departments or provide explanations if
questioned;
• ministers must not mislead Parliament – or if they do inadvertently, then
they must correct the record immediately; and
• ministers should attend Question Time unless urgent business prevents them
from doing so.
For a convention to exist, actors must be aware of an obligation to behave in
particular ways, and believe they are bound to adhere to its prescriptions. If
this occurs then the continuation of the practice of adhering to the convention
remains high. Agreement and acceptance are important considerations in this
context, as are expectations of reciprocity and mutuality. As Jaconelli (2005, p.
171) notes:
… the party that is in power at the moment respects the constraints that
are imposed on it by constitutional conventions in the expectation that
the Opposition parties, when they attain office, will likewise respect the
same constraints.
The observance of conventions forms a restraint on the abuse of power by the
government or the Crown (Hood, Phillips and Jackson 1978, p. 108). For example,
the application of caretaker conventions during an election campaign formalises
the rights of the Opposition as a potential future government and voluntarily
restrains the governing party from exploiting the advantages of incumbency.
Adherence to conventions can be seen as a constitutional compact of ‘mutual
9
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forbearance’ where each party, as it gains government, is schooled in the
discipline of observing the constraints imposed by conventions (Jaconelli 2005,
p. 173).
A further safeguard to observance of constitutional conventions in the Australian
context is the role of the Governor-General. Hasluck (1979, p. 12) argues that
the Governor-General ‘occupies a position where he can help ensure that those
who conduct the affairs of the nation do so strictly in accordance with the
Constitution and the laws of the Commonwealth and with due regard to the
public interest’. According to Hasluck (1979, p. 18), because of his close and
regular contact with Ministers through Executive Council, the Governor-General
‘is both a watchdog over the Constitution and laws for the nation as a whole and
a watchdog for the government considered as a whole (whatever government
may be in power)’.
Moral sanctions against continued and deliberate breaches include the diminution
of the system of government as a whole and the loss of ‘respect for the established
distribution of authority’ (Marshall and Moodie 1971, p. 32). Breaches diminish
the power of the convention and the loss of restraint on the abuse of power
undermines the principle of reciprocity and mutuality which underpins the
adherence to conventions.
It is generally accepted that the main sanction against the abuse of conventions
is political. Dicey (1959, p. 444) argues that the power of public opinion ensures
obedience. Ongoing media and public scrutiny of political behaviour ensures
that breaches are well-publicised by journalists, commentators and the
Opposition. It has been observed that where a ‘breach’ of a convention is likely
to be politically costly, the convention is far more secure (Sampford 1987, p.
375). However, voter cynicism and disengagement from politics raises questions
about whether political sanctions are a sufficient deterrent to a breach of
conventions. Sometimes, concerns that conventions have been breached reveal
a complainant’s lack of familiarity with the nature and status of conventions
rather than a deliberate substantive breach (as, for instance, did occur with the
Bjelke-Petersen calculation).
The application of conventions relies on judgement, knowledge of precedents
and a desire to see the continuation and upholding of the convention. It is this
exercise of prudence that creates uncertainty for many politicians and
bureaucrats, since interpretation is inevitably subjective, situational and
context-dependent. However, the application of conventions remains critical to
adhering to the Westminster principles of responsible government.
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ENDNOTES
1  Proposals to formally include some aspects of responsible government in the written Constitution
were formally rejected during the constitutional debates before federation (Rhodes, Wanna and Weller
forthcoming, Ch. 3).
2  Standing Orders of in the Commonwealth Parliament are the rules and orders made by each House
under section 50 of the Constitution concerning, interalia, the order and conduct of business and
proceedings. They also cover the 'mode in which its power, privileges and immunities may be exercised
and upheld'.
3  A joint sitting of the NSW Parliament chose an independent, Cleaver Bunton, to replace outgoing
Labor Senator, Lionel Murphy, who resigned when he was appointed to the High Court of Australia.
4  Queensland Premier Joh Bjelke-Petersen nominated the anti-Whitlam Pat Field for the vacancy created
by the death of Labor Senator Bert Milliner. Both appointments undermined the ALP Government’s
tenuous hold on the Senate, setting the scene for its dismissal in November 1975. As it happened, Bunton
voted with the Government in the crucial votes; Field did not vote at all as his selection was challenged
and referred to a Court of Disputed Returns.
5  For guidance on the current practice for the filling of casual vacancies, see Odgers’ Australian Senate
Practice, 11th Edition. http://www.aph.gov.au/senate/pubs/odgers/chap0421.htm
6  For a discussion of efforts to formalise and codify key conventions of the Australian Constitution, see
Sampford (1987).
7  See, for example, Marshall (2004 pp. 38-42); Heard (1991); Twomey and Wilkins (2007).
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Chapter 3. Origins of caretaker
conventions
The source of a convention is frequently difficult to trace because of the lack of
an authoritative text and the lack of an established authority to issue or adjudicate
conventions (Sampford 1987, p. 369). Most of the conventions guiding political
life in Australia and New Zealand derive from the Westminster tradition and
the logic of parliamentary government (Davis et al. 2001, p. 12).
Turning specifically to caretaker conventions, these guide the conduct of
governments and the bureaucracy during election periods (until a new
government is sworn in)1  or in circumstances, for example, where a government
has lost its parliamentary majority. These conventions ensure that somebody
has a ‘hold of the formal levers of power until a new government can be formed’
(Laver and Shepsle 1994, pp. 291-292). Boston et al. (1998, p. 631) note that while
periods of caretaker government occur in all parliamentary democracies, they
tend to be both more frequent and protracted in countries with proportional
representation because election outcomes are often less clear cut, and the need
to form coalition or minority governments can cause significant delays.
Within Westminster systems, caretaker conventions sit within a subset of
conventions about the accountability of the elected Government to Parliament
(Marshall 1984, p. 18). Rhodes and Weller (2005, p. 2) note that the Westminster
model comprises ‘a set of beliefs and a shared inheritance that creates expectations
and hands down rules that guide and justify behaviour.’ The belief that the
party in opposition is an alternative executive-in-waiting and, therefore, entitled
to a smooth transition to office should voters award it an electoral majority, is
fundamental. This belief is lent weight by the progressive institutionalisation
of the Opposition’s role through entitlements (and, in some cases, salaries) for
shadow ministers and office-holders, the provision of staff, specific arrangements
in the Standing Orders and so on. Caretaker conventions moderate the substantial
advantages of incumbency by constraining the power of the political executive
during the election campaign and until a new government is appointed. They
provide guidance to ministers, the Opposition and public servants about how
the business of government should be conducted during the caretaker period.
Broadly, caretaker conventions specify that during the caretaker period:
• governments should avoid making major policy decisions that are likely to
commit an incoming government—the government and the public service
should thus maintain the policy ‘status quo’ (Boston et al. 1998);
• governments should also avoid making significant appointments or signing
major contracts; and
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• governments should not include public servants in election activities.
Like other types of conventions discussed above, caretaker conventions have
evolved to add detail to the administrative practices derived from the
Constitution. In common with other aspects of the Westminster tradition, they
adapt to reflect changing practices and political mores. They evolved through
experience, from observation of practices elsewhere and on the basis of advice
from constitutional experts and commentators, political leaders and the Cabinet
Office (McLeay 1999, p. 12). This means the application of the conventions is
both simple and complex at the same time. The application of conventions is in
some ways simple, because they are based on two principles:
• with the dissolution of the House, there is no popular chamber to which the
Executive government can be responsible; and
• every general election brings with it the possibility of a change of government
(Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, Annual Report 1986-1987,
p. 39).
Applying the conventions can also be complex because difficult judgements
sometimes have to be made about whether an action will cause a breach of those
underlying principles. Unlike laws, the interpretation of which can be tested in
courts, conventions reflect the beliefs and practices of political actors — their
interpretation is fluid, often contested and subject to a dynamic and constantly
evolving political environment. New challenges or technical possibilities, such
as the use of the departmental internet by the incumbent party, can arise during
an election campaign. The administration of caretaker conventions depends on
a body of corporate knowledge about past application combined with sound
judgement to deal with new issues as they arise.
The highly charged atmosphere of general elections in Australia and New Zealand
means that caretaker conventions have not been without their controversies.
Debate generally has been around their application in specific circumstances
rather than the fundamentals of the principles that define them. The evolution
of caretaker conventions in these two countries has focused on increasing detail
on ‘guidance’ on how to apply them. Challenges to their application during an
election campaign have led to further additions to formal guides about their
application to clarify and remove existing ambiguities. The intention is not to
change the ‘rules’ but to reduce breaches by a more precise statement of the
application (Sampford 1987, p. 373).
Breaches and sanctions in the caretaker period
Claimed breaches of caretaker conventions are a mainstay of election campaigns.
In Australia, responsibility for the administration of the caretaker conventions
rests with the Prime Minister, the Premier or the Chief Minister who are required
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to ‘self-police’ the rules (Jaconelli 2005, p. 176). Self-policing is not always the
preferred option for an Opposition that may suspect a breach of the conventions
by those in power. In the heat of an election campaign, an Opposition is
understandably reluctant to have the leader of the party they are challenging
arbitrating on complaints about their own behaviour. A disgruntled complainant
has but two sanctions to call on—moral sanctions or political sanctions.
Alleged breaches of caretaker conventions during an election campaign revolve
around the perception that the government has benefited from using the resources
of office to give them an unfair advantage over the Opposition (see, for example,
McMullan 2007, pp. 27-31). The weight of public condemnation may be sufficient
to embarrass and politically damage the government for the perceived breach,
especially if the issue is taken up vigorously by the media. The intention is to
harm the political capital of the government by showing their moral deficiency
and their inability to be trusted with handling the delicate niceties of the system
of government.
It would be true to say that almost every election sees a public skirmish about
an alleged breach of the caretaker conventions. It is now part of the political
grist of election tactics. It is always difficult to resolve these allegations as
decisions are made on the basis of fine judgements about the applicability of the
conventions in a particular circumstance. The lack of an authoritative mediation
process means that it can never be ascertained whether a violation has, in fact,
occurred (Jaconelli 2005, p. 163).
An area which has received little attention is the accusation of a breach against
a public servant. Ironically, the sanctions for a breach by the bureaucracy are
more real and enforceable than the moral or political sanctions applying to
politicians. For example, at the commencement of this monograph, we noted
that the Queensland Crime and Misconduct Commission (CMC) was asked to
investigate a complaint from the Leader of the Opposition that departmental
officers had acted in a politically partisan way (CMC 2004, p. 2).2  Although it
was clear that the CMC had no jurisdictional power over the Premier (CMC 2004,
p. 3), it was considered that a deliberate breach of the caretaker conventions
could amount to misconduct and be grounds for possible disciplinary action
under the Public Service Act (CMC 2004, p. 5). A detailed analysis of this case is
undertaken in Chapter 7.
So, periodically, caretaker conventions are one of the more scrutinised of
constitutional conventions because alleged breaches occur in the heated
atmosphere of an election campaign with the attendant media attention upon
the unfolding political process. This has led to increased documentation, the
development of guidance documents for governments and—in particular—the
public service to explain and assist with decision-making during this time. The
next section of this monograph identifies and explores the elements which make
15
Origins of caretaker conventions
up the caretaker conventions of the Commonwealth and New Zealand
governments, the Australian States and Territories.
Caretaker conventions — guidelines and application
Australia
Although there is evidence of earlier informal acceptance of the need for caution
during the caretaker period (Wilson 1995), the first public record of caretaker
conventions in Australia is in the form of a letter from the Prime Minister, Robert
Menzies, to his ministers at the outset of the 1951 double dissolution elections,
stating:
I should also be glad if you would note that whilst continuing to take
whatever action you deem necessary in connection with the ordinary
administration of your Department, you should not make decisions on
matters of policy or those of a contentious nature without first referring
the matter to myself (quoted in DPM&C 1987, p. 40).
By 1961, the established practice was that the Prime Minister would write to all
ministers advising them explicitly of the need to avoid ‘major policy decisions
or important appointments’ in the relevant period. The ball was firmly in the
ministers' court, it being their responsibility to behave accordingly.
The need for more detailed guidance, particularly on consultations with the
Opposition, became relevant when, after two decades of Coalition government,
the 1969 election raised the prospect of a change of government. In the event,
three more years would elapse before it became a reality. The 1972 election saw
the public service confront a transition for the first time in 23 years.
Former Governor-General, Sir Paul Hasluck, added to the sparse material on
caretaker conventions by identifying what he thought was the key intent of the
convention in his Queale Memorial Lecture in 1972:
… no new decisions on matters of major policy should be taken and no
appointments to high office should be made. The common-sense of this
convention is to avoid a situation in which an expiring government may
do something, which a month or so later, an incoming government may
immediately try to cancel. The philosophy of it is that if a question on
major policy is being put to the electorate at an election, a government
should not make final decisions on that question before the electorate
has given its answer (Hasluck 1979, p. 18).
In 1983 and 1985 the Constitutional Conventions—meetings of Commonwealth,
State and local government politicians—sought to codify and declare the
conventions that guide the Australian political system.3  Resolution 32, adopted
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at the 1983 meeting, is based on the Hasluck pronouncement (Lindell 1988, p.
322), and is the only resolution on the caretaker convention. It stated:
No important new initiative is taken, and no appointment to high office
is made, by a government in the period immediately prior to a general
election for the House of Representatives unless it can be publicly
justified as necessary in the national interest. (Proceedings of the
Australian Constitutional Convention, 1983).
Marshall (2004, p. 42) notes, however, that unlike the courts, the Australian
Convention:
… had no particular hold on the public imagination or claim to deference
and it is unclear what the effect or significance of promulgating a
declaration of this kind can be. Unless or until the committee’s
conclusions are embodied in legislation (when they would cease to be
conventions), there seems no very good reason for anyone to defer to
the views of such a body.
The Governor-General can require additional restrictions during an election
campaign, but these are rare: with the only example in the Australian context
related to the double dissolution elections in 1975 when the ‘caretaker Prime
Minister’, Malcolm Fraser, appointed after the Whitlam government was sacked,
gave specific undertakings to then Governor-General Sir John Kerr that no
appointments or dismissals would be made and no policies would be initiated
(DPM&C 1987 p. 40). More usually, the Governor-General’s role in caretaker
arrangements might be exercised through Executive Council. Hasluck (1979, p.
18) gives a flavour of this potential in the following observation:
Of course the business of the country cannot be wholly suspended and
there may be emergencies in which action should be taken at once, but,
if a single Minister overlooks the convention, it is customary to defer
his recommendation and draw the attention of the Prime Minister to the
fact so that it becomes a matter for the Prime Minister or his Cabinet to
decide whether the urgency is so great that action must be taken at once.
Documentation and guidance
The conventions were gradually refined over the years (Codd 1996, p. 23). The
first detailed text of their intent and application was published in 1987 as a
special article in the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet's Annual Report
1986-87. Noting the relative lack of written material on the conventions, it
reflected ‘the Department’s experience in relation to the conventions and
associated practices, arising from its advisory and coordinating role’ (DPM&C
1987, p. 39). Arguably, it indicates that the imperative for clarifying caretaker
arrangements had shifted from the realm of the political (guidance to Ministers
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about what they could and should do) to the administrative. It also meant that
political conventions have become ‘legalistic’, with lawyers increasingly brought
in to administer or comment on them.
It has been noted that conventions evolve with political practice and reflect
prevailing mores. In addition, we can state that formal guidance on their
application has equally increased significantly in Australian jurisdictions since
the 1980s. A major review and consolidation of the existing caretaker
arrangements was undertaken by the Department of the Prime Minister and
Cabinet (DPM&C) after the 1987 election. A significant addition was a set of
Guidelines for Pre-Election Consultation with Officials by the Opposition. The issue
of what kind of contact should be allowed between public servants and the
alternative government had been bubbling since the 1970s. Whitlam had
unsuccessfully sought permission from then Prime Minister, William McMahon,
to meet with public servants prior to the 1972 election to discuss the
administrative implications of Labor’s policies (Hawker and Weller 1974, p. 100).
Thereafter, a summary of the guidance on caretaker conventions, with an
emphasis on Cabinet matters, was incorporated as part of the 'Cabinet Handbook'.
At less than two pages it is far less detailed than the DPM&C guidance document
(which now runs to 10 pages). It is reviewed and updated after each election on
the advice of the Government Division of DPM&C, which provides assistance
to agencies in interpreting the conventions during the caretaker period.
Increasingly, guidance documents are being presented as helping ‘to avoid
controversies about the role of the public service’ during the caretaker period
(DPM&C 2004). Passage of the Public Service Act 1999 (Cwlth), sections 10 and
13 of which set out the ‘Australian Public Service (APS) Values and Code of
Conduct’, has formalised public servants’ obligations in this respect,
incorporating in legislation explicit obligations regarding the behaviour of public
servants. As part of its statutory responsibility to promote and uphold the Code,
the Australian Public Service Commission (APSC) has developed educational
resources to assist public servants, including the recent Good Practice Guide:
Supporting Ministers: Upholding the Values. A short section of this guide deals
briefly with issues that may arise during the caretaker period (APSC 2006, pp.
48-50).
State and Territory jurisdictions have tended to follow the Commonwealth
example, adopting the underlying principles and acknowledging its lead in
formalising, publishing and updating caretaker conventions. But different
electoral timetables, local specificities and individual experience has meant the
codified conventions are not consistent across all jurisdictions. The comparative
analysis of different jurisdictional arrangements in Chapter 4 shows the nature
and extent of some of these local variations.
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In Queensland and South Australia the caretaker conventions are spelt out in a
Cabinet Handbook. In Tasmania and Victoria, they are issued as guidance
documents by the respective departments of Premier and Cabinet. In New South
Wales and Western Australia, they are contained in a government memorandum
to ministers issued by the Premier following announcement of the general
election. In the Australian Capital Territory (ACT) and the Northern Territory,
guidance documents are issued by the Chief Minister’s departments.
Local government
Local governments in Australia are established under State legislation and have
no constitutional recognition or status. State governments have broad powers
in respect of local councils, including over their governance and the distribution
of financial grants from the Commonwealth (Kane 2006). The legislative and
operating framework for local councils takes the form of a Local Government Act,
and Regulations established under that Act.
Until recently, local government was distinct from other tiers of Australian
government in that no formal guidance was provided about the conduct of
incumbents during election periods. The Victorian government first introduced
‘caretaker arrangements’ to cover the conduct of council elections, through
amendments to the Local Government Act 1989 (Vic) contained in the Local
Government (Democratic Reform) Act 2003 (Vic). This legislation introduced a
range of electoral reforms, including caretaker provisions. These came into use
for the first time in elections for 25 Victorian local councils held in November
2004.
Victoria’s caretaker arrangements require councils to observe ‘special
arrangements’ during the period leading up to a general council election. The
intent of these arrangements is to avoid the use of public resources in a way that
may unduly affect the election result and minimise councils making certain types
of decisions that may limit the decision-making ability of the incoming council.
Caretaker arrangements for Victorian local governments apply during the ‘election
period’ only, which is defined in the Local Government Act 1989 (Vic) as ‘the
period from entitlement day, when the voters’ rolls close, until the election day
… [t]his is a 57 day period in Victorian local government elections’. Section
76(C)3 of the Act requires councils to develop and approve a Code of Conduct
for the council, including a statement about caretaker procedures, while Section
76(C)4 outlines specific requirements for such procedures, with reference to
Sections 93(A) and 55(D) of the Act.
The Queensland Government has recently followed Victoria’s lead in establishing
caretaker arrangements for local councils as part of a suite of reforms aimed at
ensuring (inter alia) ‘accountable and transparent local government elections’
(QDLGPSR 2005). These reforms were precipitated by a CMC investigation into
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the conduct of the Gold Coast City Council election in March 2004, and alleged
improprieties on the part of several councillors (CMC 2006).4  Previously, neither
the Local Government Act 1993 (Qld) nor the City of Brisbane Act 1924 (Qld)
placed limits on the conduct of councillors during election periods.
During its inquiry, the CMC issued a discussion paper on the local government
electoral process, questioning whether existing Queensland legislation was
sufficient to maintain the integrity of the local government electoral process
(CMC 2005). This followed the release by the Department of Local Government,
Planning, Sport and Recreation (QDLGPSR) of its own discussion paper,
Queensland Council Elections, in December 2005. The Local Government and Other
Legislation Amendment Act 2007 was passed by the Queensland Parliament in
April 2007. The new caretaker provisions will be applied for the first time during
Queensland local council elections, due in March 2008.
Significantly, caretaker arrangements for local government are legislated in
Queensland and Victoria—they have become matters of law, adjudicated by the
ministers for local government, rather than matters purely of judgement, as
characterises the situation in other levels of Australian government and
internationally. The implications of these developments are yet to be tested, and
may indeed not yet be fully appreciated, but they represent a significant
departure from practice in other Westminster-style political systems.
New Zealand
The development of New Zealand’s caretaker conventions has followed a similar
trajectory to that of Australia. It is broadly agreed that its arrangements have
been shaped by three important experiences:
• the 1984 constitutional crisis;
• the ‘hung parliament’ following the 1993 general election; and
• the adoption in 1996 of the mixed member proportional (MMP) electoral
system.
The 1984 constitutional crisis
The July 1984 general election delivered a landslide victory to Labour, but it
was expected to be around 10 days before the return of the writs. Controversy
arose, however, when outgoing National Party Prime Minister, Sir Robert
Muldoon, refused to act on advice from the New Zealand Reserve Bank that the
dollar should be devalued because of a run on the nation’s foreign currency
reserves.5 The situation was exacerbated by the market’s expectation that Labour
would devalue the currency by between 15 and 20 per cent. After the election,
as a currency crisis loomed, the defeated Muldoon refused to meet with officials
over the weekend despite their concerns that opening of the foreign exchange
markets would trigger a financial crisis. The incoming Prime Minister, David
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Lange, supported devaluation and suggested that ‘Muldoon should either
implement the incoming Government’s instructions or resign and let another
member of the National Cabinet take over as caretaker Prime Minister for a week
until Labour took office’ (Gustafson 2000, p. 392). After much wrangling,
Muldoon relented under pressure from his Cabinet colleagues,6  but the situation
raised questions about the authority and responsibilities of a defeated government
during the period leading up to its formal replacement by an incoming
administration.
The experience was a catalyst for more explicit guidance about the actions of
outgoing governments during the caretaker period. Recommendations of a 1986
Officials Committee on Constitutional Reform were accepted by both parties.
Boston et al. (1998, p. 636) note that ‘the wording adopted by the Officials
Committee corresponded closely to that employed at the time of the 1984 crisis
by the outgoing Attorney-General, Jim McLay, in a press statement’. Although
formalised by its subsequent incorporation into the Cabinet Office Manual, the
convention had been operative in that it was accepted by both the Labour and
National parties from the time of McLay’s statement.
The initially hung parliament that followed the 1993 general
election
In contrast to the situation in 1984, the outcome of the 1993 election was initially
unclear. To address uncertainty over the conduct of business in the period until
the new government could be determined, the Cabinet Office issued a circular
outlining criteria for Cabinet and ministerial decision-making. It suggested that
caretaker governments should refrain from significant decisions and outlined
interim procedures to be followed in the event that urgent decisions were
required—specifically, that these should be taken only after consultation with
Opposition party leaders. As matters transpired, within a fortnight the National
Party had achieved a clear (if slim) majority, leaving the proposed arrangements
untested, notwithstanding their having bipartisan support. The criteria were
subsequently incorporated into the Cabinet Office Manual in 1996 (Boston et al.
1998, p. 637).
The adoption of a mixed member proportional (MMP) electoral
system from 1996
The adoption of a mixed member proportional (MMP) electoral system has had
a profound impact on New Zealand’s caretaker arrangements. Boston et al. (1998,
p. 637) note this development ‘supplied the necessary political incentive for a
more careful formulation of the conventions governing caretaker administrations’.
The period between 1993 and 1996 was a time of transition during which the
constitutional implications of greater political uncertainty and longer caretaker
periods were widely canvassed. The 1996 election, the first held under the new
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system, produced no clear result. The government remained in caretaker mode
throughout the nine weeks it took to broker a coalition. Boston et al. (1998, pp.
68-73) describe the challenges created for the ongoing business of government
in New Zealand by the unexpectedly lengthy caretaker period.
As a consequence of these experiences, the New Zealand guidance, detailed in
the Cabinet Office Manual, identifies two additional sets of circumstances (aside
from election campaigns) in which governments are bound by caretaker
conventions:
• after a general election: the convention applies until a new administration
is sworn in or it becomes clear that the incumbent government continues to
have the support of the House necessary to govern; and
• if the Government has clearly lost the confidence of the House: the
convention guides the government’s actions until either it is confirmed in
office or a new administration takes its place.
The guidance explains that there are ‘two arms’ of the convention, each of which
has its own constitutional principles. These are, first, when it is clear who will
form government, but they have not yet taken office and, second, where it is
not clear who will form the next government.
The complexities and uncertainties of New Zealand’s electoral processes have
necessitated development of highly prescribed caretaker arrangements and
practices. The Cabinet Office Manual has been periodically updated to incorporate
the new understandings that have evolved through practice. Constitutional
expert Elizabeth McLeay (1999, p. 12) notes:
The treatment of caretaker government in successive editions nicely
demonstrates how conventions evolve: through practical experience
(good and bad); from observation of practices elsewhere; and through
constitutional advice from the Crown Law Office, constitutional
commentators, Prime Ministers and, of course, the Cabinet Office itself.
Thus, many factors have influenced, and are continuing to influence,
the formulation of rules on how caretaker governments should behave.
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ENDNOTES
1 This is usually a matter of a few days in two-party majoritarian systems like Australia, but can take
weeks or months if no party enjoys a clear majority. In New Zealand under MMP the process of forming
minority governments can take longer than the election period.
2  It should be noted that the obligation on public servants to observe and demonstrate impartiality is
not specific to the caretaker period and is relevant at any time. However, in the caretaker period when
political sensitivities are heightened, the risk of perceived partiality may be greater. Public servants
might reasonably be expected to promote government policy in normal times. In a caretaker period,
however, this might be seen as promoting the Government rather than the policy.
3 This process was not uncontroversial with debate about the necessity, membership, authority and
the impact on the nature of conventions on the ‘recognise and declare’ model. See Sampford (1987) for
a detailed examination of this process of codification.
4 The allegations of misconduct by a councillor are detailed in the CMC report: Independence, Influence
and Integrity in Local Government: A CMC Inquiry into the 2004 Gold Coast Election (CMC 2006).
5  In his biography of Muldoon, Barry Gustafson (2000, pp. 384-396) explains Muldoon’s rationale for
rejecting this advice. He had been in dispute with the Secretary to the Treasury and the Reserve Bank
Governor over the matter for several months. Muldoon suspected they were using the opportunity
provided by the pre-election run on the NZ currency to re-prosecute advice he had previously rejected.
6 Who were prepared to advise the Governor-General that Muldoon no longer enjoyed their confidence
and should hand over to his Deputy.
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Chapter 4. When do the conventions
apply?
The caretaker period begins at the time the lower house (House of Representatives
or Legislative Assembly) is dissolved and continues until the election result is
clear or, if there is a change of government, until the new government takes
office. For the Commonwealth, Queensland, South Australian, Western Australian
and Northern Territory governments the caretaker period commences with the
issuing of the writs for a general election. This may be some days after a political
leader indicates that an election will be called on a given date. The Queensland
guidance notes that care should be exercised during the period between the
announcement of the election and the dissolution of the Legislative Assembly,
this being a particularly sensitive time requiring judgement and common sense.
The New South Wales guidance—mindful of the fixed parliamentary terms in
that State—specifies that caretaker conventions commence when the term of
the Legislative Assembly expires. In Victoria and Tasmania, the period
commences at the time the Legislative Assembly expires or is dissolved. In the
ACT—also with fixed four year terms—the conventions apply from the beginning
of the election period, which is 37 days before the polling day (ACT 2004, pp.
3-4).
Commencement of the conventions: Australian
Commonwealth
Under the Australian Constitution, the House of Representatives continues for
three years from the first meeting of the House and no longer, but may be
dissolved earlier by the Governor-General (s. 28). The term of the current
Parliament ends when the three-year term of the House of Representatives expires
or is dissolved by the Governor-General on the advice of the Government. There
are two constitutional mechanisms by which this can occur:
• the dissolution of the House of Representatives (s. 5); or
• the simultaneous dissolution of both Houses – a double dissolution (s. 57);
A general election follows either the dissolution of the House or the expiration
of its three year term. The ‘Governor-General in Council’ (that is, acting on the
advice of the Federal Executive Council) then issues a writ directing the Electoral
Commissioner to conduct an election in accordance with prescribed procedures.
The writ specifies the date on which the election will be held and the date for
the return of the writ. It is deemed to have been issued at 6 pm on the date of
issue.
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Exhibit 1 – Key dates in commencement of caretaker conventions: Australian
Commonwealth1
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Importantly, ministers sitting in the Senate, as members of the Government, are
bound by caretaker conventions for the period of the election until the outcome
is known. This applies whether or not any Senate elections (periodical, general
or territorial) are being held simultaneously with a general election for the House
of Representatives.
The process that follows is outlined in Exhibit 1.
Until 1925, the Australian Parliament was prorogued before the dissolution of
the House of Representatives; this practice was discontinued between 1928 and
1993, but later reinstated on advice from legal experts (Odgers' Australian Senate
Practice 2004, Ch. 19). Accordingly, in 1993 and 1996, Governors-General first
prorogued Parliament by proclamation, issuing another proclamation the same
day to dissolve the Parliament. Since 1998, prorogation and dissolution have
been combined in one proclamation.
An Executive Council meeting is usually held between the calling of the election
and the issuing of the writs. This is a ‘tidy-up’ meeting that deals with last
minute issues—such as the making of regulations under recently enacted
legislation. This is seen as a legitimate house-keeping activity, but can be used
cynically by governments—for example, as an opportunity to make last-minute
appointments. Until 1996, the Executive Council meeting was preceded by a
Cabinet meeting, but to date, the Howard government has avoided this practice.
As noted, the timetable between the announcement of an election and the issuing
of writs (i.e. the period when caretaker conventions formally commence) can
vary. Since 1940, the average gap has been 19 days (Hughes and Costar 2006,
p. 47). It has been argued this reflected a ‘convention’ that some time should
elapse between the announcement of the election and the issuing of the writs
since the latter coincides with closure of the electoral rolls (Sawer 2006). Malcolm
Fraser controversially altered this practice in 1983, when the writs were issued
and the electoral rolls closed at 6 pm the same day (4 February) as his surprise
announcement of a double dissolution election for 5 March. Fraser was accused
of excluding many thousands of citizens from exercising their right to vote and
an action was mounted in the High Court, albeit unsuccessfully. The Joint Select
Committee on Electoral Reform (JSCER), established by the Hawke Labor
Government in 1983, considered the issue as part of a wide-ranging review of
Australia’s electoral system. It recommended a proclamation by the
Governor-General to announce the election date a minimum of seven days before
writs are issued. Subsequent amendments to the Commonwealth Electoral Act
1918 in 1983 inserted a stipulation that writs must be issued within 10 days of
the dissolution (s.151(2)). The JSCER recommendation was incorporated as a
separate provision (s.155). This provision remained unchanged until passage of
the Electoral and Referendum Amendment (Electoral Integrity and Other Measures)
Act (Cwlth) in 2006.2  Section 151(2) was unchanged by recent amendments.
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Since the late 1980s, the time that has elapsed between announcement of an
election and issue of the writs has declined markedly. For elections held between
1990 and 2004, the average time elapsed was around three days. However, the
perception that a ‘gap’ exists between calling of the election and commencement
of caretaker conventions remains strong.3 The bitterly fought 2001 election,
held in the wake of the September 11 terrorist attacks, may have done much to
fuel concerns about government actions in this period (see, for example, Marr
and Wilkinson 2003).
Prime Minister John Howard visited the Governor-General on Friday 5 October
2001 asking him to dissolve the House of Representatives for the November 10
election, but writs were not issued until midday on Monday 8 October. During
this intervening period, the United States launched air-strikes on Afghanistan
in retaliation for the terrorist attacks on New York and Washington.4
At issue was whether the Prime Minister was obliged to consult then Leader of
the Opposition, Kim Beazley, about a decision to commit 1,000 Australian troops
to the so-called ‘War on Terror’. John Howard argued that he would ‘observe
the conventions’, but that while he would inform Mr Beazley about
developments, he would not make joint decisions. The Prime Minister noted:
I’m quite ready to talk to Mr Beazley … but of course the decision-making
still rests with me because I am still Prime Minister. You continue, of
course, to govern and you certainly continue to take decisions within
any existing established policy (quoted in Gosch 2001).
The Government was also criticised for entering into an arrangement to process
asylum-seekers offshore in Papua New Guinea and Nauru (a policy that became
known as the ‘Pacific Solution’), just half an hour before caretaker conventions
were due to commence at midday (Marr and Wilkinson 2003, pp. 178-79). This
became the subject of contention during subsequent Senate estimates hearings,
with government officials maintaining caretaker conventions had not been
breached as (they argued) the agreements reached related to existing aid policy,
and in any event were concluded before the conventions formally commenced
(F&PA Committee Hansard, 28 May 2002, pp. 192-197). Asked her advice on
this matter, the senior DPM&C expert on caretaker conventions noted that the
situation was urgent (the fate of the asylum seekers could not await the election
outcome), but that in the circumstances the Opposition should be advised of the
decision and of the fact that any such decisions would bind any incoming
government.
In 2004, controversy arose when a Senate Select Committee conducted a one-day
hearing during the caretaker period. The Committee had been established on 30
August 2004 to examine matters arising from public statements by a former
ministerial staffer, Mike Scrafton, about conversations with the Prime Minister
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during the so-called ‘Children Overboard’ affair (which, perhaps ironically, had
occurred during the 2001 election campaign). The Prime Minister had announced
the election date on Sunday 29 August, but the House was not dissolved, nor
the writs issued, until Tuesday 31 August. The Committee held a public hearing
one day later, on 1 September. Questions were raised about the appropriateness
of this action given the politically contentious nature of the issues under
consideration, and whether the prorogation of the Parliament meant the Senate
should not be meeting. The issue of whether the Senate has a right to meet or
exercise its powers after a dissolution is highly contested, but practice has been
that the Senate has not met between prorogation and before opening of the new
Parliament, but it has frequently authorised its committees to continue to do
so.5
New Zealand
In New Zealand, with its unicameral parliament, the conventions apply from
the dissolution of the House of Representatives. In the period immediately before
a general election, although not bound by caretaker conventions, successive
governments have chosen to restrict their actions to some extent at this time in
recognition of the fact that an election and, therefore, a potential change of
government, is imminent. In practice, restraints have tended to be applied from
approximately three months before the general election is due or (if the period
between the announcement of the election and polling day is less than three
months) from the announcement of the election (NZDPM&C 2001, p. 53). The
conclusion of the caretaker period can be difficult to predict in New Zealand.
The MMP voting system means that there is a possibility of a lengthy period
before the formation of a new government—as happened in 1996, for example,
when the caretaker period lasted for nine weeks. The New Zealand caretaker
conventions have a lengthy section on guidance for when it is not clear who
will form the next government to assist with decision-making during that
interregnum.
Local government
Local government caretaker periods are specified in legislation. In each State
this period varies according to the State legislation. For instance, in Victoria,
the period is 57 days — ‘the period from entitlement day, when voters’ rolls
close until the election day’.
In Queensland the election period is defined in the Local Government Act 1993
(Qld) (s. 301(1) as ‘the period starting on the day when public notice of the
holding of the election is given and ending on the close of the poll in the election’.
For the Brisbane City Council this period is as defined in s. 3 of the Electoral Act
1992 (Qld) as the period beginning on the day after an election writ is issued
and ending at 6 pm on the polling day for the election.
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Caretaker conventions after an election
The caretaker period concludes when the election result is known with either
the confirmation of the continuation of the incumbent government or the
commissioning of a new government. Although this has mostly proved
straightforward enough, the operation of caretaker conventions in the period
after elections emerged as an issue in the late 1990s following close-run election
results in NSW, Queensland and Victoria.
The 1995 election in Queensland brought an unexpectedly close result. The
Labor Government under Wayne Goss was eventually returned with a one-seat
majority in the Legislative Assembly about 17 days after polling day. The
Opposition then challenged the result in one seat, Mundingburra, in the Court
of Disputed Returns. The judge ordered that a by-election be held in the seat
on 3 February 1996. The by-election was won by the Liberal Party candidate
and with the support of independent Liz Cunningham, the Coalition under Rob
Borbidge secured the confidence of the Legislative Assembly and, hence, the
ability to form government. Although the Government had not been in caretaker
mode because the House was not dissolved for a by-election, once the result was
clear, and Cunningham had indicated her intention to support the Coalition,
Opposition Leader, Rob Borbidge, called on Premier Goss to ‘observe the
appropriate convention’, and noted ‘the Goss Government should consider itself
in a caretaker role only’ (Reuters 1996).
In Victoria in 1999, the election result was unclear for almost a month after the
polls closed. It took several weeks and a by-election following the death of a
candidate on polling day for a minority government to be formed. The ALP
under Steve Bracks secured the support of three independents to oust incumbent
premier, Jeff Kennett.
The situation posed a challenge for the Victorian Public Service, requiring it to
understand and administer post-election caretaker arrangements until the new
government could be sworn in (Davis et al. 2001, p. 18). As both parties courted
the independents, political manoeuvring complicated the task, prompting the
Department of the Premier and Cabinet to establish a reference group, supported
by a secretariat, to support decision-making essential to keep the business of
government running. Particularly problematic was the role of political
advisers—both of incumbent and shadow ministers—who sought to act on
behalf of their principals, creating difficulties for public service impartiality and
neutrality. Several controversies arose during the extended caretaker period,
including over the appointment of a new Auditor-General, and whether it was
appropriate for a minister to sign a contract for health services that was in the
final stages of negotiation, and would incur financial penalties if not resolved.
The Victorian experience suggested a need for clear guidance on caretaker
arrangements in the post-election period. Davis et al. (2001, pp. 25-26) propose
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some principles for the conduct of public administration in such circumstances,
but these have gone largely untested. Since the ambiguous results of the late
1990s, State and Federal elections have tended to deliver clear parliamentary
majorities, mostly favouring incumbents. Former Secretary of the Department
of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, Michael Keating (2002, p. 20), urges public
servants to avoid such situations, since unlike ministers and shadow ministers,
political staff operate outside authority and accountability structures.
Four year fixed terms
In Australia, introduction of fixed four year terms for most States, Territories
and local councils has resulted in an orderly approach to the organisation of
government business in the run-up to an election. For example, major contracts
can be finalised and key appointments made without danger of falling through
because of the unexpected calling of an election. Parliamentary business can be
completed and legislation presented for assent without the threat of bills lapsing
as the Parliament is dissolved. At present, only the Queensland and
Commonwealth parliaments still adhere to three year non-fixed terms. It can be
said that both jurisdictions suffer from the heightened uncertainty that this
brings and both have experienced controversies about the application of the
caretaker conventions in recent years.
Introduction of four year fixed terms in most jurisdictions in Australia and New
Zealand has taken the heat out many of the controversies which had attended
their sudden application as an election was called. Bureaucracies are better
prepared to enter the uncertainty of an election period and can be confident the
mechanisms are in place to carry them through to the establishment of the next
government. This development has led to a more mature approach to managing
the continuity of government business during an election period.
Conclusion
The issue of when caretaker conventions apply has been something of a concern
in recent Commonwealth elections. Closer examination of arrangements governing
commencement of the conventions suggests that the time period elapsed between
the announcement of the election and the issuing of the writs to dissolve the
House of Representatives has actually decreased in recent years. Our more
adversarial politics and the emergence of the ‘permanent campaign’ mode of
contemporary politics may account for persistent uncertainty over what
governments might do and when. Four year fixed terms have addressed some
of the ‘gamesmanship’ in which governments might engage immediately prior
to the calling of an election. For jurisdictions like New Zealand, where election
results can take some time to resolve, the issue of caretaker conventions in the
post-election period has been more of an issue. Guidance documents have evolved
to address the specific concerns of individual jurisdictions.
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ENDNOTES
1  Adapted from House of Representatives Practice, Chapter 3.
2  Among other things, the Act amended s 155, reducing the seven day period for closure of the electoral
rolls to a period of three working days. For people who have not voted before, electoral rolls will close
at 8 pm the day the writs are issued. This has been a controversial change, aimed ostensibly at limiting
the potential for fraudulent enrolments, but which may have the practical effect of excluding many
young, first-time voters. For detailed analysis see Hughes and Costar (2006).
3  See, for example, Peter Charlton 2001,‘Caretaker’s Conundrum’ The Courier Mail, 9 October, 2001.
4  Prime Minister Howard was advised of the US air-strikes in a telephone call from Vice-President,
Dick Cheney, early in the morning of 8 October, 2001.
5  Extensive discussion of this issue and references to expert opinions can be found in Odgers' Australian
Senate Practice (2004, Chapter 7).
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Chapter 5. Caretaker conventions: an
overview of Australian jurisdictions
Each Australian jurisdiction has developed its own guidance to support
ministerial and departmental decision-making during the caretaker period.
Guidance on the observance of caretaker conventions tends to be couched as
general principles rather than strict, highly specific rules (Boston et al. 1998 p.
646), although, when a well publicised breach has occurred, the tendency has
been to increase the detail in prescribing behaviour. Malone (2007, p. 5) notes
‘the proper operation [of caretaker conventions] is dependent on the public
servants who will make judgements on precisely what they mean and how they
apply’. That is true, but they also depend to a significant extent on the attitude
of the first minister and their receptiveness to advice.
In broad terms, caretaker conventions aim to ensure incoming governments are
not bound by last minute decisions or actions of their predecessors, that the
neutrality of the public service is preserved, and that the substantial—and
arguably increasing—advantages of incumbency are moderated. However, the
Government remains the government and the ordinary business of public
administration continues.
Within this accepted set of principles, each Australian jurisdiction has developed
guidance on the practice of the conventions locally. These guidance documents
all acknowledge the overarching principles and contain details about local
application.
In this chapter we draw on these guidance documents to present a detailed
overview of caretaker arrangements. We look at the practices that have developed
around specific issues and government activities. We use cases and examples to
illustrate the complex and contested nature of caretaker conventions and
highlight areas of similarity and difference of practice.
Avoiding major policy decisions
All jurisdictions cite the taking of major policy decisions as a key area which
falls under caretaker conventions. The adherence to three caretaker principles
is involved in any decision concerning a major policy matter. They are: (1) not
taking a decision for which the Government (or minister) cannot formally be
called to account in Parliament; (2) not binding an incoming government to a
course of action; and (3) avoiding a decision which is a matter of contention
between the Government and the Opposition.
Nevertheless, the emphasis on what constitutes a policy decision is not consistent
across all jurisdictions. A number of jurisdictions focus on the taking of a policy
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decision and others focus on the implementation of a new policy. For example, the
Commonwealth, Tasmanian, Western Australian, ACT and Northern Territory
governments are concerned to ensure that major or significant policy decisions
are not made during the caretaker period. ‘Major or significant’ is not specifically
defined, but a decision must be assessed for its policy and financial significance
and the likelihood that it would be politically contentious.
The Queensland, Victorian and South Australian governments’ guidance
documents state that the bureaucracy should avoid implementing major policy
decisions during the caretaker period. It is a fine distinction that has important
implications. The jurisdictions that are concerned about implementation of major
policy decisions distinguish between prior and future policy intent. The
implementation of major policy decisions does not infringe the conventions
where decisions are ‘made or implemented before the expiry of dissolution of
the Assembly’ and are announced during the caretaker period (Vic DPC 2006:
2). Future policies are also exempt with the majority of jurisdictions
acknowledging that the ‘conventions do not apply to promises on future policies
that the party in government announces as part of its election campaign’ (DPMC
2004, p. 3).
The sections of the guidance documents on the taking or implementing of major
policy decisions acknowledge the reality of political incumbency in that the
Government will be maximising its term in office by making decisions right up
to issuing of the writs for the election. Both sides will be making major policy
commitments throughout the campaign and these commitments will be the centre
of extensive media analysis and debate. The claim that a decision was taken
prior to the election is hard for an Opposition to challenge because of the
confidentiality of Cabinet decisions. But this has not deterred Oppositions from
making such claims in the heat of an election campaign.
Two examples illustrate this difficulty:
Signing Medicare funding agreements 1993
In 1993, the Keating Labor Government announced that it had signed a five-year
Medicare hospitals funding agreement with the Victorian and New South Wales
governments just minutes before the Official Secretary read the proclamation to
dissolve the House of Representatives for the general election. Its actions in
doing so were criticised by the Opposition and media because it would bind an
incoming government to provide additional funding for those jurisdictions for
a period of five years. The then Prime Minister was unrepentant in his defence
of the decisions, arguing that the States’ decisions to sign the agreement ‘at one
minute to midnight’ showed they wanted the protection of Labor’s health policy
even if Dr Hewson were elected (quoted in Kitney and Maley 1993). State
ministers explained the decision in terms of their need for funding certainty,
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since the Medicare agreement had been due to expire at the end of June 1993.
In the event, the Coalition lost the election, and the Keating Labor Government
provided $300 million in additional funding for public hospitals over the life of
the agreement.
Deploying Defence personnel to Iraq in 2004
In September 2004, more than two weeks into the caretaker period, the Howard
Government announced that it had dispatched officers of the Special Air Service
(SAS) to rescue two Australians feared kidnapped by insurgents in Iraq. The
Opposition Labor Party claimed the Government had breached the caretaker
conventions by not consulting then Leader, Mark Latham, about the deployment.
Then Defence Minister, Robert Hill, argued the decision was not binding on a
future government and, moreover, that it had been ‘taken in accordance with
the contingency plan that had earlier been agreed by Cabinet’ (AAP 2004). The
Prime Minister, John Howard, told reporters the decision to establish a hostage
crisis team was taken by the National Security Committee of Cabinet before the
election campaign. He said: ‘the caretaker doctrine does not require a government
to consult the Opposition in relation to the implementation of a decision taken
before the caretaker mode commenced’ (quoted in Seccombe and Allard 2004).
As these examples suggest, the environment for making judgements about the
taking and implementation of policy decisions during the caretaker period is
highly political and subject to intense public scrutiny through the news media.
This has obvious implications for public sector officials and how they should
act and manage the complexities which ensue. Managing the interpretation of
what constitutes a major policy announcement is a matter for judgement. Such
judgements are not required in most matters of ongoing administration, which
does and should continue during the caretaker period. The need for judgement
arises when issues are contested between the opposing political parties and the
matter is controversial. Public sector officials need to be aware of the requirement
to act cautiously when there is no possibility of parliamentary oversight of
executive decision-making (Wilson 1995). Judgement cannot be acquired at the
calling of an election but is built over time and through experience. This is why
only the most senior officials should be responsible for caretaker conventions,
and why they often consult central agency experts when weighing their
decisions.
As an election approaches, senior departmental officers often take stock of factors
relevant to the programs and decisions that they have been dealing with. They
should be familiar with, for example, the level of bipartisan support for particular
policies, whether there is significant community or stakeholder opposition and
the potential for significant media attention. The closer the election, the more
pressure there is for public sector officials to get things right, particularly if, for
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example, a recently announced Government policy is unpopular with the
Opposition. In all cases it is imperative the bureaucracy behaves responsibly
and dependably – rather than trying to second-guess who will win the election.
Moratorium on significant appointments
All jurisdictional guidance documents contain a section on avoiding significant
appointments during the caretaker period and there is a degree of unanimity on
handling the issue between the different jurisdictions. The majority of
jurisdictions state that the ‘significance’ of an appointment can be assessed
through two considerations – the importance of the position and the likelihood
that the appointment would be controversial. Many have codified the level of
appointment with precision.
Tasmania, Western Australia and Queensland all offer a classification of what
constitutes a ‘significant appointment’. For Tasmania, it is the ‘head or deputy
head of an agency, head of a division or branch whose activities are deemed
sensitive, members of statutory bodies and statutory office holders’ (Tas DPC
2006, p. 4). Queensland defines appointments to Senior Executive Service and
Senior Officer positions as ‘significant’ and prescribes that these should not be
processed. Queensland guidances also advise that care should be taken in
appointment to AO8 and AO7 levels (Beattie 2006). Western Australia
recommends no action be undertaken on senior officer positions classified PSA
Level 8 and above (WADPC 2005, p. 2).
Significant appointments should not be controversial because of the range of
options available to manage the situation. The options are:
• appoint on a short term or acting basis (to be confirmed at a later date);
• defer appointment until after the election; and
• consult the Opposition (although the Opposition may not accede).
Both Western Australia and Queensland also advise that if a contract is due to
expire during the caretaker period it is acceptable to issue a short term contract
for up to three months.
Jurisdictions have accepted that they should exercise constraint in making senior
appointments during the caretaker period but, technically, caretaker conventions
were developed to guide ministerial behaviour, not the behaviour of public
servants. The limitation on appointments has evolved as a self-imposed constraint.
The New South Wales and Commonwealth guidances mention only that ministers
should avoid making significant appointments. They are silent on senior
appointments within the public service.1 Their concern is restricted to
appointments of members to statutory bodies and statutory office-holders. Other
jurisdictions have expanded what would initially have been a concern about
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stacking boards in the dying days of a government to encompass all senior
government appointments.
A level of prescription contained in a guidance document is usually an indication
that it has been an area of controversy in the past. In Victoria in 1999 an
appointment became an issue because, as noted in Chapter 3, the results of the
election were not clear for nearly a month after polling day. The appointment
of a new Auditor-General had been approved and announced before the election.
Because the appointee was relocating from New Zealand, the formality of approval
by the Governor-in-Council did not happen until he had taken up his position.
The appointee had already signed a legally binding contract for the position.
The Labor Opposition indicated that if it were to form government it would
support the appointment, but the Opposition did not support the signing of the
instrument during the caretaker period (Davis et al. 2001, p. 18).
The prescriptive detail included in the Queensland guidance was driven by
controversy about the signing of employment contracts with department heads
in the lead-up to an election. In 1989 incoming Premier, Wayne Goss, announced
that his Labor Government would take a ‘close look’ at decisions, appointments
or contracts entered into by the outgoing National Party Government during
the caretaker period. Of particular concern to the incoming Government was
the outgoing Premier Russell Cooper’s decision to renew the contract of a senior
Treasury official the day before the election was held (Roberts 1989). In 1996
the minority government of Wayne Goss was criticised for signing a five-year
contract with an agency head one day before the Mundingburra by-election,
which Labor lost. Unable to secure the support of independents, Goss was forced
to resign his commission as Premier. The incoming Coalition Government sacked
the CEO, and was forced to pay out the balance of his contract.
Avoiding signing major contracts, undertakings and
agreements
All guidance documents contain a section addressing the need for governments
to avoid entering into major contracts or undertakings. The guidances reflect
commercial realities by recognising the need for much of the work of government
to continue during the caretaker period. As such, consideration is given to the
definition of the word ‘major’ with the most common definitions revolving
around the monetary value of the contract and whether proceeding with it would
entrench a ‘policy, program or administrative structure’ (Commonwealth, Tas,
Vic, NT). The Victorian guidance contains some additional material about
allowing the entering into of contracts which are subsidiary to an existing ‘head
contract’ during the caretaker period.
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Most guidance documents acknowledge the difficulty of deferring contractual
commitments for legal or commercial reasons and suggest options if this is the
case. These include:
• consultation with the Opposition;
• consultation with the contractor to see if the contract could be renegotiated;
and
• the development of contracts which include a clause providing for
termination in case an incoming government did not wish to proceed.
Jurisdictions with fixed parliamentary terms may find managing contractual
arrangements less complex, since the regular election date is known in advance.
The management of contracts is routine administration for many departments,
and often involves long lead-times. The guidance documents suggest that caution
should be exercised in cases which fall under the definition of ‘major’, or that
require ministerial approval.
Controversy arises when contracts are seen to breach caretaker conventions by
giving electoral advantage to the incumbent government, or when they are
interpreted as seeking to entrench a controversial policy. Such contention was
avoided in Victoria in 1999, when the Minister for Health—who had been
defeated at the election but who remained minister pending the swearing in of
the new government—delegated to the Secretary of his Department responsibility
for finalising a contract that, if not executed within a specified time-frame, would
attract significant penalties. This action was taken on the grounds that the
Minister believed it was inappropriate to deal with it himself. The matter was
resolved by officials in consultation with the Premier, the Leader of the
Opposition, the Shadow Health Minister, political advisers and bureaucrats
(Davis et al. 2001, pp. 18-19). The long delay in forming a new government in
Victoria after the 1999 election was problematic for other types of contracts.
Davis et al. (2001, p. 19) report that new procedures were required to allow
urgent contracts to be finalised in the post-election caretaker period.
Negotiations with other governments and official visits
Official visits of dignitaries are not covered by guidance documents in all
jurisdictions. New South Wales, Western Australia and the Australian Capital
Territory are silent on this issue. The other jurisdictions have a high level of
unanimity in how visits from dignitaries should be handled. The common advice
is to defer the visit if possible, with either the Prime Minister or relevant premier
taking the decision. Dignitaries who have scheduled a visit should be advised
of the calling of the election and the reduced availability of ministers to meet
them. The Victorian guidance points out that fixed four year terms should allow
agencies planning visits to avoid the period in and around the caretaker period
(VDPC 2006, p. 4).
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The focus of jurisdictional advice on negotiations centres on attendance at
ministerial councils and forums, where it could be expected (by other
governments) that someone from the relevant jurisdiction would be involved.
Tasmania is the one jurisdiction silent on such negotiations but other jurisdictions
are in close agreement that, if possible, the government should seek to defer
negotiations. If the interests of the State need to be represented at a ministerial
council, it is accepted practice for a senior official to attend with observer status
and with a limited role of supplying factual information on past positions. It is
quite clear that no commitment or agreement should be entered into that would
commit an incoming government.
The option of seeking Opposition agreement to a negotiating position is also
canvassed by both the Commonwealth and Victorian guidance documents. The
lead time for major Commonwealth–State negotiations is quite considerable and
with the majority of jurisdictions on fixed terms, this is an area which has not
been open to major breaches. In March 2007, the Commonwealth Government
ceased negotiations of the new five year Medicare Agreements with the States
until after the Federal election due in late 2007. The long lead times around
negotiated agreements and the annual nature of most ministerial council meetings
has left this area relatively free of controversy.
Dealing with requests from ministerial offices
Requests from ministerial offices during an election campaign can be a source
of conflict and uncertainty between the government and the bureaucracy. It is
often an area where the government tries to push the advantages of incumbency
and exert pressure on what had been a responsive bureaucracy. The elements
of advice from the guidance documents are consistent in how to deal with
requests from ministerial offices. During the caretaker period, departments are
restricted to giving factual advice—not policy advice—to ministerial offices. It
is acknowledged that ministers can determine the use to which the material can
be put, with both Tasmania and the ACT stating that factual material can be
incorporated into speeches or political publications. The majority of jurisdictions
have a caveat on the supply of information based on the Commonwealth guidance
which suggests it is appropriate to decline a request if it requires ‘the use of
significant resources and was clearly for use in an election campaign’ (DPMC
2004, p. 8).
The majority of guidances remind officers to avoid any perception of partisanship
in their dealings with ministerial offices and the sensitivity of this interaction
is acknowledged by advising that any concerns should be referred to the
department’s CEO or to the CEO of the central agency. It is accepted that the
level of judgement required with regard to some requests should not be the
responsibility of a junior officer. The South Australian Government, for example,
recommends establishing special arrangements for communication with the
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ministerial office to be put in place through the office of the CEO (SA Cabinet
Office 2005, p. 6). This would enable agencies to operate at arm’s-length from
political activity while the ongoing business of government continues. The NSW
memorandum is written to provide guidance for ministers rather than the
bureaucracy and asks ministers to ‘take particular care to ensure that they do
not compromise the neutrality of the public service’ (Premier of NSW 2006).
Once again it is stressed that the day-to-day business of government continues.
The Commonwealth, Victorian and Tasmanian guidances all acknowledge that
given the potential for urgent domestic or international issues to arise, advice
should be provided to protect Australia’s or the State’s interests. This is
particularly relevant in the areas of Federal responsibility for defence and national
security where international crises and circumstances mean Australia could be
in a position of needing to agree on a new policy during a caretaker period.
Restrictions on advertising and information campaigns
The handling of government advertising and information campaigns sees
divergent practice amongst Australian jurisdictions. All agree on the need to be
able to continue to disseminate material in the public interest and to stop
communications that represent a political interest. Campaigns cited as addressing
the public interest include defence recruitment, health promotion, road safety
or material of an operational nature. There is general agreement that material
can be classified as political if it highlights government achievements and policies,
features the minister or is a matter of contention between parties. Decisions on
advertising and information campaigns need urgent attention at the beginning
of an election campaign.
Jurisdictions have developed different mechanisms to handle decision-making
on the continuation of advertising and marketing campaigns. The Commonwealth,
Queensland and Western Australian governments all identify the head of a
communications or purchasing unit as the responsible officer to make the decision
on behalf of the Government on what campaigns should be discontinued. South
Australia and Tasmania leave the decision at the political level with the Premier
deciding on which campaigns to curtail. The ACT has no central mechanism and
leaves it to the discretion of each department. Victoria has a mixed model where
campaigns that promote government policies are sent to ministers for review
but, if an agency has concerns, it is recommended it consult the Strategic
Communications Unit in the Department of the Premier and Cabinet.
This mixture of approaches demonstrates the dual nature of caretaker
conventions. Is it a guide for ministerial behaviour or a guide for departments
to manage within the intense atmosphere of an election campaign? The divide
is explicit in the handling of advertising campaigns where some departments
take back the decision-making as a check on the power of incumbency while
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others leave the management of the decision to the head of the government, the
Premier. The Commonwealth guidance makes explicit that bipartisan agreement
should be sought for campaigns that are to continue.
Government advertising has proved highly contentious in recent years. It has
been described as ‘the single most significant benefit of incumbency’ (Young
2005). In her submission to the Joint Standing Committee on Electoral Matters
inquiry into the conduct of the 2004 election, Melbourne University academic,
Sally Young, identified a number of instances where the government’s use of
advertising might have been questionable. These included what Young (2005,
p. 3) describes as an extensive ‘warm up’ period in the lead-up to the election
campaign, during which there was a very large increase in government spending
on advertising. Although she notes it is not unusual to see ‘spikes’ in government
advertising expenditure immediately prior to an election, ‘what was unusual in
2004 was the extent of pre-election spending and the sheer variety of government
ads that were run. The Federal Government spent somewhere between $32 and
$40 million between May and June alone’.
‘Even more startling’, according to Young (2005, p. 3), ‘was the government’s
reluctance to forgo government advertising even during the election campaign’.
The ‘Help Protect Australia against Terrorism’ campaign ran extensively on TV,
radio and in newspapers during the election period. Under caretaker conventions,
this campaign had to be approved by Labor. Media reports suggest that the
Government ‘had Labor over a barrel’ with the anti-terrorism campaign. If it
refused it could be ‘accused of preventing the community from being warned
about the dangers of terrorism’ (Canberra Times, 24 October 2004). Labor agreed
to the ads continuing on terms negotiated with the Government, including the
stipulation that the ads specify they were authorised by the Australian Federal
Police (AFP).
In supplementary remarks to the Committee’s report, Australian Democrat Senator
Andrew Murray recommended that, given the potential for incumbents to exploit
government advertising for political benefit:
The blackout provisions in the caretaker period for all non-essential
government advertising should be extended to cover the time from the
July 1 date preceding the earliest likely Federal Election date that can
occur for both the House of Representatives, and the half-Senate election
(JSCEM 2005, p. 410).
But it seems the Government is unpersuaded of the need for reform. In its
response to the Committee’s report, the Special Minister of State, Gary Nairn,
stated:
The Government notes the supplementary remarks issued by Senator
Murray which address the issues of political governance, constitutional
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reform, government advertising, funding and disclosure and other
matters. These issues have been raised by Senator Murray on a number
of previous occasions. The Government makes no further comment on
the supplementary remarks (Government response to JSCEM, 30 August
2006, p. 24).
The management of government advertising during an election campaign is
further complicated by being covered by electoral legislation. The basis of the
Commonwealth and State Acts revolves around the need for authorisation of
any material which may affect voting patterns with the concern of attracting a
penalty if the legislation is breached.
There is less concern about managing printed material during a campaign. The
guidelines around printed material generally leave the decision to the discretion
of the department based on the previous criteria—does the material promote
the policies of the Government, contain photos of ministers or focus on
government achievements? The key word in the guidance documents is to avoid
active distribution of material which could be seen to promote party political
content. The passive distribution of material through responding to requests or
making it available in public places is considered acceptable.
Use of internet and electronic communications
Concern about misuse of the internet and electronic communications is a fairly
recent addition to many guidance documents. When it is included, fairly detailed
instructions are given. The Commonwealth, Victorian, Tasmanian, Western
Australian and ACT documents contain similar instructions. The starting point
is that agencies are responsible for ensuring that government resources are not
used to support any political party. For these jurisdictions, agencies play the
role in determining if any material needs to be removed from agency websites
and ministerial websites supported and maintained by that agency. Ministerial
statements that criticise the Opposition are cited as an example of material which
should be removed.
The guidances make a distinction between what can be added to agency websites
and ministerial websites during the campaign. For example, it is generally agreed
that agencies should only add portfolio related announcements, factual material
and material on existing policies and programs. For ministerial websites,
maintained by departments, it is agreed that only purely factual material should
be added and no material about future policies, how-to-vote material, political
speeches and media releases that criticise the Opposition. The wisdom of adding
exit or entry messages, particularly to ministerial websites which link to party
political sites, is canvassed. The use of these messages draws a line between what
is a funded government website and what is a link outside of the government
domain. The Commonwealth’s Guidance on Caretaker Conventions is supplemented
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in this area by the Australian Government Information Management Office
(AGIMO) Guidance on Departmental and Ministerial Websites.
The use of government websites provoked controversy during the 2004 Federal
election campaign. In September 2004, Opposition Finance spokesman, Bob
McMullan, wrote to then Secretary of Defence, Ric Smith, alleging that then
Minister, Robert Hill, had breached the caretaker conventions by posting four
election-related announcements on a website maintained by the Department of
Defence after the campaign had commenced (Kerin 2004). Of particular concern
to Labor was the announcement of a new Defence headquarters at Bungendore,
in the Coalition-held marginal seat of Eden-Monaro. McMullan argued that since
they related to future policies and election commitments, the announcements
should have been posted on the Liberal Party website.
In his letter of response to the shadow minister, the Secretary explained that
Defence had closely followed the guidance document issued by the Department
of the Prime Minister and Cabinet. He noted the website in question was not a
departmental website, but one defined in the conventions as an
agency-maintained ‘ministerial website’. In accordance with the conventions,
Defence put a notice on the website stating that no political or election-related
material would be available on the website. The same notice appeared as a
‘pop-up message’ to advise visitors when they were leaving the website. Smith’s
letter also noted that the conventions are not infringed when decisions taken
prior to the commencement of the caretaker period are announced during an
election campaign. He reiterated his appreciation of the sensitivity of matters
raised by the Opposition, but stated his belief that Defence was and had been
discharging its duties diligently and professionally. However, he advised the
shadow minister that, in order to ‘minimise the risk of controversy’, henceforth
‘all of the media materials generated by our ministers and parliamentary secretary
since 31 August [commencement of the caretaker period], and all future media
materials, will now be posted by ministerial staff to the website of the Liberal
Party of Australia’ (Defence Media Release, 8 September 2004).
This example underscores the sensitivity of issues raised during the caretaker
period, and the need for careful judgement when weighing questions of whether
an incumbent government is advantaged through the support services available
to ministers in the normal course of administration. It also demonstrates the
contested interpretation of the conventions, particularly in areas of new and
emerging practice. Notwithstanding the Secretary’s confidence that Defence had
adhered to the conventions, he initiated a change in the procedure followed—a
concession perhaps, that the principle of avoiding APS involvement in election
activities should be the dominant consideration in this instance. As expected,
more detailed advice on websites and electronic communications is included in
the DPMC caretaker conventions guidance, issued in August 2007. It states that
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‘as a general rule during the caretaker period, ministerial media releases and
alerts should be placed on the website of the relevant political party’ (DPMC
2007, pp. 4-5). New advice about interactive and funded websites (DPMC 2007,
p. 5) illustrates the impact of emerging issues and technologies on the evolution
of caretaker practices.
As well as detailed guidance about the management of agency and ministerial
websites, the majority of jurisdictions caution that departmental email and
bulletin boards should not be used to publish political material.
Both the New South Wales and Queensland guidance documents are silent on
the management of the internet and electronic communications during an election
campaign. However, in Queensland, advice on the management of ministerial
websites is provided in a letter from the Director-General of the Department of
the Premier and Cabinet to each department head when caretaker conventions
commence. It mirrors the advice provided in other jurisdictions. South Australia
puts the obligation on ministers to ensure that political material is not present
on publicly funded websites. Like New South Wales and Queensland, South
Australia acknowledges that agencies should continue to maintain ministerial
websites but should only add material relating to existing policy or that is purely
factual.
The Northern Territory takes a slightly different approach, consistent with the
approach to advertising material. They recommend all agency websites carry
an authorisation identifying the senior officer who is responsible for comment
on the website. They also recommend the use of entry and exit statements so
the user is clear when they are no longer within a government site.
The need for detailed guidance on the use of electronic communications during
an election campaign is a useful illustration of the dynamic nature of caretaker
conventions, and their flexibility in adapting to changing imperatives—in this
case, rapid developments in technology.
Using the public service for policy costings
There is no set approach across jurisdictions to the issue of policy costings. The
majority of Australian jurisdictions—New South Wales, Queensland, South
Australia, Tasmania and the Northern Territory—are silent on the issue. The
Commonwealth has the most detailed guidance on policy costings. The guidance
is given statutory sanction in the Charter of Budget Honesty Act 1998 (Cwlth).
This Act outlines the process for the costing of election commitments by both
the Government and the Opposition. The Act states the Prime Minister may
request the secretaries of the Departments of Treasury and/or Finance to prepare
costings of publicly announced government policies. Requests from the Leader
of the Opposition are given to the Prime Minister who may agree to refer it to
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the responsible secretaries. The onus is then on the responsible secretary to
release the policy costings before the polling day.
Victoria allows the Department of the Treasury and Finance, in conjunction with
the relevant agency, to cost government and non-government policies as long
as the assumptions for the costings are identified and agencies are not required
to undertake extensive policy research. In Western Australia, the Financial
Responsibility Act 2000 (WA) ensures the Treasurer releases a financial projections
statement within 10 days of the dissolution of the Legislative Assembly. The
ACT allows for the factual analysis of Opposition policies, including costings,
but requests should be forwarded to the Chief Executive of the Chief Minister’s
Department.
John Howard proposed a ‘Charter of Budget Honesty’ in his first Headland Speech
in 1995 (Howard 1995). The National Commission of Audit, appointed by the
Coalition shortly after it took office in 1996, canvassed the proposal in greater
detail, and the legislation was finally adopted in 1998.2  Among Commonwealth
bureaucrats, the general view seems to be that a clear prescription of the rules
surrounding budget costings has made life easier for most departments. But the
requirement that election promises and commitments by both Government and
Opposition parties would be costed by officials has proved contentious. There
have been allegations that the process favours the Government, including
complaints from former Labor Shadow Minister for Finance, Bob McMullan
(quoted in Wanna 2006, p. 8), that the charter ‘is deliberately and demonstrably
unfair’. Wanna (2006, p. 12) agrees that the Charter’s main impact has been ‘to
award significant political advantage to the incumbents’. It does not allow
opposition parties to approach the departments of Treasury and Finance and
Administration on a confidential basis in the period prior to the calling of an
election, creating an asymmetrical position in which its policies must be costed
in the last two to three weeks of a campaign, and in a situation where its
credibility is being ‘intensively assessed’. Wanna (2006, p. 12) argues that if
opposition parties ‘were able to benefit from technical advice in advance of the
election period, they would approach the election campaign more on an equal
footing to the Government’.
Use of agency premises
The majority of jurisdictions accept the ‘appropriate’ use of government premises
for media conferences and functions during an election campaign. The formula
for determining ‘appropriateness’ is that if agency resources are involved, it is
appropriate for the Opposition spokesperson, member or candidate also to be
invited. This general approach is used by the Commonwealth, Victorian, South
Australian, and ACT governments. All agree it is not appropriate for public
servants to provide logistical support for political functions.
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This approach is less developed than some other areas of concern within caretaker
conventions. For example, no guidance is given on who is to arbitrate on this
issue: it appears to be left to the discretion of local managers. In Western
Australia, if Members of Parliament or candidates wish to visit a government
facility, the CEO must be notified and they are to be accompanied by a
representative during the visit. This is an issue which can have local application
in a way that many of the other conventions do not, as local officers are required
to take decisions about political figures with whom they have an ongoing
working relationship.
Queensland, New South Wales and the Northern Territory are silent on the issue
within their guidance documents but may, during an election campaign, continue
to use protocols that already exist to manage visits to government facilities.
Pre-election consultation with the Opposition
Most jurisdictions have quite detailed and prescriptive advice on how the public
sector should handle consultations with the Opposition. The focus of the advice
is on the government restraining and limiting the bureaucracy in its dealing
with non-government parties. This differs from the general focus of the guidance
documents which is based on giving the bureaucracy support and advice in
constraining the behaviour of the incumbent party.
A very similar process is outlined in each guidance document, with the exception
of Tasmania which is silent on the issue. The accepted procedure is for the
Opposition spokesperson to make application to the minister, who then forwards
it either to the Prime Minister or Premier for consideration. In the Commonwealth
ministers decide whether to agree or not, and then advise the Prime Minister of
the request and the decision. Guidance documents stress that the approach must
come from the non-government parties, not officials. The scope of the meeting
is limited to machinery of government and technical issues: it is stressed that
officials are not authorised to discuss government policy or give opinions. The
discussions are confidential but ministers are entitled to enquire whether the
meeting kept within the agreed purposes. It is worth noting that the
Commonwealth, Victoria and Queensland governments apply a different
commencement time to the process of consultation with the Opposition than the
application of the more general caretaker conventions. Consultation can
commence in the pre-election period which occurs either three months prior to
the expiry of the House of Representatives (Commonwealth) or the date the
election is announced—whichever date comes first.
There are some differences between jurisdictions. For example, in Queensland
an official from the Department of the Premier and Cabinet sits in on the meeting
with the departmental CEO. Queensland is also quite specific that no special
material should be prepared and that only existing material such as annual
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reports or program statements should be made available. Western Australia has
slightly reversed the process in that the Opposition approaches the minister who
then refers it to the CEO. The CEO is then responsible for advising the minister
when discussions have taken place: the minister then advises the Premier.
The Commonwealth guidance notes that consultation guidelines are different
from caretaker conventions. As noted, the guidelines were first tabled in the
House of Representatives in December 1976. These initial guidelines allowed
direct approaches to departments by Opposition spokespeople. They were
subsequently amended. The new guidelines were presented to the Senate on 5
June 1987. Consultation with the Opposition remains a contentious issue, with
some senior public servants concerned that shadow ministers may see briefings
as opportunities to score points on their opponents through their portfolio
agencies.
Non-finalised legislation
Guidance on what happens with non-finalised legislation appears rather vague
and variable. The formulation used by the Commonwealth, New South Wales
and Victoria is that if Bills have passed through both Houses they should be
assented to by the Governor-General or Governor before the dissolution of the
lower House. In respect of Bills passed by both Houses, but still awaiting Royal
Assent after the dissolution, the Commonwealth Office of Parliamentary Counsel
(OPC) has noted, ‘it would be improper for such Bills not to receive assent’
(Drafting Direction No. 4.10). The Commonwealth guidance acknowledges the
constitutional uncertainty on the validity of Acts that receive assent in the period
between dissolution and the opening of the new Parliament. To avoid such
controversies, the OPC endeavours to ensure that all such Bills are assented to
prior to dissolution of the House.
Queensland is quite specific that Bills introduced but not passed lapse as do Bills
awaiting Royal Assent. South Australia and Western Australia have a slightly
different practice in that all Bills not through both Houses automatically lapse
when the lower House is dissolved. South Australia makes provision for
legislation passed and assented to before the election to be proclaimed during
the caretaker period. In Western Australia there is provision for Bills to be given
assent during the caretaker period, notwithstanding the dissolution of the
Legislative Assembly. Western Australia allows for Bills to be proclaimed when
they come into operation during the caretaker period. The Tasmanian formula
is that Bills passed by both Houses should be assented to by the Governor, but
may lawfully receive assent later. Tasmania also has provision for legislation to
be ‘proclaimed’ during the caretaker period, but with the caveat that the decision
to make the proclamation should not be made once the caretaker period has
begun. Proclamations that fall within this period (made from earlier decisions)
will still have effect.
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The ACT and the Northern Territory approaches are slightly different. The ACT
allows for a minister to approve by gazettal the commencement of legislation
that has been passed in the Legislative Assembly. In the Northern Territory,
Bills which have been introduced to the Legislative Assembly but not passed,
automatically lapse, although every effort should be made before prorogation
to gain assent from the Administrator to those Bills already passed. There is a
capacity, based on the advice of the Clerk of the Legislative Assembly, for a
proposed law to be presented to the Administrator for consent during the
caretaker period.
There is general agreement amongst all jurisdictions on the handling of
subordinate legislation. Where there is no infringement of the caretaker
conventions, it is considered acceptable for subordinate legislation to be approved
by the Governor-in-Council, or equivalent, during the caretaker period. So, for
instance, a Governor may approve minor amendments to traffic regulations if
they are forwarded by the Transport Department during the caretaker period.
Meetings of Executive Council
All jurisdictions identify some capacity for Executive Council to meet during
the caretaker period but with different levels of advice on whether the meeting
should be routine or exceptional. For example, the Commonwealth, Victorian,
Queensland, Tasmania and Western Australia all make provision for limited and
infrequent meetings to deal with routine business such as regulations and
ordinances. Each jurisdiction offers the caveat that the business considered
should not infringe the caretaker provisions concerning the taking of major
decisions or binding an incoming government.
New South Wales advises that Executive Council will ‘meet as usual’ during the
caretaker period to consider routine matters of government business. In South
Australia it is accepted practice for the Executive Council to operate after the
dissolution of the House of Assembly. The guidance cites the principle of the
separation of powers to support that view. In the Northern Territory the advice
suggests that Executive Council should cease, although provision is made to
convene in exceptional circumstances. Although there is differing practice across
jurisdictions, the general consensus is that there is a need to provide for the
management of non-controversial routine business of government.
Meetings of Cabinet
The majority of jurisdictions are either silent on the meeting of Cabinet during
the caretaker period, or acknowledge that it would not meet. The exception is
South Australia which states that during the caretaker period the normal business
of executive government continues because of the separation of powers between
the Parliament and the Executive. Cabinet can continue to meet for routine
matters, but not major undertakings, initiatives or appointments. This is a
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different interpretation from other jurisdictions that base their approach on the
convention of responsible government which holds that with the dissolution of
the House, the executive cannot be held responsible for its decisions in the
normal manner.
A crisis situation might necessitate a Cabinet meeting during the caretaker period.
This was the case in 1914 with the outbreak of the First World War during a
Commonwealth election (see Weller 2007, pp. 30-32).
Cabinet and other documents
The management of Cabinet documents during an election campaign falls under
another set of conventions surrounding the working of Cabinet. The convention
is that Cabinet documents and decisions are confidential to the government that
created the documents and are not made available to successive governments.
All jurisdictions cite this convention and adhere to the same process. Each
department is responsible for retrieving and securing their Cabinet documents
ready for return to the Cabinet Secretariat in the event of a change of government.
The Cabinet Secretary is custodian of Cabinet records for the government and
previous governments and, if required, will take over the management of Cabinet
documents and issue detailed instructions for their return and lock down.
Correspondence
Correspondence is an area where the need for agency judgement is once again
identified. The principle for all jurisdictions is that correspondence should not
be allowed to accumulate during the caretaker period. For practical reasons,
mainly that ministers are usually busy or travelling for the campaign, there is
general agreement they should only sign necessary correspondence. Agencies
need to exercise judgement on whether it is to be signed by the minister, CEO
or another departmental officer. Most of the guidance documents focus on
protecting the public service from any perception of partisanship. Details are
given on avoiding the presumption that the government will be returned to
office by referring to an ‘incoming government’.
Public servants contesting elections
Not all jurisdictions cover this issue within their caretaker conventions—rather
it is generally the subject of a separate directive. The Commonwealth, Victoria,
Western Australia and the Northern Territory each warn that public officials
should not use agency resources to support their personal political aspirations,
and provide advice on how public speaking engagements should be managed.
New South Wales and the ACT offer no guidance on either issue.
The Queensland guidance states that public servants are entitled to contest State
elections. They are not required to resign, but must take leave during the
campaign. The details of managing leave provisions are subject to a separate
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directive. This process differs from the South Australian process which requires
officers to resign before the date of the declaration of the poll. If the candidate
is unsuccessful they can be reappointed and the break in service deemed as leave
without pay. Tasmanian candidates do not have to resign and are entitled to
leave without pay but if they are elected their position is automatically
terminated.
The Australian Constitution states that people cannot be chosen if they hold an
office of profit under the Crown (s. 44 (iv)). Therefore public servants, amongst
others, must resign before nomination. But the Public Service Act 1999 (Cwlth)
(and the earlier 1922 Act) protects their positions if they are not successful (s.
32). This provision also applies when a public servant contests an election for a
State parliament.
Other issues
There is a range of advice given on issues which appear in a small number of
jurisdictions, which may be a response to local controversies.
Grants
The Tasmanian, ACT and Northern Territory guidance documents all include a
section on the management of grants during the caretaker period. All three
jurisdictions advise that payment can be made on grants approved prior to the
caretaker period but should be forwarded by the department rather than the
minister. No commitments should be made on grant applications received during
the caretaker period.
Statutory authorities
The Northern Territory is the only jurisdiction that makes mention of the
relationship between ministers and statutory authorities and/or
government-owned corporations under a separate heading. Both the
Commonwealth and Victorian guidance documents mention the relationship
with statutory authorities as part of their Introduction. All recommend these
bodies should observe caretaker conventions unless to do so would conflict with
their legal obligations or commercial requirements.
Travel
Western Australia offers detailed advice on travel for Members of Parliament.
It outlines who can travel and under what circumstances at State expense during
the caretaker period. It is very prescriptive and even includes the formula for
calculating the costs for media representatives travelling on charter flights.
The Commonwealth and Victoria both cite the convention that ministers do not
claim travel allowance from the day of the campaign launch to the day after
polling day.3 The exception is if ministers have to travel for Cabinet meetings
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or in connection with their ministerial duties. The Victorian guidance also outlines
the travel entitlements for the Leaders of non-government parties once the
election is called.
Tabling and responses to reports
The Commonwealth, Victorian and ACT guidance documents all cover the issue
of formal responses to parliamentary reports. The advice is that outstanding
reports should be taken up with the incoming government but, in the meantime,
agencies can undertake preparatory work and consultation at the agency level
so they can provide early advice to the incoming government.
The Commonwealth and Victoria both advise that administrative reports, such
as annual reports, can be tabled out of session. The ACT has a detailed framework
for annual reporting and makes specific provision for the timetable to present
annual reports in an election year.
Conclusion
This detailed comparison of the caretaker provisions in all Australian jurisdictions
throws up some interesting observations about management of the caretaker
conventions. The tendency has been to add detail and advice as new issues
emerge and need to be dealt with. Caretaker conventions were originally designed
as a limited guidance for ministers on how to behave during an election campaign.
The management of the updating of the guidances has since passed to the public
service. Reflecting Australia’s ‘talent for bureaucracy’, this transition has seen
an increase in the codification of behaviour and in the complexity of the
documents
The documents have also taken on a hybrid nature of providing advice to both
ministers and public servants on how to deal with the other during the caretaker
period. Both sides seek to constrain the behaviour of each other and this leads
to some confusion as the guidances are giving advice for different audiences for
particular issues. Despite increased codification, the real challenge in dealing
with issues during the caretaker period still relies on judgement at both the
political and public sector level. Political judgement is required not to request
the public service to undertake work which would compromise its impartiality.
The public service must exercise judgement in ensuring it does not undertake
work that would give the incumbent party an unfair advantage. The increase
in prescriptive advice is an attempt to replace reliance on judgement with clear
guidelines against which the behaviour of ministers and public servants can be
acquitted. However, each election throws up new and unforseen challenges and
such an approach does not overcome the need for judgement to be exercised by
senior staff.
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Despite some local variations, the caretaker convention guidelines in all Australian
jurisdictions remain clear about the principles behind the documents and the
behaviour that derives from those principles. Given the caretaker period lasts
for around 33 days every three to four years, the challenge for future versions
is to maintain their intent and simplicity.
ENDNOTES
1  In fact, in the Commonwealth, ministers are explicitly prevented from intervening in public service
appointments under Section 19 of the Public Service Act 1999 (Cwlth).
2  For a detailed assessment of the Charter of Budget Honesty’s genesis and early performance, see
Wanna, Kelly and Forster (2000 pp. 245-258). For more recent, critical appraisals see McMullan (2007)
and Wanna (2006).
3 The issue of travel during the caretaker period became controversial during the 1997 ‘Travel Rorts’
affair, when former Keating Government ministers were accused by the new Coalition Government of
having ‘breached’ the convention. For details see Tiernan (2007, pp. 151-170).
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Chapter 6. Caretaker conventions: an
overview of New Zealand and local
government arrangements
The previous chapter undertook a detailed analysis of the elements of the
caretaker conventions in all Australian jurisdictions. This chapter will identify
and explore the elements of the New Zealand and emerging local government
approaches.
New Zealand
In Chapter 2 we looked at the historical factors that drove the documentation
of the New Zealand caretaker conventions. Adoption of the mixed-member
proportional electoral system (MMP) led to increased uncertainty and delay in
the formation of new governments. The MMP system brought with it the
potential for extended caretaker periods as the process of government formation
could now be as lengthy as the nine weeks taken after the first MMP election
demonstrated. These longer periods of transition from one government to the
next highlighted the need for greater prescription and codification. To respond
to these changed circumstances, there was a consolidation and addition of advice
to The Cabinet Manual after the 1996 election.1  In New Zealand this trend was
in response to a changed electoral system while, in Australia, greater prescription
has been largely driven by a desire for rules and certainty about public service
behaviour.
As in other Westminster-style systems, the principle behind the constraint
imposed by the New Zealand caretaker conventions is based on the sovereignty
of Parliament and the recognition that, during the election period, the executive
cannot be held accountable to the Parliament. The New Zealand convention is
nevertheless quite clear that the ‘incumbent government is still the lawful
executive authority, with all the powers and responsibilities that go with
executive office’ (NZDPM&C 2001, p. 54). The key difference between the
conventions of the Australian jurisdictions and New Zealand is the much greater
focus on transitions and government formation and much less emphasis on
detailed guidance on the management of issues during the actual election
campaign. The Cabinet Manual is silent on many procedural issues such as how
to handle appointments, correspondence, use of government facilities, advertising
campaigns and management of the internet which are now a feature of the
Australian guidance documents.
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Transitional arrangements
Experience in New Zealand has led to detailed clarification of the principles in
managing the interregnum before a new government is formed. The conventions
describe the ‘two arms’ of the convention:
• where it is clear who will form the next government, but they have not yet
taken office; and
• where it is not clear who will form the next government. (NZDPM&C 2001,
p. 54).
When it is clear who will form the next government, the incumbent but outgoing
government is constrained on undertaking any new policy initiatives but should
act on the advice of the incoming government on any matters of significance,
even if the outgoing government disagrees with the course of action. As we saw
in Chapter 2, this formulation is a direct response to the crisis of 1984.
The second ‘arm’ of advice, on how to manage when it is not clear who will form
the next government, is more detailed, a consequence of the length of time before
a government could be formed after the 1996 election. Confusion around what
the outgoing Government could and could not do led to development of two
principles which are:
• decisions taken and specific policy determined before the start of the
caretaker period may be implemented by a caretaker Government; and
• in general terms, the normal business of government and the day to day
administration of departments and agencies in the wider state sector may
continue during the caretaker period.
However, it is recommended that a range of decisions around significant issues
which might bind an incoming government should either be deferred, handled
by temporary arrangements or subject to consultation with other parties. The
Cabinet Manual stresses the need for careful judgement by ministers, public
servants and Crown entities and does acknowledge there are no ‘hard and fast
rules’ (NZDPM&C 2001, p. 55) and a range of considerations will need to be
taken into account before a decision is made.
Decision-making during the caretaker period
This section of The Cabinet Manual outlines the different roles of departments,
Crown entities and ministers during the caretaker period. It reconfirms the advice
that the day-to-day administration of departments continues and all issues with
caretaker convention implications should be referred to the minister for decision.
A section reminds Crown entities and State-owned enterprises of their obligation
to apply the principles of the caretaker period, taking into account their legal
responsibilities and other statutory duties.
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Responsibility for final decisions about the application of caretaker conventions
rests with the Prime Minister, although preliminary assistance is available from
the Secretary of the Cabinet. As well, the Prime Minister must be consulted on
all issues that may require consultation with other political parties. The New
Zealand guidance does not contain detailed guidance on the management of
particular issues that has become the norm for the Australian jurisdictions. For
example, there is no advice on how to handle international negotiations, visiting
dignitaries or significant appointments. Here Cabinet Circulars and guidance
provided by the State Services Commission (see below) provide the necessary
detail.2
Significantly, and in contrast to Australian experience, New Zealand governments
assert a mandate to govern for a three year period. As such, according to Cabinet
Office Circular CO (05) 2, ‘they are not bound by the caretaker convention during
the pre-election period (unless the election has been caused by the government
losing the confidence of the House mid-term). This means that the Government
has full power to make decisions in the pre-election period’. However, successive
governments have chosen to restrict their actions in the period immediately
prior to a general election, recognising the potential for a change of government.
Restraint has, for example, been exercised in making significant appointments,
and in relation to some government advertising (CO (05) 2, 4). The period of
restraint is usually about three months before the latest date that an election can
be held.
Government formation
A large proportion of The Cabinet Manual guidance concerns the process for the
formation of a new government. It is the Governor General’s role to ascertain
whether parties have the support to form a government. As part of that process,
negotiating parties may seek advice from the public service, and departmental
officials may provide that advice if authorised to do so by the Prime Minister.
Detailed advice for public sector officials on how to manage those negotiations
is published by the NZ State Services Commission in Negotiations Between Political
Parties to Form a Government: Guidelines on Support from the State Sector
(www.ssc.govt.nz). This guidance sets out the arrangements under which parties
negotiating to form a government are able to access information and analysis
from government departments. The State Services Commissioner is the contact
point for receiving and responding to these requests.
These instructions are detailed and set out the different responsibilities for
critical public sector employees such as the Chief Executive of the Department
of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, the Cabinet Secretary and the Secretary to
the Treasury. The Clerk of the Executive Council is responsible for providing
impartial support to the Governor-General while the State Services Commissioner
keeps the Prime Minister informed on what assistance is being given to different
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political parties. There is extreme sensitivity about the provision of information
and analysis to political parties and this is reflected in the requirement that only
a small number of senior officials be involved to exert the ‘careful judgement
and discretion’ required (NZSSC 2005, p. 4).
State Servants, Political Parties and Elections
As well as the material contained in The Cabinet Manual and the specific guidance
on negotiations during government formation, a third document is also relevant
to implementing the New Zealand caretaker conventions. For each election, the
State Services Commission publishes a current version of State Servants, Political
Parties and Elections: Guidance for the 2005 Election Period (SSC 2005). This
document more closely resembles the guidance documents of Australian
jurisdictions and is focussed on providing information to the public sector. It
covers communication campaigns, use of agency resources, costing of policies
and arrangements for public sector officials standing for election. This document
is supplemented by an ‘Election Fact Sheet’, framed specifically to address
questions state sector employees may have about their conduct during the
election campaign (www.ssc.govt.nz/election-guidance-factsheet).
Detailed work has been undertaken on the procedures for the costing of both
Government and Opposition policies. The bureaucracy must receive a written
request from the Minister of Finance or the department’s minister before any
work can be undertaken. All work including sources and procedures must be
documented in full and no additional commentary or subjective assumptions
are allowed. The costing guidelines confirm that ministers ‘will not require or
use information on costings in a way that might damage the neutrality of the
public service, and hence its ability to serve successive governments’ (SSC 2005,
p. 11).
The material provided on caretaker conventions in New Zealand is detailed and
regularly updated. This has arisen because of the electoral uncertainty which
now exists under the MMP system and the potential for an extended caretaker
period for government formation following polling day. Detailed advice is
provided by both the Secretary to the Cabinet and the State Services Commission.
This flurry of documentation in the 1990s reflected the transition from a long
period of single party majority governments to majority and minority coalition
governments (Boston et al. 1998, p. 648). The introduction of MMP saw a rapid
increase in detail on how to manage issues in a time of increased uncertainty,
particularly post election. That advice has been refined after the past couple of
elections and now offers a detailed guide for the incumbent party, the incoming
government (in the event of a change) and the public service on how to handle
itself in unsettled times.
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Local Government Requirements
Two jurisdictions in Australia have enacted caretaker provisions within their
local government Acts—Victoria in 2003 and Queensland in 2007. Making the
provisions legally binding has a number of implications, some of which are
explored in Chapter 7. Queensland’s provisions are based on those of Victoria.
The focus is on ensuring public confidence in local government electoral practices
and preventing sitting councillors deriving advantage from incumbency.
The main focus of local government caretaker requirements is to prevent
inappropriate decision-making by councils during an election period and to
ensure council resources are not being used to support the activities of existing
councillors, with a particular emphasis on the publication of electoral matter.
Both the Victorian Local Government (Democratic Reform) Act 2003 (Vic) and the
Queensland Local Government and Other Legislation Amendment Act 2007 (Qld)
specify a range of decisions that council may not take during an election period.
Individual councils are responsible for developing ‘codes of conduct’ which
include these caretaker provisions. The provisions prevent:
• appointing or terminating a CEO or changing the remuneration of a CEO (this
clause also has implications for other senior executives);
• entering into contracts valued at more than $100,000 (Victoria) or $150,000
(Queensland) or valued at more than one percent of the council’s revenue
from rates (whichever is the greater);
• the publication of electoral matter during a campaign.
Both jurisdictions provide an option for ministerial appeal in exceptional
circumstances. If the local council believes a major policy decision is required
in the public interest, it can apply to the minister for approval to make the
decision. If such an approval is not received, the contracts and decisions are
invalid.
Victorian legislation requires individual councils to adopt the provisions from
the Act in their own codes of conduct. In Queensland this it not a mandatory
requirement, but is left to the discretion of the chief executive of the Department
of Local Government, Planning and Sport. Because the legislation has only
recently been enacted the implications for breaches are as yet untested, as is the
potential for ministerial involvement in making judgements about alleged
breaches.
Conclusion
This chapter completes the detailed analysis of the different approaches to
caretaker conventions in all Australian jurisdictions, New Zealand and local
government in Victoria and Queensland. The likelihood of a publicised breach
or confused response during the heat of an election campaign drives the
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continued updating of prescriptive guidance documents. Constitutional crises
in New Zealand have now led to multiple sources of advice for the executive
government, the Governor-General, minority parties and the public sector.
Support for the observance of caretaker conventions for local governments is
less institutionalised, presumably because it is a comparatively recent
development. Local councils may seek to improve their internal support for
managing their caretaker provisions as the implications of real or perceived
breaches becomes obvious in future elections.
ENDNOTES
1 The Cabinet Manual advises the need to plan ahead to try to ensure all significant matters are dealt
with in advance of the election. Departments are warned that those who do not prepare for a protracted
caretaker period are likely to experience problems.
2  On government decisions and actions in the pre-election period, see http://www.dpmc.
govt.nz/cabinet/circulars/co05/2.html
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Chapter 7. Forces influencing the
observance of caretaker conventions
The cases and controversies highlighted in earlier chapters of this monograph
have much to tell us about the pressures on the interpretation of caretaker
conventions, and the sensitive issues that public officials must navigate when
upholding caretaker principles during an election campaign and until the
swearing in of a new government. This chapter highlights some of the dilemmas
posed by the need to be responsive to government while remaining apolitical
and upholding public service obligations to be professional, impartial and to
comply with the law. It addresses some of the forces impinging on public service
impartiality.
Adversarialism and partisan contest
Arguably, some of the anxiety surrounding caretaker conventions relates to the
competitive and intensely partisan environment of contemporary politics.
Although we live in the era of the ‘permanent campaign’, the period leading up
to polling day is especially fraught—ministers and their staff are under intense
pressure; Opposition spokespeople are looking to exploit opportunities to secure
political advantage; journalists are looking to break controversial stories and to
‘get behind’ tightly stage-managed ‘run of the mill’ announcements.
As guidance documents make clear, decisions about whether caretaker
conventions have been breached are ultimately matters for prime ministers and
premiers. They make political calculations about the benefits and risks of
particular courses of action. Although it is relatively common for someone to
claim that caretaker conventions have been breached, such claims are rarely
substantiated. Usually the public debate moves on, or investigations reveal that
the decision taken in the matter was a question of judgement. Caretaker guidance
documents are guidances only, not hard and fast rules. But, as will be seen in
subsequent chapters, recent developments in the adjudication of alleged breaches
is challenging traditional understandings of conventions as shared norms of
behaviour.
Pressures on public service responsiveness
The public service is expected to be responsive to the government it serves.
This obligation does not disappear during the caretaker period. This is mainly
an issue with ministerial offices which are accustomed to a different relationship
with the bureaucracy, and can be dealt with by establishment of agreed protocols
at the commencement of the caretaker period.
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Ministerial Staff
Ministerial staff play important roles in exacting responsiveness from the public
service (Tiernan 2007). The growth in their numbers and reach has created new
challenges for public servants during the caretaker period. The potential for
staff to make inappropriate or unreasonable requests of departments is
occasionally highlighted in articles about the caretaker period (Malone 2007)
and was clearly evident in the 'Children Overboard' case, which unfolded in the
partisan glare of the 2001 Federal election (Tiernan 2007; Weller 2002).
In the Victorian case, Davis et al. (2001, p. 19) noted the tensions public servants
face as they seek to remain politically impartial while dealing with ministerial
advisers ‘whose main objectives were overtly political’. They note the
conventions are ‘silent on the role of political advisers during the caretaker
period’ (Davis et al. 2001, p. 20). Former Deputy Prime Minister, Brian Howe
(2001, p. 28), observes that ‘advisers have become essential when
ministers/shadow ministers need to understand points of difference in technical
detail likely to arise during an extended caretaker period’, but he concedes their
unelected and unaccountable status raises issues when they represent their
principals in negotiations. Keating (2002, p. 120) agrees there is a problem with
ministerial staffs’ lack of accountability. He stresses the need for public servants
to be confident that political staff accurately represent the views of their minister
and are acting on his/her authority when claiming to do so.
Public Servants
Given the potential for ministerial staff to conduct themselves in ways that are
not strictly in accordance with the spirit of the caretaker conventions, Keating
(2002, p. 120) suggests that public servants should insist on directly briefing
the minister or shadow minister during the caretaker period and ensure that
their personal agreement is obtained for any unavoidable decision taken. This
recommendation would essentially place the responsibility for initiating contact
with either the Government and/or the Opposition in an election context on
public servants—a situation that would pose considerable difficulties for all but
the most senior officials.
Recognising the particular sensitivities of the caretaker period for managing the
departmental–ministerial office interface, the Australian Public Service
Commission (APSC) has developed a number of resources to assist public servants
in discharging their obligations using good judgement and common sense. In
its most recent publication, Supporting Ministers: Upholding the Values, the APSC
emphasises:
• The need for the ordinary business of government to continue during the
caretaker period—it warns agencies to be careful not to allow the possibility
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that an election will be called to constrain the capacity of the elected
government to govern;
• The need for officers to be familiar with and follow official guidelines about
the operations of caretaker conventions;
• That potential problems and difficulties may be avoided if effective liaison
with the minister’s office occurs prior to the election. It recommends
establishing formal protocols for managing briefing requests and other issues;
• That senior departmental officers have primary responsibility for managing
the interface with ministers and the Opposition as alternative government
during the caretaker period;
• The desirability of consulting with central agency experts on the caretaker
conventions if difficult or sensitive issues arise that are of concern to
departmental officers. It is suggested that a single point of contact be
established for this purpose.
In many ways the Commonwealth Government practice of ministerial staff
decamping from Canberra to campaign offices in Sydney or Melbourne may
reduce some of the demands on public servants. In State governments, where
ministerial offices are often co-located with departments, the challenge may be
greater, but accountability and oversight regimes for ministerial staff are
comparatively stronger in Australian State jurisdictions than in the
Commonwealth.
Technological change
Technological change, notably the rise of the internet and email, has necessitated
development of new practices and guidance to assist public servants to manage
within the spirit and intent of the caretaker conventions. The implications of
technological change were not canvassed in earlier iterations of the guidance
documents and issues of government websites simply did not arise. The 2004
guidance document gave agency heads discretion to determine their own
portfolio’s approach to websites. This attracted some criticism. Malone (2007,
p. 4) has called for stronger prescription and consistency to assist public servants
in maintaining their impartiality during the caretaker period. Such developments
would further reinforce the tendency to bureaucratise caretaker conventions.
Pace and complexity of decision-making
The increased pace and complexity of government decision-making is much
remarked upon by practitioners and scholars. An uncertain international security
and threat environment has added to this complexity, creating demands for
governments to take decisive action even during election campaigns. Controversy
followed the Howard Government’s decision to deploy an SAS hostage crisis
team to Iraq in 2004, and there were questions about the Government’s use of
the military in its Pacific Solution policy during the 2001 Federal election. In
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2004, the Australian embassy in Jakarta was bombed; the attack occurred during
the caretaker period. Because governments need to move quickly in such
situations, academic John Uhr (in AAP, 15 September 2004) has argued there
may be a need for ‘supplementary rules’ to guide crisis decision-making.
Power of incumbency
During long periods of incumbency, ministers and their staffs become accustomed
to the high levels of support provided by departments. Depending on their level
of experience, ministers and members of their staff may find it difficult to adjust
to the reduced levels of assistance with advice and briefing from officials. Recent
research indicates that the average period of incumbency is 11.6 years for
governments federally, and just under 11 years in State jurisdictions (Strangio
2006). In office, governments enjoy substantial advantages in terms of staffing
and resources, and the capacity to use advertising and other political ‘weapons’
in their efforts to retain elected office. The likelihood that a serving government
will be returned may create difficulties for public servants in ‘standing up’ to
a minister or his/her staff over a caretaker conventions issue.
Conclusion
A number of forces in modern politics influence the interpretation and
management of government business during the caretaker period. This chapter
has identified the pressures that greater adversarialism, the growth in power
and influence of ministerial staff, rapid technological change, the pace and
complexity of decision-making and the power of incumbency are placing on
public servants during election campaigns. These influences are driving the
trend to codification and bureaucratisation of guidance documents on caretaker
conventions, and have been influential in shifting the onus of responsibility to
observe the conventions from ministers to bureaucrats.
These forces—particularly the trend from the old style parliamentarianism,
where pleasantries could be exchanged across the House, to the professionalism
of party machine politics—have led to a more ruthless approach to maximising
political advantage. The next chapter explores some of the consequences this
transformation could have on caretaker conventions.
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Chapter 8. A changing practice?
The understanding that caretaker conventions have no standing in law and,
therefore, are not enforceable is gradually being tested. The characteristic of
conventions is that they are not legally binding and are based on evolving
practice rather than legislation. Regular updating of the guidances has been a
response to the emergence of issues in the heat of election campaigns.
Jurisdictions have continued to extend and refine the advice given in the light
of alleged breaches and controversies. In recent years there has been a trend to
a more legalistic approach through the translation of conventions into legislation
with the addition of legal penalties for breaches.
This chapter will explore some recent examples of quasi-judicial oversight of
caretaker conventions. First, the Queensland Crime and Misconduct Commission’s
(CMC) report into an alleged breach; and, second, recent Victorian and
Queensland Government legislation embodying caretaker conventions in local
government statutes. We will also look at the New Zealand model as a best
practice guide for council communications
The Tugun Bypass controversy – a case of mistaken
oversight?
In February 2004, during the last week of the State election campaign, Queensland
Premier Peter Beattie made an announcement on a proposed route of a bypass
road, known as the ‘Tugun Bypass’, at the southern end of the Gold Coast. The
new route would involve resumption of 14 houses. Officers from the Department
of Main Roads were advised of the announcement the night before and asked
by the then Minister for Transport to inform the affected residents of the
announcement and the impact it would have on their properties. Limited time
was available for departmental officers to draft and distribute a letter to affected
residents before the Premier’s announcement the next morning. The text of that
letter is provided in Exhibit 2.
After the election the CMC received a complaint from the Leader of the
Opposition, Mr Lawrence Springborg MP, alleging the announcement of the
bypass involved a breach of ‘both the spirit and the letter’ of the caretaker
conventions. He alleged a lack of impartiality by the officers of the Department
of Main Roads who were ‘acting in a politically partisan manner to implement
a major Government decision during an election campaign’.
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Exhibit 2 – Tugun Bypass Letter
5 February 2004
Dear Resident
TUGUN BYPASS PROPOSED ROUTE
As you are aware, in late 2003, the New South Wales Government
withdrew support for the proposed C4 option, largely on environmental
grounds, despite extensive studies being undertaken which had shown
that environmental impacts were manageable.
The Queensland Government has maintained its commitment to finding
a solution to the congestion in the Tugun and Bilinga area and has been
reviewing alternative routes, including those to the east of the airport.
The Premier today announced a proposed route which has the least
impact on the broader community. This route will run from Stewart
Road Currumbin, on the eastern side of the airport connecting to the
Tweed Bypass.
Following the Premier’s announcement, I advise that the proposed route
will have an impact on your property.
You may wish to discuss this further with us. We invite you to contact
(Public Consultation Officer) on (07 5583 8328).
Yours sincerely
A/District Director South Coast Hinterland
The CMC accepted the complaint and investigated. A report, The Tugun Bypass
Investigation, was issued in July 2004. The CMC found that the letter was in
breach of the caretaker conventions because it lacked the impartiality required
during an election campaign (CMC 2004, p. 26). However, the CMC did not
recommend disciplinary action against the officers involved. Four
recommendations were made about additional training for public sector agencies
on the content and application of caretaker conventions, including reinforcing
the requirement for public servants to avoid any appearance of political partiality
during the caretaker period (CMC 2004, p. 32).
The CMC report is one of the few detailed analyses of an alleged breach of a
caretaker convention. All of the participants, from the Director-General to those
delivering the letter to the residents of Alinda Street, were interviewed and the
information presented gives a snapshot of a range of officers at different levels
trying to do their job to support multiple stakeholders. The report identified
the decisions made over 24 hours and why those decisions were taken. It
highlighted the challenges of working in the heated atmosphere of an election
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campaign and the shortened timeframes within which decisions and judgements
have to be made.
Issues
Jurisdictional Oversight by the CMC
In its report, the CMC had a lengthy section on the statutory basis for the
investigation. However, it did not cite any existing precedents for such an
oversight body to accept a complaint on an alleged breach of a convention for
investigation. As described in Chapter 2, sanctions against breaches are usually
moral or political. The CMC report acknowledged this in relation to allegations
about the Premier and dismissed any possibility of criminal liability on the part
of the Premier by citing the lack of legal standing of the caretaker conventions
and concluded ‘an alleged breach of the conventions by a member of Parliament
… is not a matter within the investigative or official misconduct jurisdiction of
the CMC’ (CMC 2004, p. 3).
The CMC, however, believed that a ‘different standard applies to public servants’
(CMC 2004, p. 4) and a public servant who breached the caretaker conventions
could come within section 14 [b][1] of the Crime and Misconduct Act 2001 (Qld)
by acting ‘in a way that is not honest or is not impartial’. For that breach to
amount to official misconduct, it must constitute a criminal offence or a
disciplinary breach so serious as to warrant the person’s dismissal (CMC 2004,
p. 4). The CMC also identified the possibility of a breach of the Public Service
Act 1996 (Qld) which contained a statement of principles for the conduct of
public servants including ‘providing sound and impartial advice to the
Government’ (CMC 2004, p. 4). A contravention of that Act or departmental
Codes of Conduct could be grounds for disciplinary action against an officer.
Because the Director-General of the Department of the Premier and Cabinet
circulated the caretaker conventions to all departments, a breach of these
instructions could amount to official misconduct or grounds for disciplinary
action under the Public Service Act 1996 (Qld).
On this formulation, the CMC decided that the non-justiciability of conventions
was over-ridden by the provisions for impartiality vested in other Acts governing
the conduct of the public service with the possibility of such a breach leading
to official misconduct. Its actions can be seen as an example of encroaching
legalism, where lawyers seek to make judgements about political norms.
Concerns of the Opposition
The concerns of the Opposition were two-fold: that the actions of the Department
of Main Roads officers were an implementation of a policy decision taken during
the caretaker period, and that the content of the letter to affected residents was
not impartial (CMC 2004, p. 7). The first allegation was made against the Premier
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for implementing a policy initiative against the caretaker conventions. As the
CMC had decided the conventions were not legally enforceable against a Member
of Parliament, the investigation focused on whether departmental officers had
implemented a policy initiative during the caretaker period.
Departmental officers interviewed were quite clear the announcement was a
new policy promise released during an election campaign and would not have
bound an in-coming government (CMC 2004, p. 25). The CMC concluded the
allegation could not be substantiated and there was insufficient evidence to
support the view that departmental officers were implementing a new policy
(CMC 2004, p. 26).
On the second allegation of lack of impartiality, the CMC found that the letter
to residents had breached the conventions by displaying partisanship by omitting
to mention that the road announcement was contingent on the Beattie
Government being re-elected. The CMC then determined whether the breach of
the caretaker conventions provided a basis for the recommendation of disciplinary
action against any officer (CMC 2004, p. 26). It concluded that the evidence
would not support a finding of misconduct against anyone because no officer
‘deliberately sought to flout the conventions or to otherwise act with the
intention of advancing a political agenda’ (CMC 2004, p. 27).
The CMC’s test for the breach was whether officers had colluded to achieve a
political purpose or that any officer had sought to improperly influence another
concerning what the letter should contain (CMC 2004, p. 27). The CMC quite
correctly looked beyond the wording of the letter for intent and concluded that
the inappropriate wording arose from two causes:
1. an apparently inadequate understanding by those who drafted the letter
of the scope and rationale of the conventions; and
2. the pressing timeframe that resulted in more senior officers having
insufficient time to properly review the letter and give the relevant issues
the consideration that the circumstances requires. (CMC 2004, p. 28)
The CMC concluded that for the letter not to breach caretaker conventions it
should have included a qualification that the new route was contingent on the
completion of a number of processes and the result of the election (CMC 2004,
p. 28).
The View from the Department
The interviews with Department of Main Roads officers highlight the challenges
of juggling multiple stakeholders. The Director-General of the department
received a phone call at 7.30 pm to inform him the Premier would be making an
announcement the next day on the proposed route. The department was
requested to inform the affected residents of the impact of the announcement
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on their properties. The focus of the department’s work was then on informing
the residents personally before they heard the announcement through the media.
Officers were quite clear that ‘out of courtesy, morally and ethically’, it was the
department’s role to tell the residents of the announcement (CMC 2004, p. 18).
The shortened timeframe meant that the normal approval and checking of the
letter did not take place.
From the department’s point of view, officers were fulfilling their responsibility
to be both responsive to the government as well as sensitive to stakeholder
impact. The extremely truncated timeframe meant the letter was considered
‘close enough’ (CMC 2004, p. 20) as the department focused on the challenge of
getting officers on the ground before the announcement. When interviewed, all
departmental officers said they were aware of the provisions of the caretaker
conventions and none of them thought, at the time, that they were not being
politically impartial. In retrospect it was conceded that, although the department
had been concerned to offer a ‘compassionate response to those 14 households’
(CMC 2004, p. 18), more care should have been taken with the drafting of the
letter.
Outcomes and Implications
The Crime and Misconduct Commission made four recommendations about
additional guidance and training on the operation of caretaker conventions. The
recommendations were:
1. that all public sector agencies have an adequate training mechanism to
ensure that staff are fully aware of the caretaker conventions and how they
operate during election periods;
2. the CEOs of public sector agencies identify which staff should receive such
training, having regard to their duties and how the conventions apply to
such duties;
3. the CEOs of public sector agencies ensure that, as soon as the caretaker
periods begin, all relevant internal officers receive advice summarising the
conventions; and
4. that additional ways be found to reinforce the requirement on all public
servants to avoid any appearance of political partiality during caretaker
periods.
The CMC’s view was that further explanatory material to give guidance to
departmental officers was required to prevent their actions—even if
well-intentioned—from becoming politically controversial (CMC 2004, p. 32).
Yet, evidence from all of the officers involved showed they understood and were
aware of the provisions of the caretaker conventions. The reality of
decision-making in such a truncated and pressured timeframe did not allow for
the normal consideration and approval processes that would be undertaken for
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such a sensitive letter. The focus of the Department of Main Roads was on
informing the affected residents in a courteous and sensitive manner before the
inevitable media onslaught.
The implications of the CMC report for the Queensland public service are many.
The report clearly says that the conventions are not legally binding on politicians
but that a different standard applies to public servants because of the principle
of impartiality contained in the Public Service Act 1996 (Qld). This is the first
time that an assessment has been made that public sector employees can be held
to account for a breach of caretaker conventions in a way that politicians cannot,
even if officers are responding to a request from a minister.
The realisation that public servants can bear real consequences for a breach of
caretaker conventions has implications for responsiveness during an election
campaign. The double standard of accountability means that, in contrast to
public servants, ministers have very little to lose in pushing the boundaries.
CEOs need to be more alert and responsible for moderating the expectations of
ministers and protecting staff from any potential breaches through being overly
responsive to the incumbent government.
There is increased responsibility for departmental CEOs to: (a) ensure that all
staff are properly trained in the operation of caretaker conventions; and (b)
develop an increased understanding of the sanctions for a breach of impartiality.
The need for documented approval processes for checking and clearing work
becomes important. The CMC oversight of this area also leads to increased
pressure and stress on the bureaucracy during the election period and an
increased need to exercise high level judgement and caution.
Legislating caretaker conventions in local government –
unintended consequences?
Two State governments—Victoria and Queensland—have recently amended
local government legislation to specify ‘caretaker arrangements’ which apply
during the election period. The Queensland amendments were based on the
Victorian and both follow the same formula. In both states the arrangements
bring local government into line with the State and Commonwealth practices.
The local government arrangements have a twofold aim:
• to avoid the use of public resources in a way that may unduly affect the
election result; and,
• minimise the likelihood of council making certain types of decisions that
may unduly limit the decision-making ability of the incoming council
(www.localgovernment.vic.gov.au).
These new statutory arrangements derived from concerns about official
misconduct and the integrity of practices during local council elections. In
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Victoria, the change to the legislation was a response to a review of the State
constitution in 2003. In Queensland, the legislation was in response to a CMC
report into the conduct of candidates at the 2004 Gold Coast City Council
elections. Like the State and Commonwealth conventions, these local government
arrangements are concerned with curtailing the benefits of incumbency and
preventing the present administration from making decisions that would commit
an incoming council. The arrangements are based on the caretaker principle that
every election brings the possibility of a change of government.
The legislation of caretaker arrangements for councils is still in its infancy but
it is possible to conceive of a range of complexities that could arise in the face
of such a legalistic approach. Local government representatives in Australia tend
to be community representatives rather than organised along party lines. This
could lead to a lesser constraint on behaviour as there is often no party machine
to exercise discipline and set standards of electoral behaviour. Hence the recent
trend to legislate caretaker behaviour could be a response to the lack of political
sanction that would normally operate against a political party seen to flaunt the
caretaker provisions. A legislated response puts the onus back on individual
behaviour instead of the mutually agreed responsibility which is the hallmark
of a convention.
The role of the Local Government minister as decision-maker has the potential
for conflict, particularly if there are partisan differences between the two
jurisdictions. There is the potential for claims of breaches to be tested in the
courts particularly around definitions of what is a ‘major policy decision’ and
‘election matter’. The legislation is silent on whether council officers can be
prosecuted for breaches and it does not identify whether it is the CEO or the
Lord Mayor who is the accountable officer for implementing and managing these
arrangements during the caretaker period. The caretaker arrangements focus on
limiting the advantages of incumbency but do not formalise the rights of the
opposing candidates to access briefings from the administration.
Compared to the more detailed guidance documents of the other levels of
Australian and New Zealand governments, the legislation is short on detail and
nuance. This lack of information could leave the legislation open to challenge
and legal interpretation. Legislation is a blunt tool and by legislating these
arrangements local government loses some of the evolutionary capacity and
flexibility that a non-legislated convention gives. Legislation is time-consuming
and difficult to update and cannot easily reflect the nuance of changing practice.
A self-managed process, as adopted by New Zealand (see below), keeps the
capacity for regular updating to respond to local circumstances and issues as
they arise
69
A changing practice?
New Zealand’s ‘good practice’ approach
In 2004 the New Zealand Controller and Auditor-General published a report on
Good Practice for Managing Public Communications by Local Authorities. The
report addressed the broader issue of all council public communications and
addressed the concern that publicly funded communications be used for
legitimate purposes. The report stated that the guidance is not binding on
councils but recommends that each council adopts a formal communications
policy. The report acknowledged this is a contested area where communications
should reflect the public interest and not support a partisan point of view, nor
be used to promote the profile of individual councillors.
The report included a section on communications in a pre-election period which
is concerned with ensuring existing members do not use council resources to
promote their re-election prospects. The following principle is identified:
A local authority must not promote, nor be perceived to promote, the
re-election prospects of a sitting member. Therefore, the use of Council
resources for re-election purposes is unacceptable and possibly unlawful.
The guidance is quite detailed and has been voluntarily adopted by local
government in New Zealand. Because of the voluntary process, each council can
amend the principles and requirements to meet local needs and update it if local
controversies lead to a change of focus.
Conclusion
The trend to transition from convention to legislated practice has a range of
implications for those involved with government decision-making. At present,
conventions are a moral and mutually reciprocal obligation acknowledged by
most political players. Because they have not been subject to legal interpretation
conventions have been able to evolve and adapt to changing circumstances and
political values. There is concern that those most at risk from legal action are
likely to be public sector officials caught in the crossfire of partisan politics.
A desire for formal embodiment of sanctions in legislation could reflect concerns
about the efficacy of self-regulation and the willingness of government to adhere
to a voluntary restraint not to abuse power. The move towards a more formal
restraint on the power of incumbency would see the ‘gentlemen’s agreement’
of mutual obligation changed to one of seeking advantage through legal action.
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Chapter 9. Caretaker conventions and
the future of responsible government
The scope and application of caretaker conventions will continue to evolve. In
previous chapters we have documented the similarities and differences between
the jurisdictions under consideration and looked at the implications of changing
practice.
Caretaker conventions are among the most challenged and controversial of all
conventions. They apply during the most intense time of adversarial
politics—when both major parties have the potential to retain or gain
government. Minor slips and inexactitudes are exploited by both sides. There
is intense pressure on public servants to justify their decisions regarding
perceived support or partiality for the incumbent government. As outlined in
Chapter 2, conventions are about a shared understanding and mutual
responsibility for their upkeep. Perhaps the nature of modern adversarial politics
gives the concept of conventions a somewhat antiquated air. The introduction
of ministerial codes of conduct and anti-corruption commissions indicates political
participants appear less trusting of mutuality and are becoming more interested
in enforceable sanctions.
An important corollary of this development is whether the voluntary nature of
caretaker conventions can be sustained in contemporary politics? Caretaker
conventions were established on the principle of ‘self-policing’ but as accusations
intensify about alleged government breaches of conventions, might not future
governments consider establishing an independent arbiter? A transition from
the status of convention to a set of legally enforceable rules would see a radical
recasting of caretaker arrangements.
Prescription and codification
It is difficult to pinpoint precisely when the maintenance of caretaker conventions
shifted from being a political responsibility to a primarily bureaucratic one. In
his 1951 letter to ministers, Menzies was clear it was their responsibility to
exercise judgement in the continuing operation of their departments. As this
monograph has demonstrated, a simple letter reminding ministers of their
responsibilities has been, since the 1970s, supplanted by increasingly detailed
guidance designed to support public servants to make decisions across a broad
range of government activities. Most jurisdictions, with the exception of NSW,
have a system to review their guidance documents after each election to respond
to recent controversies or ambiguities. This has led to a pattern of increasing
prescription and specification as jurisdictions try to prevent repetition of claimed
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breaches and controversies by increasing or adding new suggestions about how
to handle a particular situation.
The guidances have evolved into strangely hybrid documents. They acknowledge
the responsibility of government politicians to adhere to the conventions, for
example, ‘adherence to the conventions is ultimately the responsibility of the
Premier and the government collectively’ (Vic DPC 2006, p. 2). Yet the advice
contained is focussed on assisting the public sector to put boundaries around
and manage the relationship with their political masters. An example of this can
be seen in the Victorian guidance document, which is described as being
‘intended to explain the conventions and practices in more detail and to provide
guidance for the handling of business during the caretaker period’ (Vic DPC
2006, p2).
Increasing prescription has the potential to diminish bi-partisan agreement on
the caretaker conventions. If conventions are mutually agreed principles that
guide political behaviour, that mutuality may be eroded by incumbents adding
new levels of detail to the guidance documents. Quite often, the updating is
undertaken at a bureaucratic level, as officers try to counteract criticism by
adding advice on how to manage, for example, the impact of the internet. To
preserve the mutuality of caretaker conventions amendments should be agreed
by both major political parties to ensure the acceptance of bi-partisan
responsibility for their maintenance and observance.
Codification and prescription also leads to a focus on interpretation and a loss
of flexibility. An emerging concern is that increased prescription will lead to
legal sanctions for breaches for the public service. Codification also shifts the
responsibility to adhere to the restraints away from politicians and displaces it
to the public service. The public sector’s tendency to document and regulate
might, in the longer term, transfer the spotlight from political behaviour to
bureaucratic interpretation and application. This is already evident in some of
the commentary on caretaker conventions (see, for example, Malone 2007).
Introduction of statutory sets of public service values and codes of conduct
means that public servants now have legal obligations for non-partisan behaviour
and these apply during the caretaker period. This was tested during the Tugun
Bypass example cited in Chapter 7. Although it has not been repeated since, the
potential remains for public servants to be caught in similar breaches with the
possibility that disciplinary or financial sanctions could be applied. The
implication is clear although little publicised at present. Public servants are
exposed in ways that ministers still are not. This changing environment will
only accelerate the trend to prescription which can be used as a bulwark against
ministerial demands for responsiveness during the caretaker period.
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Future prospects
If a convention reflects shared norms about political behaviour, is it not the
prerogative of the government of the day to update or revise its content or
application? Over the years, public servants have unobtrusively become the
guardians of the detail and the application of the caretaker conventions. This
presents a dilemma because public servants understandably want the certainty
and clarity that detailed procedures provide. Australia’s ‘talent for bureaucracy’
(Davies 1964) tends to favour addressing problems by the development of detailed
guidelines and procedures.
The trend to increased codification could reflect a diminished understanding
of, and experience with, the processes of government. The application of
conventions has been, in the past, the province of the most senior bureaucrats.
Their long experience and judgement allowed them to make the fine distinctions
often required to navigate the political/public service interface. To do so
successfully requires a capacity to apply the caretaker principles with the
confidence to take and defend such judgements in the contested atmosphere of
an election campaign. Arguably, contemporary trends in public sector
employment—rapid progression to senior ranks, external appointments to senior
positions and greater use of contract appointments—could account for
uncertainty and discomfort in applying the caretaker conventions. If that is the
case, the trend to codification and prescription is likely to continue so that senior
officials can point to written guidance as the basis for their decision-making.
The controversy that surrounds the application of caretaker conventions is
unlikely to diminish but political processes require political solutions. The
increase in detail in the application of caretaker conventions cannot continue
indefinitely and, eventually, responsibility will have to return to ministers and
political leaders to manage. With the increased potential for public servants to
be disciplined for breaches of the guidelines there might well be some relief in
returning ownership to the political players.
73
Caretaker conventions and the future of responsible government

Glossary
Cabinet
A committee of ministers which forms the apex of executive decision-making.
Commonwealth Charter of Budget Honesty
An Act that provides, among other things, for a pre-election costing of
Government and Opposition commitments and policies during the caretaker
period. The Charter is the subject of significant controversy.
Constitution
The set of rules by which a country or state is governed. In Australia, the
Constitution was written in the 1890s and it sets out the structure of Australian
Federal Government. The Constitution can only be explicitly amended by
referendum.
Convention
Conventions are non-legal rules that guide political practice in areas on which
the Constitution is silent.
Dissolution of the House of Representatives
The House of Representatives is dissolved by the Governor-General under
mechanisms specified in the Constitution (s. 5) and (s. 57).
Double Dissolution
Colloquial term for dissolution of both the Senate and the House of
Representatives arising when the Senate blocks, fails to pass or amends a bill
unacceptably on two occasions with a gap of at least three months.
Executive Council
Executive Council is a formal body of the Governor-General or Governor meeting
with members of the Cabinet. Governor-General-in-Council/Governor-in-Council
gives legal effect to many of the decisions of Government such as subordinate
legislation and appointments.
Mixed Member Proportional (MMP) electoral system
The New Zealand electoral system, introduced in 1996, is based on each elector
having two votes—one for a party and one for a local candidate.
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Prorogation of Parliament
A discontinuation of a session of Parliament without necessarily dissolving it.
The Commonwealth Parliament is sometimes prorogued immediately prior to a
dissolution of the House of Representatives.
Royal Assent
The Governor-General or Governor gives assent to laws when they have been
passed by Parliament. This is the final step in the legislative process with assent
giving legal effect to Bills becoming Acts.
Subordinate legislation
Subordinate legislation is made under the authority of existing Acts. Subordinate
legislation includes regulations, by-laws, orders, ordinances, statutory
instruments and notices. Subordinate legislation is signed by
Governor-General/Governor-in-Council.
Westminster Model
The Westminster model of government is based on practices of the British
Government, many of which are adopted by a range of representative
democracies. Elements of the Westminster model include: parliamentary
sovereignty; a collective and responsible cabinet; ministers accountable to
Parliament; a non-partisan and permanent civil service; and an Opposition
recognised as an executive-in-waiting.
Writ
A document commanding an electoral officer to hold an election. The writ
contains dates for the close of rolls, the close of nominations, election day and
the return of the writ.
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Appendix A. Different approaches –
what the jurisdictional guidances say
This appendix collects and publishes for the first time all of the caretaker
guidances from across Australia and New Zealand. This appendix collates and
provides a brief overview of the similarities and differences of the approaches
adopted by different jurisdictions.
In Australia, caretaker conventions were first published by the Commonwealth
in 1987, although they had been explicitly articulated by prime ministers since
1951. The Commonwealth guidance is both the oldest and most authoritative—the
majority of State provisions are derived from the Commonwealth. Since 1987,
the tendency has been to add prescriptive detail and to enumerate the practices
behind the conventions. Pressures on the management and interpretation of
caretaker conventions discussed in chapter 5 have prompted a transition from
the minimalist approach of a letter from Mr Menzies to his ministers, to a highly
planned and administered process of updating and disseminating the caretaker
conventions before an election, and providing advice on application during the
election campaign.
All jurisdictions except New South Wales have engaged in an increased
bureaucratisation of the process, with increased detail and advice in response
to breaches and controversies. The focus of the New South Wales guidance is
on advising ministers of their responsibilities. It directs them on behaviour that
should be avoided during an election campaign. The guidance is there to ‘assist
ministers’ and, at just over a page, has avoided the tendency of other jurisdictions
in adding detailed and more prescriptive instructions with the passage of time.
The focus of the New Zealand caretaker convention guidance, contained in The
Cabinet Manual, is broader than its Australian counterparts because of that
country’s different electoral system. Introduction of the MMP system of voting
in 1996 necessitated an increased focus on transitions and the formation of
government. It contains detailed advice about procedures when it is not clear
who will form the next government and on decision-making during an extended
caretaker period. It was noted in Chapter 2 that in 1996 the caretaker period
lasted for nine weeks. Although this has not been repeated at subsequent
elections, New Zealand departments are encouraged to plan and prepare for the
possibility of a protracted caretaker period (The Cabinet Manual 2001 DPC, p.
58).
The emphases of caretaker guidance documents have shifted from advising
ministers about appropriate conduct during the election period to supporting
public sector officials to avoid perceptions of partisanship and prevent
governments from exploiting the advantages of incumbency. The majority of
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jurisdictions now work with caretaker guidance documents that have dual
objectives. Ministers and departmental officers have different roles during an
election campaign and they need to be clear about their respective roles. As
caretaker guidance documents become more detailed with prescriptive advice
for public servants, there may be a need to develop and publish two guidances:
the first might be aimed at ministers, outlining their responsibilities within the
broader Westminster context and reiterating their relationship with the public
service during the caretaker period. The other would provide detailed advice
for departments on how best to manage internal arrangements at a time when
the fate of the Government is in the hands of the people, examples being the
signing of correspondence or decisions about departmentally supported websites.
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Australian Capital Territory
2004 General Election Guidance on Caretaker Conventions
Issued by Chief Minister’s Department, June 2004
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5. Further Information
1. Introduction
It is accepted practice within governments at both the State/Territory and
Commonwealth levels that special arrangements apply with regard to the
operation of government in the ‘caretaker period’ immediately before and after
an election.
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Each general election brings with it the possibility of a change of government,
and so it is appropriate for governments to operate in ways that will not limit
the freedom of action of an incoming government.
Successive ACT governments have adopted similar arrangements during the
caretaker period. These arrangements have no legal standing and so are known
as the ‘caretaker conventions’.
Adherence to the caretaker conventions is ultimately the responsibility of the
Chief Minister. The Chief Minister strongly supports adherence to these
longstanding conventions, and has approved these guidelines.
The following guidelines apply to all ACT Government Ministers and to all
officers of ACT Government departments and agencies.
2. The Caretaker Period
In accordance with the provisions of Section 100(1) of the Electoral (Amendment)
Act 1997, the Australian Capital Territory is scheduled to hold a general election
for the Legislative Assembly on Saturday, 16 October 2004.
It is accepted practice in the Australian system of government that the period
during which the caretaker conventions apply commences from the time of the
dissolution of the Parliament. This reflects that, after dissolution, there is no
parliamentary chamber to which a government may be held accountable.
However, under the ACT’s system of fixed terms of parliament, where the
Legislative Assembly is not dissolved until the day of a general election, the
caretaker period must be defined differently.
The ACT’s caretaker conventions apply from the beginning of the ‘election
period’ as defined by the Electoral Act 1992. Under section 3 of the Electoral
Act:
‘the ‘election period’, in relation to an election, means the period —
(a) beginning on the first day of the pre-election period; and
(b) ending when the result of the election is declared under section 189’.
The ‘pre-election period’ is defined in section 3 as:
‘…the period of 37 days ending on the expiration of polling day for an
election’.
Thus, in relation to the 2004 ACT general election, the caretaker period begins
on 10 September, which is 37 days before polling day on 16 October.
The Australian Capital Territory (Self-Government) Act 1988 requires the
Legislative Assembly to elect one of its number to be Chief Minister on the first
sitting day following a general election. The Chief Minister then appoints
Ministers to form government. Therefore, in the event of a change of government,
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the caretaker conventions will remain in force until the first sitting day of the
Legislative Assembly following a general election.
Alternatively, in the event of a returned government, the caretaker conventions
will apply until such time as the government is clearly returned (i.e. at the
declaration of the result of the election as per Section 189 of the Electoral Act).
This would be where the government has a majority of Assembly seats in its
own right, or where the government can clearly count upon a majority of
Assembly Members for support. At this time the incumbent government regains
its mandate to govern without the restrictions of the caretaker period. If,
however, the likely outcome of the election of the Chief Minister by the
Legislative Assembly remains unclear, the caretaker conventions will remain in
force until the first sitting day of the Assembly.
Note: In the event of a Federal election being called for 16 October 2004, the
ACT election will be moved to 4 December 2004. In this event the caretaker
period would begin on 29 October 2004 and, as outlined above, would end once
the election result is clear or a new government is formed. Were it the case that
the caretaker period had already begun, (i.e. that the Federal election was called
for 16 October after the commencement of the ACT caretaker period on 10
September), the caretaker conventions would cease to apply and would not
recommence until the beginning of a new caretaker period on 29 October.
3. Operations of the Government
The business of government continues during the caretaker period. However,
the caretaker conventions in effect during this period impact on a number of
areas of government administration. These areas are:
3(a) Policy Decisions
The Government should avoid taking major policy decisions likely to commit
an incoming government.
This restriction would not apply to the implementation of major policy decisions
taken and announced before the caretaker arrangements came into effect. Also,
the Government may, of course, announce during the caretaker period new
policy initiatives that it proposes to implement after the election, should the
Government be returned to office.
If circumstances require the Government to make a major policy decision during
the caretaker period that would potentially commit an incoming government,
this should be done in consultation with appropriate non-Government party
leaders/Members.
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3(b) Appointments
The Government should avoid making appointments of any significance during
the caretaker period.
Ministers should:
i. if possible, defer the appointment until after the caretaker period;
ii. if an appointment needs to be made for reasons of continuity, appoint for
a short term only to carry through until after the caretaker period; or
iii. if a short-term appointment is not practicable, appoint for the full term,
following consultation with appropriate non-Government party
leaders/Members.
3(c) Contracts and Undertakings
The Government should avoid entering into major contracts or other
undertakings during the caretaker period that are likely to commit an incoming
government.
This restriction includes commitments that would be politically contentious. If
a major contract or undertaking cannot be deferred until after the caretaker
period, the Government should seek the agreement of non-Government party
leaders/Members before entering into the contract or undertaking.
3(d) Ministerial Attendance at Intergovernmental Fora
during an Election Period
Ministers, whilst they retain their office and title during the pre-election period,
would not generally represent the ACT in intergovernmental fora unless it is
unavoidable. Where possible, Ministers and agencies should seek postponement
of such meetings until after the election. If postponement is not possible, a senior
departmental officer should attend the meeting in an observer capacity to ensure
that the ACT is fully informed of progress, briefing the Minister on return.
The usual practice is for the Chief Executive of the Chief Minister's Department
to write to jurisdictional counterparts advising them of the timing of the ACT
Election and seeking their cooperation with intergovernmental arrangements
during this period.
3(e) Requests by Ministers of Departments and Agencies
Ministers may seek a wide range of factual information during the pre-election
period, some of which may be incorporated into Ministerial speeches or political
publications. It is appropriate for the public service to provide factual information
to Ministers provided that they take no active part in the incorporation of this
material into information of a party political nature.
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3(f) Commencement of Legislation
During the caretaker period, a Minister may, by gazettal, and with the approval
of the Chief Minister, approve the commencement of legislation that has been
passed in the Legislative Assembly.
4. Operations of Departments and Agencies
During the caretaker period, the ongoing obligation on departments and agencies
to act in an apolitical manner in keeping with ACT public sector requirements,
takes on added significance. The caretaker period affects a department’s or
agency’s usual activities in several ways:
4(a) Provision of Information and Advice to Ministers
A department or agency should continue to provide information and advice
concerning the day-to-day business of government to Ministers. Accordingly,
factual material should be provided if requested by a Minister, even if it might
be drawn upon for use in speeches or other material for the election campaign.
Provided that the material is strictly factual, the use to which it is put is a matter
for the Minister.
Strictly factual analysis of opposition policies in terms of practical
implementation, for example costing, can be undertaken, but departments and
agencies need to exercise the utmost care not to become involved in critiquing
the policy. Having regard to the potential sensitivity of such requests, and
consistent with the advice of the ACT Commissioner for Public Administration
on this issue, chief executives of departments and agencies should refer such
requests to the Chief Executive, Chief Minister’s Department for decision.
4(b) Ministerial Correspondence
Ministers would usually sign only the necessary minimum of correspondence.
Any correspondence beyond this necessary minimum should be prepared for
signature by Chief Executives or their delegates, rather than allowing the
correspondence to accumulate for an incoming Minister.
In preparing correspondence, departments and agencies should avoid using
language that might be construed as implying any particular outcome of the
election. References to post-election action should be expressed in terms of ‘the
incoming Government’.
4(c) Cabinet Documents
Before the date of the election, the Chief Executives of departments and agencies
must ensure that all Cabinet documents are accounted for and securely stored
so that, if there is a change of government, the documents can be returned
promptly to the Cabinet Office for destruction in accordance with the provisions
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of the Cabinet Handbook. Alternatively, documents may be destroyed by Cabinet
Liaison Officers according to the guidelines given in the Cabinet Handbook,
which can be found at http://www.cmd.act.gov.au/
Documents/Cabinet_Handbook.pdf .
4(d) Pre-Election Budget Update
The Financial Management Act 1996 was amended in 2003 to require a
pre-election budget update be prepared by the Under Treasurer and provided
to the parliamentary counsel for notification at least 30 days before the polling
day of an ordinary election. In the case of the 2004 ACT general election this
update should be provided on or before Friday 17 September. The Financial
Management Act 1996 may be found at http://www.legislation.act.gov.au/
a/1996-22/current/pdf/1996-22.pdf .
The purpose of the pre-election budget update is to give the electorate an accurate
picture of the Territory’s financial position before the election, and allow the
assessment of the government’s performance against its financial policy
objectives. The update should include budget estimates for the Territory, General
Government Sector and Public Trading Enterprises.
4(e) Incoming Government Briefs
The Chief Minister’s Department is responsible for coordinating two sets of
incoming government briefs in the lead-up to an election. One set of briefing
papers will be developed for the event of a returned government, and the second
for the event of a newly elected government taking office.
4(f) Consultation with Public Servants by Non-Government
Parties
In order to ensure a smooth transition in the event of a change of government,
there may need to be consultation between the leaders of the non-government
parties and departmental officers during the caretaker period.
For such consultations to occur, leaders of non-government parties should request
the relevant Minister to grant access to departmental and agency officers. The
Minister should notify the Chief Minister, and the relevant Chief Executive, of
any such request and whether the request was granted.
The subject matter of the discussions between departmental and agency officers
and non-government parties should be restricted to matters relating to the
machinery of government and government administration, and may include
advice on the administrative and technical practicalities and procedures involved
in implementing policies already proposed by the parties. Officers are not
authorised to discuss Government policies or to provide opinions on alternative
policies or other party-political matters.
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Officers are to inform Ministers, through their Chief Executive, of when the
discussions are to take place.
4(g) Publications and Advertising Campaigns
During the caretaker period, departmental and agency publications and
advertising material should proceed only if they constitute a normal operational
requirement of the department or agency. In such cases, publications and
advertising material should not include photographs and/or statements of a
Minister.
Departments and agencies should carefully monitor their media releases during
the caretaker period to ensure that the material is of public interest, relates only
to the day-to-day business of the department or agency, and cannot reasonably
be construed as being for political purposes.
The ACT Electoral Commission advised government agencies through Whole of
Government Message No.225 on 27 February 2004 as to the laws applying to
the publication of electoral matter. Government agency publications do not
require authorisation as electoral matter if they include as a minimum on the
cover and/or title page:
• The Canberra coat of arms;
• The agency name; and
• The words ‘Australian Capital Territory’, ‘Australian Capital Territory
Legislative Assembly’, ‘ACT Legislative Assembly’, ‘Australian Capital
Territory Government’ or ‘ACT Government’.
However, for documents published for the first time from 16 April 2004 until
the election, authorisation is required for government agency documents that
contain a picture of a Member of the ACT Legislative Assembly.
Further guidance can be obtained from the ACT Electoral Commission’s website,
at: http://www.elections.act.gov.au/adobe/FactSheets/FactSheetAuthorising
ElectoralMaterial.pdf .
4(h) Government Use of Electronic Communication
Agency websites may retain material placed on the website before the
commencement of the caretaker period in most cases. Agencies should check
the wording of any icons and links on their websites to ensure that they cannot
be interpreted as promoting a Government policy. Agencies should add only
the following material to their websites during the caretaker period:
• agency-related announcements of a routine, apolitical nature;
• purely factual material; and
• information on existing policies and programmes, unless the information
includes statements of a partisan political nature.
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If agency websites contain links to websites outside the act.gov.au domain,
agencies should consider the need for clear entry/exit messages.
In order to avoid the need for authorisation as electoral matter, agency websites
must conform to the ACT Electoral Commission’s guidelines for government
publications, as outlined above under ‘Publications and Advertising Campaigns’.
Electronic bulletin boards and email systems provided by agencies should not
be used to publish or distribute political material. Material from political parties
and how-to-vote material, whether produced by a union, a church or any other
organisation should not be displayed.
4(i) The Use of Government Agency Premises
There may be occasions where agency premises can appropriately be used during
the caretaker period by political parties for public events, such as media
conferences, or where they are the obvious place for a function (for example,
the opening of a building by a Minister). In the case of official functions involving
the use of agency resources, it would generally be appropriate for the Opposition
spokesperson, member or candidate to be given the opportunity to be present.
It is not appropriate that the use of agency premises extend to such activities as
engaging public servants in political dialogue, or using public servants for
logistical support for political functions. Nor should the use of premises
unreasonably disrupt the normal operations of the offices concerned.
4(j) Approval of Grants
The payment of grants approved prior to the caretaker period can proceed but
should be forwarded by the Department rather than by a Minister or another
member of the Government.
During the caretaker period, commitments should not be made in respect of
grant applications received during the period or which were lodged before
commencement of the period but are awaiting decision.
4(k) Response to Parliamentary Committee Reports
Responses to outstanding parliamentary committee reports should be taken up
with the incoming government. Agencies may, however, undertake appropriate
preparatory work and consultation at the agency level so that they are in a
position to provide early advice to the incoming government.
4(l) Annual Reports
The Annual Reports (Government Agencies) Act 2004 has revised the framework
for annual reporting across the ACT Public Sector, and makes specific provisions
for the timetable for presenting annual reports in an election year. The Act
requires Ministers to table reports in the Legislative Assembly during the 3
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month period following the end of the financial year. However, the last sitting
day before the 2004 election is 26 August. Accordingly, the Chief Minister has
required that agencies and public authorities provide 17 copies of their annual
report to their Minister(s) by 24 September 2004, which must then be provided
to the Speaker by 30 September. A further 40 copies must be provided for tabling
in the Assembly on the second sitting day following the scheduled 16 October
election.
Agencies are advised that definitive guidance is available in the Chief Minister’s
Annual Reports Directions for 2003/04, to be made available from June 2004 at
Public Sector Managements’ website: http://www.psm.act.gov.au/
publications.htm . In addition, agencies may refer to the full text of the Annual
R e p o r t s  ( G o ve r n m e n t  A g e n c i e s )  A c t  2 0 0 4  a t
http://www.legislation.act.gov.au/a/2004-8/current/pdf/2004-8.pdf .
Other administrative reports and publications can be released during the
caretaker period. However, where a report or publication contains information
that is likely to be controversial, consideration should be given to whether
delivery should be deferred until after the caretaker period.
4(m) Public Sector Ethical Requirements
Public sector agencies, public employees and members of Government boards
and committees must consider numerous ethical issues during the pre-election
period with regard to their operations and conduct. These might relate to real
or perceived conflicts of interest, the public perception of impartiality in their
operation and conduct, and the participation of individuals in political
campaigning.
The Commissioner for Public Administration has issued guidance on these matters
for public officials during the pre-election period, entitled Guidance on Public
Sector Ethical Requirements during the Pre-Election Period Including the
Operation of Boards and Committees. This document is available from PSM’s
website at http://www.psm.act.gov.au/publications/ethics_election_issues.doc
. Further enquiries can be directed to Employment Policy and Workplace
Relations.
5. Further Information
Where Ministers require further clarification of these guidelines, they should
seek advice from the Chief Minister.
Where Chief Executives require further clarification of these guidelines, they
should seek advice from the Chief Executive of the Chief Minister's Department.
General inquiries regarding the caretaker period arrangements and their
application can be directed to:
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Manager, Intergovernmental Relations and Executive Projects
Cabinet Office
Chief Minister’s Department
Telephone 620 50513
Fax 620 75996
Further guidelines and information on arrangements that apply in the election
period may be accessed from:
• Public Sector Management Group
www.psm.act.gov.au
Phone: 620 76207
• ACT Electoral Commission
www.elections.act.gov.au
Phone: 620 50236
Mike Harris
Chief Executive
Chief Minister’s Department
June 2004
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New South Wales
Premier of New South Wales (Memorandum to all Ministers)
MEMORANDUM No. T2002-6
‘CARETAKER’ GOVERNMENT CONVENTIONS AND OTHER
PRE-ELECTION PRACTICES
This Memorandum relates to ‘Caretaker’ Government Conventions and other
Pre-election Practices and replaces Premier’s Memorandum T98-6.
A number of conventions that have evolved in relation to periods of ‘caretaker’
government should be adhered to in New South Wales. These conventions cover
the period leading up to an election. They apply on and from Friday, 28 February
2003, when the Legislative Assembly expires, to the declaration of the election
result.
As a general rule, no significant new decisions or initiatives, appointments, or
contractual undertakings should be made during this period. Routine government
business, however, should proceed as usual.
To assist Ministers the attached outline of the relevant conventions has been
prepared. Should any difficulties arise in the application of these conventions
in particular circumstances, Ministers should contact the Director-General,
Premier's Department, except when the matter relates to Cabinet conventions,
in which case the Director-General, The Cabinet Office, should be contacted.
Please ensure that all agencies within your portfolio are advised of these
conventions.
Bob Carr
Premier
Issued: Cabinet Secretariat
The Cabinet Office
Contact: Maria Sykes
(02) 9228-4636
Date: December, 2002.
‘Caretaker’ Government Conventions and Other Pre-Election
Practices
Successive Commonwealth and State Governments have accepted over the years
that special arrangements should apply in the period immediately before an
election. Governments assume a ‘caretaker’ role during this period to ensure
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that decisions are not taken which would bind an incoming Government and
limit its freedom of action.
The formal period during which the ‘caretaker’ conventions operate dates from
the expiration of the Legislative Assembly until the election result is clear, or,
in the event of a change of Government, until the new Government is appointed.
The general rule is that routine government business should continue during
this period, but there are some important qualifications to this:
Appointments
Ministers should avoid, wherever possible, making significant appointments
during the ‘caretaker’ period. In particular, appointments, which are potentially
controversial, should be avoided. When an appointment must be made, there
is the option of making an acting or short-term appointment.
Major Contracts and Agreements
During the ‘caretaker’ period, the Government should avoid entering into major
contracts or undertakings which have not previously been announced or for
which tenders have not been called, especially those commitments which would
be politically contentious.
Operation of Agencies
During the ‘caretaker’ period, Ministers should take particular care to ensure
that they do not compromise the neutrality of the Public Service. Material
concerning the normal day to day business of government is supplied to Ministers
in the usual way.
During the election period, Ministers should continue to attend to essential
correspondence. Other correspondence may be attended to by agencies.
Consultation by Non-Government MPs with Agency Officers
As is normally the case, requests by non-Government members of Parliament
to consult with agency officers must be made through the relevant Minister.
Ministers should draw to the attention of agency officers that they might
comment on the practicalities of implementing and administering Opposition or
other non-Government member's policies, but should not discuss Government
policies. Ministers must be advised of when discussions are to take place and
the general nature and scope of those discussions.
Cabinet Documents
As Ministers are aware, Cabinet documents are confidential and are not to be
made available to succeeding Governments drawn from different political parties.
Accordingly, Ministers should ensure that all Cabinet documents are accounted
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for and properly stored ready for return to The Cabinet Office in the event that
there is a change of Government.
Legislation
It is the practice for Bills which have passed through Parliament to be assented
to by the Governor before the expiration of the Legislative Assembly.
The Executive Council will meet as usual during the ‘caretaker’ period to consider
routine matters of Government business.
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This document is available at http://uluru.nt.gov.au/dcm_external/caretaker
These guidelines have been prepared by the Cabinet Office,
Department of the Chief Minister.
Last updated April 2005
Northern Territory of Australia - Guidance on Caretaker
Conventions
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1. Introduction
It is accepted practice within governments at both State/Territory and
Commonwealth levels that special arrangements apply with regard to the
operation of government in the ‘caretaker period’ immediately before and after
a general election.
During the caretaker period, the business of government continues and ordinary
matters of administration still need to be addressed. However, each general
election brings with it the possibility of a change of government, and so it is
appropriate for governments to operate in ways that will not limit the freedom
of action of an incoming government. These arrangements are not legally binding
and so are known as ‘caretaker conventions’. Their application in individual
cases requires judgement and common sense.
The basic caretaker conventions require a government to avoid implementing
major policy initiatives, making appointments of major significance or entering
major contracts or undertakings during the caretaker period.
Other than in exceptional circumstances, Cabinet and Executive Council functions
will cease until such time as a new government is formed.
The basic conventions are directed to decision-taking, not to policy
announcements. The caretaker conventions do not apply to new policy initiatives
which a Government may announce as part of its election campaign.
The following guidelines apply to all Northern Territory Government Ministers
and to all officers of Northern Territory Government Agencies and
instrumentalities.
2. What is the Caretaker Period?
The caretaker period commences from the prorogation (suspension) of the
Legislative Assembly by the Administrator (usually the same day as the
announcement of the General Election). The caretaker period continues until:
a. the election result shows the Government is returned; or
b. in the event of a change of Government, the new Government is appointed
by way of swearing in of the new Ministers by the Administrator.
3. Notification of Caretaker Period and Conventions
When announcing the date for a general election, the Chief Minister will write
to Ministers advising them of their role as the caretaker Government and
providing them with a copy of these guidelines.
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The Chief Executive of the Department of the Chief Minister will write to all
Agency Chief Executive Officers advising them of the commencement of the
caretaker period and that the caretaker conventions are to apply to all Agency
activities.
4. Operations of Government
4.1 Cabinet and Executive Council
The functions of Cabinet and the Executive Council will generally cease during
the caretaker period and do not resume until the incoming Government is formed.
Should it be necessary for Cabinet to convene, any deliberations and decisions
should be made in the context of the caretaker conventions.
In exceptional circumstances, and with the consent of the Administrator, the
Executive Council may convene during the caretaker period to handle urgent
non-controversial matters.
Cabinet records held in Ministerial Offices should be clearly identified and
promptly returned to the Cabinet Office before the expiry of the caretaker period,
in accordance with any instructions issued by the Cabinet Office.
4.2 Appointments
The Government should avoid making appointments of significance during the
caretaker period. Factors to consider when deciding whether a particular
appointment is significant include the inherent importance of the position and
the degree to which the appointment may be a matter of disagreement between
the major parties contesting the election.
If deferring the appointment is impracticable, usually for reasons associated
with the proper functioning of an Agency or Government body, there are several
options:
a. make an acting appointment;
b. make a substantive, but short term appointment to extend until shortly
after the end of the caretaker period; or
c. if those options are not practicable, the Minister could consult the relevant
Parliamentary Opposition spokesperson regarding a full term appointment.
4.3 Major New Policies
Governments avoid making major policy decisions during the caretaker period
that are likely to commit or limit the freedom of an incoming government.
Whether a particular policy decision qualifies as ‘major’ is a matter for judgement.
Relevant considerations include not only the significance of the decision in terms
of policy and resources, but also whether the decision is a matter of contention
between the Government and Opposition in the election campaign.
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The conventions apply to the making of decisions, not to their announcement.
Accordingly, the conventions are not infringed where decisions made before
prorogation of the Legislative Assembly are announced during the caretaker
period. However, it is preferable that decisions be announced prior to the
commencement of the caretaker period, especially if their announcement is likely
to cause controversy.
If circumstances require the Government to make a major policy decision during
the caretaker period that would potentially bind an incoming government,
consultation between the caretaker Government and the Parliamentary Opposition
should occur.
The above restrictions do not apply to the implementation of major policy
decisions taken and announced before the caretaker arrangements came into
effect.
During an election period, Ministers may not request the development of new
policy initiatives but may request factual material from Agencies.
4.4 Major New Contracts or Undertakings
The caretaker Government should avoid entering into major contracts or
undertakings which could potentially commit an incoming Government to a
particular course of action. When considering whether a contract or undertaking
qualifies as ‘major’, agencies should consider the monetary value of the
commitment, and also whether the commitment involves a routine matter of
administration or rather implements or entrenches a policy, program or
administrative structure which is politically contentious.
If a contract or undertaking cannot be deferred until after the caretaker period
for commercial or legal reasons, or for essential continuity of government reasons,
there are a number of options. The Minister could consult the relevant
Parliamentary Opposition spokesperson regarding the commitment. Agencies
could, where applicable, explain the implications of the election to the contractor
and ensure that contracts include provision for the termination of the contract
or undertaking should the incoming Government not wish to proceed. In the
case of tenders, it may be appropriate to warn potential tenderers about the
implications of the election and the possibility that the tender might not be
completed.
4.5 Intergovernmental Meetings
During the caretaker period, Ministers would not normally represent the
Northern Territory at intergovernmental meetings. Where it is not convenient
to postpone such a meeting, a senior Agency officer should attend as an observer
to ensure the Northern Territory is informed of the deliberations, and brief the
Minister afterwards as necessary. The Agency officer should make it known
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that he/she is constrained by caretaker conventions and is not authorised to
commit the incoming Government to proposed actions that may be discussed at
the meeting.
The Chief Executive of the Department of the Chief Minister will write to
jurisdictional counterparts to advise of the timing of the election and the
application of caretaker arrangements.
4.6 Hosting Dignitaries
It is preferable that visits to the Northern Territory by dignitaries be deferred
by the Chief Minister until after the caretaker period, particularly where there
is an expectation that agreements are to be made or negotiations undertaken.
In those cases where it is agreed that a visit will still proceed during the caretaker
period, dignitaries are to be advised of the election announcement and any
changes in arrangements for the visit, including the reduced availability of
Ministers.
4.7 Departmental Liaison Officers
Where Departmental Liaison Officers (DLOs) have been provided by Agencies
to assist Ministers’ offices with necessary liaison work with Agencies, the need
for that work should be reviewed at the commencement of the caretaker period.
If there is ongoing work of a liaison nature during the caretaker period, DLOs
may remain with Ministers’ offices. However, DLOs are NT Public Sector staff
and therefore are to avoid assisting Ministers in ways that could create a
perception that they are being used for party political purposes.
4.8 Ministerial Websites
Ministerial websites can continue to retain information held on them prior to
the commencement of the caretaker period. Additional materials should not be
added during the caretaker period.
5. Operation of Government Agencies
5.1 General
While the NT Public Sector is required at all times to act in an apolitical manner,
the circumstances of the caretaker period require special attention to ensure the
impartiality of the Public Sector and its ability to serve whichever Government
is elected.
The general rule during the caretaker period is that the normal business of
Government continues until the wishes of the incoming Government are known.
However, a number of aspects of an Agency’s usual activities are affected by
the caretaker period as outlined in the following sections.
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5.2 Ministerial Correspondence
During the caretaker period, Ministers usually sign only the minimum of
correspondence. In some circumstances, correspondence which would otherwise
normally be signed by a Minister may be signed by a Chief Executive Officer.
In such cases, the correspondence should make it clear that the correspondence
is being sent from the Agency due to Government being in caretaker mode.
Judgement should be exercised in determining when such action is appropriate.
It is important that Agency correspondence during the caretaker period does
not assume or imply that one party or another will form the Government after
the election.
Care should be taken to protect the NTPS from perceptions of partisanship.
Correspondence that requires an explanation of Government policy should not
commit the Government to post-election action, nor should it imply that the
policy will continue if the Government is re-elected. References to post-election
action are to be expressed in terms of the ‘incoming Government’.
5.3 Provision of Information or Advice to Ministers
During the caretaker period, Agencies should continue to provide Ministers
with information and advice relating to the general day-to-day operations of the
Agency as required. While Ministers cannot request the development of new
policy initiatives, they may continue to request factual material from Agencies.
The purpose to which such material is used is a matter for the Minister to
determine.
5.4 Legislation And Subordinate Legislation
All Bills which have been introduced in the Legislative Assembly but are yet to
be passed, automatically lapse when the Assembly is prorogued.
Every effort should be made to ensure that Bills passed by the Assembly are
presented to the Administrator for assent prior to prorogation of the Assembly.
Advice will be sought by the Clerk of the Legislative Assembly if it is considered
necessary to present a proposed law to the Administrator for assent during the
caretaker period.
Where a commencement notice for a new Act has been signed by the
Administrator, every effort should be made to ensure that publication (gazettal)
of the notice occurs prior to prorogation of the Assembly. If a commencement
notice has been signed by the
Administrator but not published at the time of prorogation, consideration needs
to be given as to the appropriateness of publishing it during the caretaker period.
Once the caretaker period has commenced, Ministers should avoid requesting
the Administrator to sign commencement documentation for Acts.
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It is possible, where there is a genuine need and where there is no infringement
of the basic caretaker conventions, for subordinate legislation (e.g. regulations)
to be made by the Administrator, acting on the advice of the Executive Council,
during the caretaker period (see also section 4.1 on Cabinet and Executive
Council).
5.5 Public Information Programs
5.5.1 Advertising
The definition of advertising is broad and includes print, radio, television,
cinema, web and all outdoor advertising.
As a general rule, advertising should not be undertaken by Government Agencies
during the caretaker period except to fulfil statutory requirements or to provide
essential information to the public. Examples of public information may include:
• Advertising of emergency information, such as natural disaster information
• Promotion of essential community health information, such as the outbreak
of a disease, mosquito warnings, etc.
• Advertising of road closures or road works.
If it is necessary to advertise at all, Agencies should consider their obligations
under the Electoral Act and the Australian Broadcasting Act. In the interests of
risk management, it is desirable that all advertising placed by Agencies during
the period of the election be officially authorised on behalf of the Government.
In all cases, the person authorising the advertisement will need to be named in
the manner described at Appendix A. This person is likely to be the CEO or a
senior delegate, as the named individual becomes personally responsible for the
advertising material. For this reason, the authorising officer should be satisfied
that each advertisement placed during an election period is necessary, factual
and free from political inference.
5.5.2 Media Releases
During the caretaker period, Agencies should ensure that any media releases
focus on issues of public interest relating to the day-to-day operations of the
Agency. The Government’s guidelines for advertising may assist in considering
whether the content of a media release is appropriate.
5.5.3 Government Websites
All Agency websites must carry authorisations on at least the home page in the
form shown at Appendix A. Websites should also warn internet users when
they are leaving the website to ensure there is no confusion about the material
being authorised. See Appendix A.
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5.5.4 Other Materials
During the caretaker period, Agencies should avoid the active distribution of
materials such as brochures, newsletters, DVDs and booklets that have an
emphasis on the achievements of Government.
5.6 Public Speaking
NT Public Sector officers should generally decline to speak publicly during the
caretaker period. If officers wish to speak at a public meeting, they should seek
permission beforehand from the Chief Executive Officer of their Agency. NT
Public Sector officers should not attempt to explain or promote Government
policies during this time.
5.7 Approval of Grants
The payment of grants approved prior to the caretaker period can proceed but
should be forwarded by the Agency rather than by a Minister or another member
of the Government. During the caretaker period, commitments should not be
made in respect of grant applications received during the caretaker period or
which were lodged before commencement of that period but are awaiting
decision.
5.8 Hospitality by Agencies
Agencies should exercise care in hosting official functions during the caretaker
period to avoid any perception that the function is for electioneering or political
purposes. Generally speaking, such functions should only proceed where they
were scheduled prior to the calling of the election.
If Agency resources are being used to host an official function during the
caretaker period where a Minister is present, it is appropriate to give the
Parliamentary Opposition spokesperson the opportunity to attend.
5.9 Statutory Authorities and Government Owned
Corporations and Companies
The relationship between Ministers and bodies such as statutory authorities and
government companies, varies from body to body. However, those bodies should
observe the caretaker conventions and practices unless to do so would conflict
with their legal obligations or compelling commercial/organisational
requirements.
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6. Important Agency Responsibilities during the Caretaker
Period
6.1 Cabinet Documents
Cabinet documents are treated as confidential to the Government which created
them. Accordingly, such documents are not available to succeeding Governments
drawn from different political parties. The Cabinet Handbook, which is available
on the NT Government intranet site, provides further guidance for Agencies on
this topic.
Before the date of the election, Chief Executive Officers of Agencies are to ensure
that all Cabinet documents in the Agency’s possession are to be accounted for
and securely stored. In the event of a change of government, any Cabinet
documents not strictly required for retention by the Agency are to be destroyed
under the supervision of the Agency Secretariat or the Cabinet Office, with any
retained Cabinet documents to be stored subject to the appropriate security
arrangements.
6.2 Incoming Government Briefings
During the caretaker period, Agencies are required to prepare two sets of briefing
documents. The first set should be prepared on the basis that the current
Government will be returned, and the second set on the basis that there is a
change in government.
The briefing documents should provide the incoming Minister with a
comprehensive statement of the organisation, structure, budget, functions and
major current issues facing the Agency.
7. Guidelines for Consultation by the Opposition with
Agency Officers
In order to ensure a smooth transition in the event of a change in Government,
the following guidelines for pre-election consultation between the Parliamentary
Opposition and Agency officers should apply:
a. Consultations with Agencies are initiated by the Opposition spokesperson
making a request to the relevant Minister to meet with Agency personnel.
The Minister is to notify the Chief Minister as to the nature of the request
and whether it has been granted;
b. Agencies are to be represented in such discussions by the relevant Chief
Executive Officer, accompanied by senior Agency officers if necessary;
c. The subject matter of the discussions between Agency officers and
Opposition spokespersons should relate only to the machinery of
Government and its administration. Discussions may also relate to the
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resources generally available in the portfolio area to implement policies of
the incoming Government;
d. Agency officers are not authorised to provide an opinion on the merits of
Government or Opposition policy; and
e. Queries about approval of particular requests for consultation should be
handled between the relevant Minister and the Chief Minister. Requests
which involve an unreasonable amount of work by the Agency may
properly be denied.
8. Political Participation by NTPS Officers
NT Public Sector officers should not use Agency resources or their position to
support particular political purposes.
While it is recognised that NT Public Sector officers have the right to participate
in public life, potential conflicts of interest, whether real or perceived, should
be brought to the attention of the relevant Chief Executive Officer in accordance
with the Northern Territory Public Sector Principles and Code of Conduct made
under the Public Sector Employment and Management Act.
NTPS officers should also refer to the document NTPS employees and elections
- Guidelines for public sector employee conduct during election periods and
Procedures for contesting Federal, State, Territory or Local Government elections
(January 2005) published by the Office of the Commissioner for Public
Employment, and available at the following website:
http://www.nt.gov.au/ocpe/public_sector/Guidelines_employees_elections.pdf
Appendix A - Guidelines for Advertising during the
Caretaker Period
Newspapers: Print advertising is controlled under the Electoral Act. All
advertisements must comply as follows:
• The word ADVERTISEMENT must appear at the top of each advertisement
in a minimum 10pt Helvetica font (or equivalent).
• The advertisement must be authorised by a named person on behalf of the
Northern Territory Government. For example:
Authorised by Mike Burgess on behalf of the Northern Territory
Government, Department of Business, Industry and Resource
Development, The Esplanade, Darwin.
Television: The standard authorisation tags placed on Northern Territory
Government television advertisements will need to be expanded to include both
the name of the individual authorising the advertisement as well as a voiceover
carrying the ‘Spoken by J Bloggs and L Smith’ (during non-election periods,
these words are only written on the end screen).
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At the end of each advertisement, a black screen will appear carrying the
following words in white text. For example:
Authorised by Robert Griew on behalf of the Northern Territory
Government, Department of Health and Community Services, Mitchell
Street, Darwin.
Spoken by J Bloggs and L Smith.
At the same time these words appear on screen, they must also be spoken.
Some advertisements have been exempted from using authorisation tags on
television and radio advertisements during non-election periods. These
exemptions do not apply during election periods.
Radio Advertising: Again, the normal authorisation tags will need to be extended
during an election period. At the end of each advertisement, the following words
must be spoken, for example:
Authorised by Richard Galton on behalf of the Northern Territory
Government, Department of Corporate and Information Services,
Cavenagh Street, Darwin.
Spoken by J Bloggs and L Smith.
Again, any exemptions from using the authorisation tag do not apply during an
election campaign.
Outdoor Advertising (billboards, buses, taxis, outdoor signage, airport signage,
etc): Agencies should urgently review any existing advertising or signage of
this nature and authorise it immediately. This signage must be authorised, usually
by placing a ‘sticker’ or some other additional signage on it. The words must be
as follows, e.g.:
Authorised by Sarah Butterworth on behalf of the Northern Territory
Government, Department of Infrastructure, Planning and Environment,
Cavenagh Street, Darwin.
There is no minimum size required for this authorisation.
Internet/Intranet websites: All Agency websites must carry authorisations on
at least the home page. Information in the metadata tag is not enough. The
authorisation may appear in the footer of the home page. For example:
Responsibility for comment in this website is taken by Paul Tyrrell on
behalf of the Northern Territory Government, Department of the Chief
Minister, Mitchell Street, Darwin.
To ensure there is no confusion about what the CEO is taking responsibility for,
Agencies must make it clear to the user when they are leaving the Agency
website. For example, a message should appear when leaving the website carrying
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words such as ‘You are now leaving the Northern Territory Government website.
No responsibility can be taken for the accuracy of information outside of this
site’.
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Queensland
9.1 Basic Conventions and Practices
Successive Commonwealth and State Governments have accepted that special
arrangements apply in the period immediately before an election, in recognition
of the considerations that:
with the dissolution of the Legislative Assembly, there is no popular
Chamber to which the Executive Government can be responsible; and
every general election brings with it the possibility of a change of
government.
By convention, the government assumes a caretaker role from the time that the
Legislative Assembly is dissolved, and ensures that decisions are not taken which
would bind an incoming government and limit its freedom of action.
The basic caretaker conventions require a government to avoid implementing
major policy initiatives, making appointments of significance or entering into
major contracts or undertakings during the caretaker period. The basic
conventions are directed to the making of decisions, and not to policy
announcements. The caretaker conventions do not, of course, apply to new
policy promises which a government may announce as part of its election
campaign.
There are other established practices, usually regarded as part of the caretaker
conventions, which govern activities in the election period. These are mainly
directed at ensuring that departments should avoid any partisanship during an
election campaign. They address matters such as the nature of requests that
Ministers may make of their departments, procedures for consultation by the
Opposition with departmental officers, travel by Ministers and their Opposition
counterparts and the continuation of government advertising campaigns.
Adherence to the conventions and practices (which have no formal legal standing)
is ultimately the responsibility of the Premier. Where Ministers are in doubt
about a particular matter, they should raise it with the Premier.
9.2 The Caretaker Period
The caretaker conventions operate from the dissolution of the Legislative
Assembly until the election result is clear or, in the event of a change of
government, until the new government is appointed. However, it is also accepted
that some care should be exercised in the period between the announcement of
the election and the dissolution of the Legislative Assembly.
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9.3 Notification of the Convention(s)
Shortly after the announcement of an election, the Premier will write to all
Ministers, summarising the conventions which will apply from the dissolution
of the Legislative Assembly and other matters which relate to the election period.
The Director-General of the Department of the Premier and Cabinet will write
to all Chief Executive Officers advising them of the caretaker conventions and
when they will commence.
The Cabinet Secretariat will also circulate information to all CLLO's advising
them of caretaker conventions, as soon as the election is announced.
9.4 Appointments
By convention a caretaker government should avoid, wherever possible, making
appointments of significance in the caretaker period. Factors in deciding whether
or not a particular appointment is significant include the degree to which it may
be a matter of disagreement between the major parties contesting the election,
as well as the position's inherent importance.
As a rule, significant appointments dated to commence after polling day would
not be made in the caretaker period. Appointments which would normally be
made after the date of dissolution are deferred until after the election.
Where it is necessary for a significant appointment to be made during the
caretaker period, usually for reasons associated with the proper function of the
agency concerned, there are several options available.
One is that provisions for an acting appointment, where available, are used to
avoid the need for a substantive appointment. Another is that a short term
appointment, normally of up to three months' duration, is made.
9.5 Major New Policy Implementation, Contracts or
Undertakings
The broad rule is that governments should avoid implementing new policies, or
entering into major contracts or undertakings during the caretaker period. This
includes commitments which could bind an incoming government. Major
contracts or undertakings should not be considered only in terms of monetary
commitment but should also take into account other relevant factors such as the
nature of the undertaking and the level of bipartisan support.
Consistent with this requirement, major project approvals within government
programs are normally deferred by Ministers.
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9.6 Operations of Departments
The general rule during the caretaker period is that the normal business of
government continues until the incoming government's wishes are known.
Several aspects of a department's usual activities are, however, affected.
While departments are concerned at all times to avoid partisanship, the
circumstances of an election campaign require special attention to the need to
ensure the impartiality of the Public Service and its ability to serve whatever
government is elected.
During the election period, Ministers would usually sign only necessary or
routine correspondence. It is desirable that judgement be used in determining
whether correspondence of significance should be signed in this period by the
Minister or by the Chief Executive Officer. Care is taken when preparing
departmental replies not to assume that one party or another will form the
government after the election. References to post-election action are in terms of
the ‘incoming government’.
During an election period, Ministers may not request the development of new
policy initiatives but may request factual material from departments.
Departmental officers should not use their official position to act in a partisan
manner.
Departmental officers who feel there is a difficulty with a particular request
from a Minister may raise the matter with the Chief Executive Officer of the
Department who may, if necessary, consult with the Director-General of the
Department of the Premier and Cabinet.
9.7 Guidelines for Consultation by The Opposition with
Departmental Officers
In order to ensure a smooth transition in the event of a change of government,
the following guidelines for pre-election consultation between the Parliamentary
Opposition and departmental officers should apply.
These guidelines may come into operation before the caretaker period, and apply
as soon as the election announcement has been made or two months before the
expiry of the term of the Legislative Assembly, whichever date occurs first. Like
the practice in all other Australian jurisdictions, consultations during the
caretaker period are conducted through informal discussions:
Consultations with departments are initiated by the Opposition spokesperson
making a request for access to the relevant Minister, who will notify the Premier
as to the nature of the request and as to whether it has been granted.
The subject matter of the discussion between officers and the Opposition
spokespersons relates to the machinery of government and administration and
the resources generally available in the portfolio area as they would relate to
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the implementation of Opposition policy. Officers are not authorised to discuss
the merits of policies of either the government or the Opposition.
Officers are to inform Ministers when the discussions are taking place and
Ministers are entitled only to seek assurances that the discussions are kept within
the agreed purposes. The content of the discussion is confidential to the
participants.
Departments will be represented in such discussions by the Chief Executive
Officer and an appropriate officer with relevant expertise from the Department
of the Premier and Cabinet.
For the purpose of facilitating consultation, the Chief Executive Officer should
seek details of the likely topics for discussion so that relevant information can
be made available during the deliberations. Information should only be presented
in the form in which it exists at the time of the consultation (eg. annual reports,
program statements, etc.). Alternatively, information can be communicated
orally.
The creation of documents for, or records of, consultations should be avoided.
The confidentiality of matters raised during discussions should remain insulated
from partisan political debate during an election period. Specific material
generated for, or notes taken during, the meeting would form an official record
of the proceedings and seriously undermine the requisite confidentiality of the
consultation particularly if the records subsequently became public.
Departments will be expected to prepare two sets of briefing documents for the
incoming government. One set will be drafted on the basis that the current
government is returned, the second set on the basis that a new government is
elected. Both sets of briefing documents should aim to provide the incoming
Minister with a comprehensive statement of the organisation, structure, budget,
functions and major current issues facing the department.
Queries about approval of particular requests for consultation should be handled
between a Minister and the Premier. Requests which involve an unreasonable
amount of work by the department may properly be denied.
9.8 Cabinet Documents
It is a requirement that Cabinet documents are treated as confidential to the
government that created them. Accordingly, such documents are generally not
made available to succeeding governments drawn from different political parties,
except in specific circumstances related to continuity of administration. Refer
to Chapter 4.15.5 ‘Access to past government's Cabinet documents by the present
government’.
At the beginning of the caretaker period and in accordance with instructions
issued by the Cabinet Secretary, all Cabinet documents previously circulated
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by the Cabinet Secretariat and held in ministerial and departmental offices should
be clearly identified and prepared for possible return to the Cabinet Secretariat
for disposal purposes. In the event of a change of government, the outgoing
Premier will issue instructions through the Cabinet Secretary about the disposal
of documents of the outgoing administration.
9.9 Legislation
All Bills that have been introduced in the Legislative Assembly but are yet to
be passed, automatically lapse when the Legislative Assembly is dissolved.
Likewise, all Bills passed by the Legislative Assembly and awaiting Royal Assent
will lapse with the dissolution of the Assembly.
By convention, the Governor should not proclaim the commencement of any
Acts during the caretaker period. It is therefore necessary to ensure that all Bills
which are awaiting Royal Assent and/or proclamation receive Assent and/or are
proclaimed prior to the dissolution of the Legislative Assembly.
It is possible, where there is a need and where there is no infringement of the
basic caretaker conventions, for subordinate legislation to be approved by the
Governor in Council during the caretaker period.
9.10 Executive Council during the Caretaker Period
Ordinary meetings of the Executive Council are not held during the caretaker
period. However, with the consent of the Premier and the Governor, special
sittings of Executive Council may be held to consider limited business.
Arrangements for Executive Council will be forwarded to all departments by
the Executive Council Secretariat at the commencement of the caretaker period.
9.11 Other Matters
It has become accepted that the Premier considers whether any government
advertising campaigns, which would otherwise be conducted during the caretaker
period, should be suspended or curtailed.
Campaigns highlighting the role of particular Ministers or addressing issues
which are controversial between the major political parties normally would be
discontinued.  Advertisements promoting rights or entitlements or which are
of an operational nature usually continue.
If necessary, the Premier also considers whether visits to Queensland by foreign
dignitaries, involving government hospitality, should proceed.  In any case, the
dignitaries are advised of the election announcement and any changes in
arrangements, including the reduced availability of Ministers.
The Council of Australian Governments or the Ministerial Councils may meet
during a caretaker period.  If such a meeting is to be held during this time,
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Ministers should generally refrain from attending and adopting or announcing
policy positions.  Where the interests of the State need to be represented, it may
be prudent for the Chief Executive Officer or another senior official of the
relevant agency to attend in an observer role.  If a major agreement is scheduled
for discussion or ratification, the Chief Executive Officer should seek deferral
of the item of rescheduling of the meeting until after the conclusion of the
caretaker period.
118
Different approaches – what the jurisdictional guidances say
South Australia
Caretaker Conventions and Other Pre-Election Practices
A Guide for South Australian Government Agencies
Cabinet Office
August 2005
Caretaker conventions in Australia go back at least as far as the administration
of Sir Robert Menzies. By 1961, it had become established practice for the Prime
Minister to remind Ministers of the special need to avoid ‘major policy decisions
or important appointments’ in the caretaker period.
The following principles are therefore based in part on the conventions
established by the Commonwealth Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet,
and formally adopted by most other states: including South Australia in all recent
elections.
Timing of Next Election
Section 28 of the South Australian Constitution Act 1934 provides for fixed
four-year terms so that the next state election will be held on 18 March 2006.
By convention, the caretaker period starts when the writs for the election are
issued. The caretaker period will run from the date of issue of the writ until the
outcome of the election is clear.
Despite the move to fixed four year terms, no amendment was made to the
provisions of the Electoral Act that govern the issue of the writs.1
This provides the incumbent Government with flexibility in determining the
length of the official election campaign.
The current situation is that the Premier may call an election (have a writ issued
by the Governor) on any day between Monday 23 January 2006 (for an election
period of 55 days) and Tuesday 21 February 2006 (for a short election period of
25 days).
Basic Conventions and Practices
Successive Commonwealth and State Governments have accepted that special
arrangements apply in the period immediately before an election, in recognition
of the considerations that:
• with the dissolution of the House of Assembly, there is no popular chamber
to which the Executive Government can be responsible;
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• every general election brings with it the possibility of a change of
government.
By convention the Government assumes a caretaker role from the announcement
of an election by the Premier and ensures that decisions are not taken which
would bind an incoming government and limit its freedom of action.
The basic caretaker conventions require a government to avoid implementing
major policy initiatives, making appointments of significance or entering into
major contracts or undertakings during the caretaker period.
The basic conventions are directed to the taking of decisions, and not to policy
announcements. The caretaker conventions do not, of course, apply to new
policy promises which a government may announce as part of its election
campaign.
There are other established practices, usually regarded as being part of the
caretaker conventions, which govern activities in the election period. These are
mainly directed at ensuring that agencies should avoid any partisanship during
an election campaign. They address matters such as the nature of requests that
Ministers may make of their agencies, procedures for consultation by the
Opposition with agency officers, travel by Ministers and their Opposition
counterparts and the continuation of Government advertising campaigns.
Adherence to these conventions and practices (which have no formal legal
standing) is ultimately the responsibility of the Premier. Where Ministers are
in doubt about a particular matter, they should raise it with the Premier.
The Caretaker Period
The caretaker conventions operate from the announcement of an election by the
Premier until the election result is clear or, in the event of a change of
government, until the result is clear leading to the appointment of a new
government.
Notification of the Conventions
Immediately after the announcement of an election, the Premier will write to all
Ministers, summarising the conventions which will apply and other matters
which relate to the election period. The Chief Executive of the Department of
the Premier and Cabinet will write to all Chief Executives advising them of the
caretaker conventions.
Executive Government
When an election is announced, the Premier will have asked the Governor to
dissolve the House of Assembly and authorise an election (Section 47, Electoral
Act). It is accepted practice that Ministers of the Crown continue in office. It is
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also accepted practice that the Executive Council continues to operate after the
dissolution of Parliament as logically does the Cabinet. This is a reflection of the
basic principle of the Westminster system of the separation of powers between
the Parliament, the Executive and the Judiciary.
Thus, during the caretaker period, the normal business of Executive Government
continues with the exception that by convention it is not considered appropriate
for the Executive Government to undertake significant business (which might
not be in accordance with the wishes of an incoming government and which
would not have the scrutiny of a House of Assembly). Thus, Cabinet may
continue to meet for routine matters which could not be classified as ‘major’
undertakings, initiatives or appointments. (See the discussion which follows.)
It is also possible, where there is a need and where there is no infringement of
the basic caretaker convention, for subordinate legislation and certain other
matters to be approved by the Governor in Executive Council during the
caretaker period. The agenda of Cabinet would also reflect this situation.
Significant Appointments
During a caretaker period, the making of all significant appointments should be
avoided wherever possible.
The judgment as to whether or not a particular appointment is significant would
include:
• the position’s inherent importance;
• the degree to which it may be a matter of disagreement between the two
major parties.
The rule has been that significant appointments which would commence after
polling day are not made in the caretaker period. Appointments which would
normally be made after the date of dissolution are generally deferred until after
the election.
When it is necessary for a significant appointment to be made during the
caretaker period for reasons of operational functioning of the agency, either an
acting appointment or a short term appointment for up to three months may be
made.
However, if a short term appointment is not practicable, an appointment may
be made following consultation with the relevant Opposition spokesperson.
Boards and Committees
Vacancies may occur on government boards and committees during the caretaker
period. As mentioned above, the caretaker conventions prohibit appointments
of ‘significance’ during the caretaker period. If a board or committee experiencing
a vacancy is able to operate legally and effectively with a quorum during the
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period, they should be encouraged to do so without the need for any new
appointment.
If a ‘non-significant’ appointment is necessary, then short term appointments
should be considered. A practical consideration is the fact that meetings of
Cabinet and Executive Council will be infrequent during the election period.
Major New Policy Implementation, Contracts or
Undertakings
The broad rule is that governments should avoid implementing new policies, or
entering into major contracts or undertakings during the caretaker period. This
includes commitments which could bind an incoming government.
Consistent with this requirement, major project approvals and major new
contracts within Government programs are normally deferred by Ministers.
However, where the Government has previously announced its commitment to
enter into the contract, and the substance of the terms have been agreed before
the election is called, or the contract is in the nature of a collateral agreement
into which the Government is obliged to enter, then the execution of that contract
is viewed as an administrative act and is not caught by the caretaker convention.
Similarly, where the Government is obliged to enter into a contract (e.g. because
of a collateral contract) the convention does not prevent this occurring. However
where there are still significant policy matters to be determined in respect of a
contract and the contract is of real significance (either because of its subject
matter, complexity, amount involved or political sensitivity) then it should not
be executed during the election period.
Departmental Operations
During the caretaker period, Ministers would usually sign only necessary or
routine correspondence. It is desirable that judgment be used in determining
whether correspondence of significance should be signed in this period by the
Minister or by the Chief Executive. Care is taken when preparing departmental
relies not to assume that one party or another will form the Government after
the election. References to post election action are in terms of the ‘incoming
Government’.
Judgment is required with regard to the development of new policy initiatives.
Departmental officers who feel there is a difficulty with a particular request
from a Minister may raise the matter with their Chief Executive, who may consult
with the Chief Executive of the Department of the Premier and Cabinet.
Cabinet Documents and Agency Files
Successive governments have also accepted the convention that Ministers should
not seek access to documents recording the deliberations of Ministers in previous
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governments. Cabinet documents, in particular, are considered confidential to
the government that created them. In this context, all Cabinet documents,
including files, submissions and related documents should be returned to the
custody of Chief Executives for storage until the result of the election is known.
Each Chief Executive should advise the Executive Director, Cabinet Office when
they have accounted for all documents and ensured they are securely stored.
Legislation
All Bills which have been introduced in the Parliament but are yet to be passed,
automatically lapse when Parliament is dissolved.
It is the practice for Bills which have been passed through Parliament to be
assented to by the Governor and, if necessary, proclaimed before the election is
announced. At the same time subordinate legislation, including instruments
made under Acts just assented to, may be approved by the Governor in Council.
Legislation that has already been assented to may be proclaimed during the
caretaker period.
It is also possible, where there is a need and where there is no infringement of
the basic caretaker conventions, for subordinate legislation and certain other
matters to be approved by the Governor in Council during the caretaker period.
Ministerial Councils
When a Ministerial Council meeting is scheduled to take place during the
caretaker period, the Minister concerned should be mindful of the caretaker
conventions when considering participation in the meeting. Ministers should
ensure that any statements of policy position are made subject to the qualification
that the Government is in a caretaker position and policy may be open to change.
Subject to the concurrence of the Ministerial Council, the Government may elect
to send an official observer to the meeting (generally a senior public official).
Advertising Campaigns
It is accepted that during the caretaker period the Premier will consider all
advertising campaigns, with particular regard to campaigns that that may be
regarded as being party political in nature. In these cases, campaigns must be
suspended.
Advertising or promotional campaigns that do not overtly favour the party in
government, such as community based information campaigns or advertisements
of an operational nature, may continue during this caretaker period.
Telephone Answering Messages
During an election campaign the Government’s promotional material is subjected
to greater scrutiny than normal. This includes the telephone answering messages
123
South Australia
attached to agency numbers. Depending on the matters raised during the election
campaign, some of these messages may be considered as electoral advertisements
(‘calculated to affect the outcome of the election’) within the meaning of the
Electoral Act 1985. They should therefore cease during the election period. It is
not appropriate that electoral advertising material be funded from agency
budgets.
Agency and Ministerial Websites
Ministers have an obligation to ensure that political material is not contained
on publicly funded websites.
Agencies may continue to maintain and fund the maintenance of ministerial
websites during the caretaker period and material placed on the minister’s
website before the caretaker period may be retained, as may links between the
Minister’s and agency’s websites. However, agencies should add to ministerial
websites only material relating to matters of existing policy or purely factual
material.
Material concerning future policies, election commitments, how-to-vote material
or media releases and speeches that criticise opponents, promote the Government
or pursue election issues should not be displayed on a government website.
Credit Cards
Access to credit cards charged to agency budgets should be strictly monitored
during the caretaker period and their use strictly controlled. Special care should
be taken with entertainment expenses.
Relationship Between Agencies and Ministerial Offices
By agreement with ministers, special arrangements for communication with their
offices should be considered during the caretaker period. The aim is to ensure
that agencies can continue to operate at ‘arms length’ from political activity
while ensuring that the ongoing business of government continues to be
addressed.
It may be appropriate, for example, to request that all communications with
agencies pass through Chief Executive’s offices or through some delegated senior
staff.
Use of Government Premises
While there should be no difficulty with the responsible use by all parties
campaigning in an election of agency premises that are normally open to public
use, it is most important during an election campaign that public servants not
engage in party political activity. For that reason, it is not appropriate that
premises be used as logistical support for political functions.
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Public Servants in Ministers’ Offices
Generally, public servants must not be seen to be supporting particular issues
or parties during the election campaign. Proper lines of supervision and support
for public servants working in Ministers’ offices are essential to avoid potential
conflicts of interest. For this reason it is entirely proper if the normal reporting
relationships of public servants to Ministers and Ministerial staff is changed by
Chief Executives during the caretaker period, following consultation with
Ministers.
Non-essential public servants may be recalled from offices for the period but
common sense would require that continuity of government and the usual
services of the office need to continue, especially if there is any change of
ministerial responsibilities following an election.
Access to Public Servants by Members of Parliament
Access to public servants by Members of Parliament should normally proceed
through application to the relevant Minister. (PSM Act Determination 9 – Ethical
Conduct – Access by Members of Parliament to Public Servants.)
Public Servants may not discuss the affairs of Government with a Shadow
Minister unless agreed by the Minister after consultation with the Premier. The
procedure will be initiated by the relevant Opposition spokesperson making a
request of the Minister concerned, who will notify the Premier of the request
and whether it has been agreed. Officials will inform their Ministers when any
approved discussions are taking place.
Party Leaders may have other Members of Parliament or their staff members
present.
Officials will not be authorised to discuss Government policies or to give opinions
on matters of a party political nature. The subject matter of the discussions
would relate to the machinery of Government and administration. The discussions
may include the administrative and technical practicalities and procedures
involved in implementation of policies proposed by the Opposition parties.
Should the Opposition representatives raise matters which, in the judgment of
the officials, seek information on Government policies or seek expressions of
opinion on alternative policies, the officials would suggest that the matters be
raised with the Minister.
Protocol
Official Visits
Dignitaries need to be informed of the election announcement. It would be
normal for any official visits already scheduled and now falling within the
caretaker period to be postponed. However, where a visit that is non-political
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is scheduled, it could proceed and advice must be provided to the Premier
regarding these circumstances and the desirability and practicability of the visit
continuing or being postponed.
Appointments for dignitaries to meet with the Premier, Ministers and the Leader
of the Opposition are generally cancelled. An appointment with the relevant
Chief Executive could be arranged as an alternative.
No inter-governmental agreements should be signed and no formal letters of
invitation to overseas dignitaries should be issued during the caretaker period.
Hospitality
Generally official functions of a formal nature, i.e. luncheons, dinners and
receptions, scheduled to be hosted by the Premier or Ministers are postponed
or cancelled but in the circumstances referred to under ‘Official Visits’ they may
continue.
There may be circumstances where the Governor could be asked to host a
function during the caretaker period.
Titles
Any Ministers who lose their seats during the election and have served a term
of three or more years in Cabinet can, through the Premier, seek permission of
the Governor to retain the title ‘Honourable’.
Advice on all official ministerial functions may be obtained from the Manager,
Protocol on telephone 8226 3627.
Public Servants Contesting an Election
PSM Act Determination 2 – Recruitment and Employment of Non-executive
Employees – Employees Contesting Elections provides information on the
employment options for public servants contesting an election.
The Constitution Act precludes any officer or employee of the Crown from being
elected to the South Australian Parliament. The Act states that the resignation
of a public servant must be effective before the date of declaration of the poll.
However, if they are the only candidate for a seat, they will be declared as elected
without a poll, on the day of nomination. Public servants intending to contest
an election should therefore ensure that their resignation is effective before the
date of declaration of the poll and may also wish to seek permission to lodge a
provisional resignation, effective on the day nominations close, which takes
effect only if they are the sole candidate.
For the purposes of contesting an election a public servant may choose to resign
at an earlier date, apply for leave or electioneer in their own time. However,
employees should note that if they do not resign from the public service while
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electioneering they are potentially in a position of conflict of interest, and the
provisions of Section 56 of the Public Sector Management Act may apply.
Departmental property and time must not be used for campaigning purposes.
Where an employee has chosen to resign in order to contest an election and is
not successful, the Public Sector Management Act requires that the employee
be reappointed (Section 54) and the break in service will be deemed to be leave
without pay.
ENDNOTES
1  Subsection 48(2) of the Electoral Act provides that a writ must fix:
• the date and time for the close of the rolls (which must be a date falling not less than seven days
nor more than 10 days after the date of the issue of the writ);
• the date for nominations (which must be a date falling not less than three days nor more than 14
days after the date fixed for the close of the rolls);
• the date for the polling (which is now fixed under section 28(1) of the Constitution Act)
• the date for the return of the writ.
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1 Introduction
1.1 By convention, during the period preceding an election for the House of
Assembly, the government assumes a ‘caretaker role’. This practice recognises
that, with the dissolution of the House, the Executive cannot be held accountable
for its decisions in the normal manner, and that every State election carries the
possibility of a change of government.
1.2 The caretaker period begins at the time the House of Assembly is dissolved
and continues until the election result is clear or, if there is a change of
government, until the new government is appointed.
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1.3 During the caretaker period, the business of government continues and
ordinary matters of administration still need to be addressed. The role of
government agencies remains unchanged, the provision of all normal services
should continue and statutory responsibilities are not affected.
1.4 However, successive governments have followed a set of practices, known
as the ‘caretaker conventions’, which aim to ensure that their actions do not
inappropriately bind an incoming government and limit its freedom of action.
1.5 While business continues, as it applies to ordinary matters of administration,
the caretaker conventions do affect some aspects of executive government. In
summary, the conventions are that the government avoids:
• making major policy decisions that are likely to commit an incoming
government;
• making significant appointments; and
• entering major contracts or undertakings.
1.6 There are also established conventions and practices associated with the
caretaker conventions that are directed at protecting the apolitical nature of the
state service, preventing controversies about the role and work of the State
Service during an election campaign, and avoiding the use of State Government
resources in a manner to advantage a particular party.
1.7 The conventions and practices have developed primarily in the context of
the relationship between Ministers and their portfolio departments. The
relationship between Ministers and other bodies, such as statutory authorities,
government business enterprises and State-owned companies, varies from body
to body. However, those bodies should also observe caretaker conventions and
practices unless to do so would conflict with their legal obligations or compelling
organisational requirements.
1.8 The following notes are intended to explain the conventions and practices
in more detail and to provide guidance for the handling of business during the
caretaker period. The conventions are neither legally binding nor hard and fast
rules. Their application in individual cases requires judgement and common
sense. The Secretary, Department of Premier and Cabinet is able to provide
information and advice to agencies, but responsibility for observing the
conventions ultimately rests with heads of agency and, in matters where they
are involved, with the relevant Ministers.
2 Major Policy Commitments
2.1 Governments avoid making major policy decisions during the caretaker
period that are likely to commit an incoming government. Whether a particular
policy decision qualifies as ‘major’ is a matter for judgement. Relevant
considerations include not only the significance of the commitment in terms of
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policy and resources, but also whether the decision is a matter of contention
between the Government and opposition parties in the election campaign.
2.2 The conventions apply to the making of commitments, not to their
announcement. Accordingly, the conventions are not necessarily contravened
where commitments made before the calling of an election are announced during
the caretaker period. However, where possible, commitments about policies that
have been agreed but not made public should be announced ahead of the
caretaker period if their announcement is likely to cause controversy during the
election campaign.
2.3 The conventions do not apply to promises on future policies that the party
in government announces as part of its election campaign.
2.4 If circumstances require the Government to make a major policy commitment
during the caretaker period that would bind an incoming government, the
relevant Minister, after agreement with the Premier, would usually consult the
Opposition spokesperson beforehand.
Operational Note
a. Consultation by non-government parties or Members of Parliament with
departmental officers must only occur with the express authorisation of
the Premier. If a non-government party or Member makes direct contact
with an agency they should be referred to the Head of the Premier’s Office.
3 Significant Appointments
3.1 Governments defer making significant appointments during the caretaker
period. As a rule, any significant appointments to commence after election day
would not be offered in the caretaker period. Appointments, to be made after
the date of dissolution, are deferred until after the elections. Finalisation of
selection processes that have started but not completed should also be deferred
until after the caretaker period.
3.2 In considering whether an appointment qualifies as ‘significant’, the agency
should consider not only the importance of the position, but also whether the
proposed appointment would be likely to be controversial. However significant
appointments will include those for head or deputy head of agency, the head of
a division or branch whose activities are deemed sensitive, membership of
statutory bodies and statutory office holders.
3.3 If deferring an appointment is impracticable, usually for continuity purposes
or reasons associated with the proper functioning of an agency, there are several
options:
• An acting appointment can be made where permissible;
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• Make a short term appointment until shortly after the end of the caretaker
period; or
• If those options are not practicable, the relevant Minister, after agreement
with the Premier, could consult the relevant Opposition spokesperson
regarding a full term appointment.
4 Major Legal or Intergovernmental Commitments
4.1. Contracts or Undertakings
4.1.1 Governments avoid entering into major contracts or undertakings during
the caretaker period. When considering whether a contract or undertaking
qualifies as ‘major’, agencies should consider the monetary value of the
commitment and also whether the commitment involves a routine matter of
administration or rather implements or entrenches a policy, program or
administrative structure which is politically contentious. A further consideration
is whether the commitment requires ministerial approval.
4.1.2 If it is not possible to defer the commitment until after the caretaker period,
for legal, commercial or other reasons, there are a number of options. The
Minister, after agreement with the Premier, could consult the relevant Opposition
spokesperson regarding the commitment. Agencies could also ensure that new
contracts entered into during the caretaker period include clauses providing for
termination in the event of an incoming government not wishing to proceed.
4.1.3 Similarly, in the case of outstanding tender processes, agencies should
warn potential tenderers about the implications of the election and the possibility
that the tender might not be completed. If possible, new tender processes should
not commence during the caretaker period.
4.2 Intergovernmental Negotiations
4.2.1 The convention that the Government avoids entering into major
commitments during the caretaker period gives rise to particular issues in the
context of intergovernmental negotiations and agreements. The Government
ordinarily seeks to defer such negotiations or adopts observer status until the
end of the caretaker period.
4.2.2 If deferring involvement or adopting observer status is not feasible, the
Government should if possible limit its role to providing information on its past
position, without committing the incoming government to that position.
4.2.3 If it is necessary for the Government to participate fully in the negotiations,
it should advise the other parties to the negotiations that any outcomes will need
to be authorised by the incoming government, or it could seek Opposition parties’
agreement to negotiating positions.
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5 Ongoing Work of The State Service
5.1 Requests from Ministerial Offices for Information
5.1.1 During the caretaker period, executive government continues to operate
and Ministers remain in authority. The Minister’s statutory responsibilities,
especially those with time limits, are not affected except to the extent that any
decision that is within the discretion of the Minister must be considered in the
context of the caretaker conventions.
5.1.2 Material relating to the day to day business of government is supplied to
Ministers in the usual way. Ministers are entitled to request, and should continue
to be provided with factual or other material, including information to be
incorporated in speeches, and to be briefed on issues. The purpose to which
such material is put is for Ministers to determine. However, to avoid controversy
in the election period about claimed breaches of the apolitical and impartial
values of the State Service, it may be appropriate for an agency to decline a
request for unusual information if it requires the use of significant resources
and is clearly for use as part of the election campaign. If in doubt, the head of
agency should discuss with the Minister or his/her senior staff the purpose for
which the material is to be used.
5.1.3 In most instances, agencies should decline requests for policy advice during
the caretaker period. There might, however, be urgent issues on which policy
advice should clearly be provided to Ministers to allow responsible ongoing
administration or to protect the State’s interests. Requests for legal advice on
issues affecting the Minister in his or her capacity as a candidate should be
declined.
5.1.4 Agencies can proceed with policy development work during the caretaker
period so that they are in a position to provide advice to the incoming
government, provided that contact with Ministers’ offices is not required.
5.1.5 Otherwise the normal work of the State Service including operational and
other activities, continues without interruption. The caretaker conventions apply
in respect of any decisions and special care should be taken with public
consultation.
5.2 Legislation
5.2.1 Bills that have passed both Houses of Parliament should, if practicable, be
assented to by the Governor before the dissolution of the House of Assembly,
but may lawfully be assented to subsequently.
5.2.2 Legislation can be proclaimed during the caretaker period but, other than
in exceptional circumstances, proclamations that have a commencement date
after the date of the election are not made.
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5.2.3 Where there is a need and where there is no breach of the caretaker
conventions, the Executive Council may approve regulations and other statutory
rules during the caretaker period. However, meetings are infrequent during the
caretaker period and are held, with the Premier’s approval, only when required
by the amount of business.
5.3 Correspondence
5.3.1 Judgement is necessary in determining whether significant correspondence
should be signed by the Minister or head of agency. Whatever the decision, the
caretaker conventions apply.
Operational Notes
a. Although Ministers continue to sign correspondence, the time they have
available for this during the election campaign will be limited. In any event,
Ministers would usually sign only essential correspondence.
b. The general principle is that correspondence should be answered rather
than left to accumulate. In cases where no issue of policy arises, for example
in relation to the preparation of replies to routine incoming correspondence,
departmental replies for signature by the head of agency should be prepared.
c. Replies should not assume that the Government will or will not be returned
to office. Any reference to post election action should be in terms of the
‘incoming government’. It may be appropriate in some cases to include a
sentence along the lines —
d. ‘The matter you raised is one which will be taken up with the incoming
government.’
e. Letters requiring explanation of current policy should, if possible, be
answered without committing a government to post election action or
implying that the policy will continue if the Government is re-elected.
f. To avoid confusion, and as a matter of courtesy, members of the House of
Assembly who are standing for re-election should continue to be addressed
as ‘MHA’ until it is known whether they have been re-elected. Newly
elected members should be addressed as ‘MHA’ as soon as it is known that
they are elected. Members who are not standing for re-election should not
be addressed as ‘MHA’ following the dissolution of the House of Assembly.
5.4 Grants
5.4.1 The payment of grants which were approved prior to the caretaker period
can proceed but should be forwarded by the Department rather than by a
Minister or another member of the Government.
5.4.2 During the caretaker period, commitments should not be made in respect
of grant applications received during the period or which were lodged before
commencement of the period but are awaiting decision.
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5.5 Tabling of and Responses to Reports
5.5.1 Responses to outstanding parliamentary committee reports should be taken
up with the incoming government. Agencies may, however, undertake
appropriate preparatory work and consultation at the agency level so that they
are in a position to provide early advice to the incoming government.
5.5.2 Reports of an administrative nature, such as annual reports, can be delivered
during the caretaker period. However, where a report contains information that
is likely to be controversial, consideration should be given to whether delivery
should be deferred until after the caretaker period.
6 Avoiding Inappropriate Involvement in Election Activities
6.1 Advertising and Information Campaigns
6.1.1 The Premier may decide to curtail some government advertising campaigns,
depending on their nature. As a general rule campaigns which promote the
Government or highlight the role of particular Ministers or which address issues
that are controversial between the major political parties would normally be
discontinued. Campaigns that are non-contentious such as road safety or public
health campaigns, usually continue.
6.1.2 At the beginning of the caretaker period, individual agencies should review
arrangements for the distribution of printed material, including newsletters.
Agencies should avoid active distribution of material during the caretaker period
if it promotes Government policies or emphasises the achievements of the
Government or a Minister.
6.2 Internet and Electronic Communications
6.2.1 During the caretaker period, agencies need to ensure that agency resources
are not used to support any particular political party. Agencies should review
their websites at the beginning of the caretaker period accordingly.
6.2.2 Agency websites may retain material placed on the website before the
commencement of the caretaker period in most cases. Exceptions might be recent
ministerial statements that criticise non-government parties or members in strong
terms. Agencies should check the wording of any icons and links on their
websites to ensure that they cannot be interpreted as promoting a new
government policy. Agencies should add only the following material to their
websites during the caretaker period:
• Portfolio-related announcements, if that is the usual practice (the definition
of portfolio-related will require judgement within each agency, but, as
examples, election promises should not be placed on an agency website, but
a ministerial press release relating to a public health warning might
appropriately be added);
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• Purely factual material; and
• Information on existing policies and program, unless the information includes
attacks on non-government parties or members or other political material.
6.2.3 If agency websites contain links to websites outside the tas.gov.au domain,
agencies should consider the need for entry/exit messages. (See 6.2.5 below.)
6.2.4 In the case of ministerial websites, agencies may continue to maintain or
fund the maintenance of the website during the caretaker period if that was the
practice prior to the caretaker period. Material placed on the Minister’s website
before the caretaker period may be retained, as may links between the Minister’s
and agency’s websites. In relation to the addition of material:
• Agency staff should add to ministerial websites only material relating to
matters of existing policy or purely factual material. They should not add
material concerning future policies, election commitments, how-to-vote
material or media releases and speeches that criticise opponents, promote
the Government or pursue election issues; and
• Agencies may also wish to place a notice on the ministerial website noting
that election-related material is not available on the website. The notice could
refer visitors to the government party’s website, or include a link to that
website.
6.2.5 If an agency-maintained/funded ministerial website contains links to
websites outside the tas.gov.au domain, such as political party websites, agencies
should give particular attention to the need to include appropriate entry/exit
messages. Such messages could be along the lines of ‘you are now leaving the
website of [X]. The website you are entering is not maintained or funded by the
Government of Tasmania’.
Operational Notes
a. If a Minister’s website is personal and not maintained by the agency, the
Minister might consider placing a disclaimer on the website to the effect
that no State Government resources are being used to communicate political
material.
b. State Servants should not use government email, faxes etc to distribute
political material. This action would be a breach of the State Service Code
of Conduct (see section 6.4).
6.3 Use of Agency Premises
6.3.1 There may be occasions where agency premises can appropriately be used
during the caretaker period by political parties for public events, such as media
conferences, or where they are the obvious place for a function. In the case of
official functions involving the use of agency resources, it would generally be
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appropriate for the Opposition spokesperson, and other non-government
Members or candidates to be given the opportunity to be present.
6.3.2 While there should be no difficulty with the responsible use, by all parties
campaigning in an election, of agency premises that are normally open to the
public, it is most important during an election campaign that public servants
not become caught up with party political activity. For that reason, it is not
appropriate that use of premises extend to such activities as engaging public
servants in political dialogue, or using public servants for logistical support for
political functions. Nor, of course, should use of premises unreasonably disrupt
the normal operations of the offices concerned.
6.3.3 Ministerial visits to agencies for consultations would, of course, be in order
for the conduct of routine government business, in accordance with the caretaker
conventions.
6.4 Political Participation by State Servants
6.4.1 State servants must not use agency resources or their positions to support
particular issues or parties during the election campaign. Material from political
parties and how-to-vote material, whether produced by a political party or any
other organisation must not be displayed within the precincts of government
buildings, or on other Crown property or vehicles. Web pages and e-mail systems
provided by agencies should not be used to publish or transmit political material.
6.4.2 State servants need to exercise judgement if they are scheduled to speak
at public functions during the caretaker period. In the case of controversial
issues, officials should decline invitations to speak. In the case of
non-controversial issues, state servants may speak, but should explain that the
Government is in caretaker mode and that they will limit their statements to
factual issues and matters of administration. State servants should avoid publicly
explaining or promoting policies during the caretaker period.
Operational Notes
i. The State Service Principles articulated in the State Service Act 2000 assert
that the ‘State Service is apolitical, performing its functions in an impartial
ethical and professional manner’. The State Service Code of Conduct requires
state servants:
• When acting in the course of their State Service employment, to behave
in a way that upholds the State Service principles;
• To behave in a way that does not adversely affect the integrity and
good reputation of the State Service;
• To disclose and take reasonable steps to avoid conflicts of interests in
connection with State Service employment; and
• To use Tasmanian Government resources in a proper manner.
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ii. State Servants Standing for Election
• An officer of the State Service who is a candidate for election to either
House of State Parliament must vacate the office on becoming a
candidate, ie when nominations have closed, and the person is formally
recognised as a candidate.
• An employee of the State Service who is a candidate for election to
either House of State Parliament does not have to resign prior to
contesting a seat.
• An employee who is a candidate is entitled to leave without pay for a
period of up to two months for the purpose of contesting an election -
Section 2(2)(b) of the Constitution (State Employees) Act 1944.
• An employee who is a candidate retains normal entitlements to other
classes of leave which may be taken as part of, instead of, or in addition
to the above leave in any desired combination, and in broken periods,
and subject to normal conditions. Annual recreation leave for
electioneering before nominations have closed may also be granted.
Whilst on leave without pay to contest an election, care should be taken
by the employee to ensure compliance with the Code of Conduct
provisions as outlined in Section 9 of the State Service Act 2000.
• If elected, the Constitution (State Employees) Act 1944 provides that
service as an employee of the State Service is automatically terminated.
7 Other Matters
7.1 Financial Entitlements
7.1.1 During the caretaker period, agency provision of entitlements for Ministers
and their staff should be assessed on a case-by-case basis. Agencies should not
cover claims relating to the election campaign or a political event, as these costs
are to be borne by the respective political party. Examples of claims that would
not be covered include requests for additional laptop computers or mobile
telephones for Ministers or their staff unless there was a demonstrable official
purpose.
7.1.2 Claims relating to the management of essential government business can
be covered in the normal way; for example, to support Ministers attending
Cabinet meetings or primarily in connection with their ministerial duties.
7.1.3 In the case of claims that cover a combination of government and political
business, partial reimbursement can be granted to cover government activities.
7.2 Government Funded Vehicles
7.2.1 Use of ministerial car and driver, or other government vehicles by Ministers
or other members of the Parliament remain available during the caretaker period
for official purposes but not for private use.
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7.3 State Visits
7.3.1 The Premier will, if necessary, determine whether visits by foreign
dignitaries involving government hospitality should proceed during the caretaker
period. In any case, dignitaries whose visits are scheduled for the caretaker
period or shortly afterwards should be advised of the election announcement
and any changes in arrangements, including the reduced availability of Ministers
and the possibility of a change of government. Details of any requests for Official
Visits should be directed to the State Protocol Officer, Department of Premier
and Cabinet.
7.4 Agency Briefings
7.4.1 It is usual during the caretaker period for agencies to prepare briefing
material for an incoming Premier on their composition, administration and major
current issues. The Director, Policy Division, Department of Premier and Cabinet
coordinates these briefings. Agencies should also prepare portfolio specific
briefing packages for their new Minister.
7.5 Post Election - Cabinet Documents
7.5.1 Successive governments have accepted the convention that Ministers do
not seek access to documents recording the deliberations of Ministers in previous
governments. Cabinet documents, in particular, are considered confidential to
the government that created them. In this context, if there is a change of
government at an election, all Cabinet documents, including Agendas, Minutes
and Decisions should be returned to the custody of the Cabinet Office.
7.5.2 The Manager, Cabinet Office issues further procedural guidelines on the
handling of Cabinet documents once the result of the election is known.
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Victoria
Caretaker Conventions – Guidance for Handling
Government Business during the Election Period
Department of Premier and Cabinet
1. Introduction
1.1 Successive Governments have accepted that, during the period preceding
an election for the Legislative Assembly, the Government assumes a ‘caretaker
role’. This practice recognises that, with the expiry or dissolution of the
Legislative Assembly, the Executive cannot be held accountable for its decisions
in the normal manner, and that every general election carries the possibility of
a change of Government.
1.2 The caretaker period begins at the time the Legislative Assembly expires or
is dissolved and continues until the election result is clear or, if there is a change
of Government, until the new Government is appointed.
1.3 During the caretaker period, the business of Government continues and
ordinary matters of administration still need to be addressed. However, the
circumstances of an election campaign require special attention to ensure the
impartiality of the Public Service is maintained.
1.4 Public funds are not to be used for electoral purposes, which is unacceptable
at any time, not just during the election period. In addition, successive
Governments have followed a series of practices, known as the ‘caretaker
conventions’, which aim to ensure that their actions do not bind an incoming
Government and limit its freedom of action. In summary, the conventions are
that the Government avoids:
• implementing major policy decisions that are likely to commit an incoming
Government;
• making significant appointments; and
• entering major contracts or undertakings.
1.5 There are also established practices associated with the caretaker conventions
that are directed at protecting the apolitical nature of the public service and
avoiding the use of State resources in a manner to advantage a particular party.
The conventions and practices also aim to prevent controversies about the role
of the public service distracting attention from the substantive issues in the
election campaign.
1.6 The conventions and practices have developed primarily in the context of
the relationship between Ministers1  and their Departments. The relationship
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between Ministers and other public sector bodies, such as statutory authorities
and Government companies, varies from body to body. However, those bodies
should observe the conventions and practices unless to do so would conflict
with their legal obligations or compelling organisational requirements. For
convenience, Agency is used in this document as a descriptor of Departments
and public sector bodies.
1.7 The following notes are intended to explain the conventions and practices
in more detail and to provide guidance for the handling of business during the
caretaker period. The conventions are neither legally binding nor hard and fast
rules. Adherence to the conventions is ultimately the responsibility of the Premier
and the Government collectively. Their application in individual cases requires
judgement and common sense. Department Heads have responsibility to ensure
that the business of Government proceeds at the direction of Ministers and in a
manner which is consistent with the conventions.
1.8 It should be recalled that since the passage of the Constitution (Parliamentary
Reform) Act 2003, Victoria has a fixed parliamentary period of four years. This
allows a degree of certainty as to when the caretaker period will take place. From
2006 elections will be held, other than in extraordinary circumstances, every
four years on the last Saturday in November and the Legislative Assembly will
expire in early November or late October 25 days earlier. In view of these
arrangements, Ministers and Agencies should consider these conventions when
making plans for the future and should avoid planning activities for this period
if those activities may be inconsistent with the conventions.
2. Major Policy Decisions
2.1 Governments avoid implementing major policy decisions during the caretaker
period that are likely to commit an incoming Government. Whether a particular
policy decision qualifies as ‘major’ is a matter for judgement. Relevant
considerations include not only the significance of the decision in terms of policy
and resources, but also whether the decision is a matter of contention between
the Government and Opposition in the election campaign.
2.2 The conventions apply to the implementation of decisions, not to their making
or announcement. It is only actions taken during the caretaker period which
commit the State to a course of action that can be contrary to the conventions.
Accordingly, the conventions are not infringed where decisions, made or
implemented before the expiry or dissolution of the Assembly, are announced
during the caretaker period. Similarly, the conventions do not apply to promises
on future policies that the party in Government announces as part of its election
campaign.
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2.3 If circumstances require the Government to implement a major policy decision
during the caretaker period that would bind an incoming Government, the
Minister would usually consult the Opposition spokesperson beforehand.
3. Significant Appointments
3.1 Governments defer making significant appointments during the caretaker
period. When considering the advice it would give on whether an appointment
qualifies as ‘significant’, the Agency should consider not only the importance
of the position, but also whether the proposed appointment would be likely to
be controversial.
3.2 If deferring the appointment is impracticable, usually for reasons associated
with the proper functioning of an Agency, there are several options:
• an acting appointment where permissible;
• a short term appointment until shortly after the end of the caretaker period;
or
• if those options are not practicable, a full term appointment, but this is
usually preceded by consultation with the relevant Opposition spokesperson.
4. Major Contracts or Undertakings
4.1 Governments avoid entering major contracts or undertakings during the
caretaker period. Where contracts have been entered into prior to the caretaker
period, further agreements can be entered into during that period if these are
subsidiary to that ‘head contract’, relating to matters already proceeding;
penalties may in fact be incurred for breach, if further agreements are not entered
into. When considering whether a contract or undertaking qualifies as ‘major’,
Agencies should consider the dollar value of the commitment and also whether
the commitment involves a routine matter of administration or rather implements
or entrenches a policy, programme or administrative structure which may be
politically contentious. A further consideration is whether the commitment
requires ministerial approval.
4.2 If it is not possible to defer the commitment until after the caretaker period,
for legal, commercial or other reasons, there are a number of options. The Minister
could consult the relevant Opposition spokesperson regarding the commitment.
Agencies could also explain the implications of the election to the contractor
and ensure that contracts include clauses providing for termination in the event
of an incoming Government not wishing to proceed. Similarly, in the case of
tenders, Agencies should warn potential tenderers about the implications of the
election and the possibility that the tender might not be completed.
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5. Negotiations and Visits
5.1 The convention that the Government avoids entering major commitments
during the caretaker period gives rise to particular issues in the context of
contractual and intergovernmental negotiations and visits (e.g. interstate/
overseas dignitaries). The Government ordinarily seeks to defer such negotiations
or adopts observer status until the end of the caretaker period. The other parties
to the negotiations, however, may not be familiar with the concept of caretaker
conventions and the Government may need to explain the constraints they
impose.
5.2 If deferring involvement or adopting observer status is not feasible, the
Government could limit its role to providing information on its past position,
without committing the incoming Government to that position. If it is necessary
for the Government to participate fully in the negotiations, it should advise the
other parties to the negotiations that any outcomes will need to be authorised
by the incoming Government, or it could seek the Opposition’s agreement to
negotiating positions.
5.3 The Premier will, if necessary, determine whether visits by dignitaries
involving Government hospitality should proceed during the caretaker period.
In any case, dignitaries whose visits are scheduled for the caretaker period or
shortly afterwards should be advised of the election announcement and any
changes in arrangements, including the reduced availability of Ministers and
the possibility of a change of Government. The four year fixed term should allow
Agencies, when planning visits for dignitaries, to avoid the period in and around
the caretaker period.
6. Avoiding VPS Involvement in Election Activities
6.1 Advertising and Information Campaigns
6.1.1 Agencies are to review their advertising campaigns which may be scheduled
to take place during the caretaker period. Any appearance of party political
content or purpose must be avoided and particular campaigns with content that
could be so perceived are to be deferred. It may be necessary to withdraw
advertising that has already been booked. Advertising campaigns which promote
Government policies and/or Ministers may be particularly sensitive and should
be referred to Ministers for review. Departmental campaigns which convey
necessary public information (e.g. to promote public health or safety) or are of
an operational nature (such as employment advertisements) may be continued
as long as they do not feature Ministers or promote Government policies. If an
Agency has concerns or requires clarification, the Strategic Communications
Unit in the DPC should be consulted.
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6.1.2 At the beginning of the caretaker period, individual Agencies should
review arrangements for the distribution of printed material, including
newsletters. Agencies should avoid active distribution of material during the
caretaker period if the material can be seen as promoting party political content,
Government policies or emphasises the achievements of the Government or a
Minister. Passive distribution of material, such as continued placement in the
Agency’s offices or distribution in response to requests, is acceptable.
6.2 Internet and Electronic Communications
6.2.1 During the caretaker period, Agencies need to take steps, which are outlined
below, to ensure that Agency resources are not used to support any particular
political party. Agencies should review their websites at the beginning of the
caretaker period accordingly.
6.2.2 Agency websites may retain material placed on the website before the
commencement of the caretaker period in most cases. Exceptions might be recent
ministerial statements that criticise the Opposition or other non government
parties or members in strong terms. Agencies should check the wording of any
icons and links on their websites to ensure that they cannot be interpreted as
promoting a Government policy. Agencies should add only the following material
to their websites during the caretaker period:
• portfolio-related announcements, if that is the usual practice (the definition
of portfolio-related will require judgement within each Agency, but, as
examples, election promises should not be placed on an Agency website,
but a ministerial press release relating to a public health warning might
appropriately be added);
• purely factual material; and
• information on existing policies and programmes, unless the information
includes criticism of the Opposition or other political material.
6.2.3 If Agency websites contain links to websites outside the vic.gov.au domain,
Agencies should consider the need for entry/exit messages. (See 6.2.7 below)
6.2.4 In the case of Ministerial websites, Agencies may continue to maintain or
fund the maintenance of the website during the caretaker period if that was the
practice prior to the caretaker period. Material placed on the Minister’s website
before the caretaker period may be retained, as may links between the Minister’s
and Agency’s websites. In relation to the addition of material:
• Agencies should add to ministerial websites only material relating to matters
of existing policy or purely factual material. Agencies should not add material
concerning future policies, election commitments, how-to-vote material or
media releases and speeches that criticise opponents, promote the Government
or pursue election issues;
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• Agencies may also wish to place a notice on the ministerial website noting
that election-related material is not available on the website. The notice could
refer visitors to the Government party’s website, or include a link to that
website;
• if the maintenance of the website has become the responsibility of the
Minister rather than the Agency, ministerial staff may add any material to
the website as long as there is no cost to the State and a notice is added to
the effect that since the commencement of the caretaker period the website
is neither the responsibility of nor a cost to the Agency.
6.2.5 If the Minister’s website is personal and not maintained by the Agency,
the Minister might consider placing a disclaimer on the website to the effect that
no State resources are being used to communicate political material.
6.2.6 If an Agency-maintained/funded ministerial website contains links to
websites outside the vic.gov.au domain, such as political party websites, Agencies
should give particular attention to the need to include appropriate entry/exit
messages. Such messages could be along the lines of ‘you are now leaving the
website of [X]. The website you are entering is not maintained or funded by the
State of Victoria’.
6.2.7 Electronic bulletin boards and e-mail systems provided by Agencies should
not be used to publish political material. Material from political parties and
how-to-vote material produced by any organisation should not be displayed.
6.3 Use of Agency Premises
6.3.1 There may be occasions where Agency premises can appropriately be used
during the caretaker period by political parties for public events, such as media
conferences, or where they are the obvious place for a function (for example,
the opening of a building by a Minister). In the case of official functions involving
the use of Agency resources, it would generally be appropriate for the Opposition
spokesperson, member or candidate to be given the opportunity to be present.
6.3.2 While there should be no difficulty with the responsible use, by all parties
campaigning in an election, of Agency premises that are normally open to the
public, it is most important during an election campaign that public servants
not become caught up with party political activity. For that reason, it is not
appropriate that use of premises extend to such activities as engaging public
servants in political dialogue, or using public servants for logistical support for
political functions. Nor should use of premises unreasonably disrupt the normal
operations of the offices concerned.
6.3.3 Ministerial visits to Agencies for consultations would be in order for the
conduct of routine Government business, in accordance with the caretaker
conventions.
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6.4 Correspondence
6.4.1 Ministers usually sign only the necessary minimum of correspondence and
it is desirable that some correspondence normally signed by Ministers be prepared
for signature by departmental officers, rather than left to accumulate.
6.4.2 When preparing replies, care should be taken to protect the public service
from perceptions of partisanship. Replies should not assume that the Government
will or will not be returned to office. References to post-election action are in
terms of the ‘incoming Government’. Correspondence that requires an explanation
of Government policy should not commit the Government to post-election action
or imply that the policy will continue if the Government is re-elected. Including
a reply that a matter is one for the incoming Government may help avoid any
implication of continuing policy.
6.5 Political Participation by Officers
6.5.1 The public sector values in the Public Administration Act 2004 state that
the public sector performs its functions in an impartial manner. Conflicts of
interests (real or apparent) must be avoided. Therefore officials should not use
Agency resources or their positions to support particular issues or parties during
the election campaign. The wearing or displaying of political material in official
premises is not permissible.
6.5.2 Officials need to exercise judgement if they are scheduled to speak at public
functions during the caretaker period. In the case of controversial issues, officials
should decline invitations to speak. In the case of non-controversial issues,
officials may speak, but should explain that the Government is in caretaker mode
and that they will limit their statements to factual issues and matters of
administration. Officials should avoid publicly explaining or promoting policies
during the caretaker period.
6.6 Requests from Ministers’ Offices for Information or
Assistance
6.6.1 Ministers may continue to request factual material from Agencies during
the caretaker period in the usual way. The purpose for which such material is
used is for the Minister to determine.
6.6.2 Ministers may not, however, request Agencies to develop new policy
initiatives. There might however, be urgent domestic or international issues on
which policy advice should clearly be provided to Ministers to allow responsible
ongoing administration or to protect Victoria’s interests.
6.6.3 Agencies can proceed with policy development work during the caretaker
period so that they are in a position to provide advice to the incoming
Government, provided that contact with Ministers’ offices is not required.
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6.6.4 Ministers may not require administrative assistance or material if the
predominant purpose for the assistance clearly relates to the election rather than
the ongoing business of Government. It is proper practice for such requirements
to be declined and for the Minister to be advised as to the reason. If the Minister
confirms that he or she requires that assistance, the Agency should promptly
consult with DPC.
6.7 Policy Costings
6.7.1 The Department of Treasury and Finance, in conjunction with relevant
Departments, may be asked by Ministers to cost Government and Opposition
policy proposals. The costings will be undertaken provided any assumptions
necessary for the costings are identified for the Departments, or do not require
extensive policy research by Departments.
6.8 Departmental Liaison Officers
6.8.1 Particular issues also arise in relation to Departmental Liaison Officers
(DLOs). DLOs are provided by Departments to assist Ministers’ offices with
necessary liaison work with Agencies. The need for that work should be reviewed
at the commencement of the caretaker period. If there is ongoing work of a
liaison nature during the caretaker period, DLOs may remain with Ministers'
offices. However, DLOs are public servants. They are not ministerial advisers.
They should therefore avoid assisting Ministers in ways that could create a
perception that they are being used for party political purposes.
6.9 Hospitality
6.9.1 Agencies must exercise care in hosting official functions during the election
period. Such functions are not to be capable of representation as being for
electioneering purposes. Consideration is to be given to deferring official visits
by dignitaries from outside Victoria, particularly where there is an expectation
that agreements will be signed or negotiations concluded.
6.9.2 Ministers may choose not to attend intergovernmental meetings, meetings
of Ministerial councils and the like. Officials, when attending such meetings are
to identify that they are constrained by caretaker conventions and confine
themselves to seeking and providing information without making any policy
commitments which might constrain whichever Government takes office after
the election.
7. Related Matters
7.1 Tabling of and Responses to Reports
7.1.1 Responses to outstanding parliamentary committee reports should be taken
up with the incoming Government. Agencies may, however, undertake
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appropriate preparatory work and consultation at the Agency level so that they
are in a position to provide early advice to the incoming Government.
7.2 Financial Entitlements
7.2.1 It has been a longstanding convention that Ministers do not claim travelling
allowance from the day of the Premier’s campaign launch to the day after polling
day. The only exceptions are where Ministers travel for Cabinet meetings or
primarily in connection with their ministerial duties/ portfolio responsibilities.
7.2.2 An additional vehicle for the Leaders of the non-government parties will
be provided once the election is called. They may also charter aircraft for
themselves during the election period. Such charters need to be approved by
the Premier on a case by case basis and the relevant Leader is to be notified of
approval or non approval in each case. Forty-eight hours notice of the intended
date of use of aircraft is required. Media representatives on any charter flights
are to make payments for an evenly shared portion of the charge.
7.3 Legislation, Executive Council and Cabinet
7.3.1 Bills that have passed both Houses of Parliament should be assented to by
the Governor before the expiry or dissolution of the Legislative Assembly.
Practice has been not to provide Royal Assent after expiry or dissolution.
7.3.2 Legislation is also not proclaimed during the caretaker period other than
in exceptional circumstances.
7.3.3 The Executive Council usually meets immediately before the dissolution
to approve regulations and Orders in Council, including those made under Acts
just assented to. The Executive Council meets during the caretaker period but
only as required. Its functions during this period are limited to approving
regulations, appointments and Orders in Council which do not infringe the
caretaker conventions. However, meetings are infrequent during the caretaker
period and are held only when required by the amount of business. Further, the
relevant Departmental Secretary will need to justify each item which is proposed
to be considered by Executive Council before the Council will consider it.
7.3.4 Cabinet rarely meets during the caretaker period — and will normally only
do so if the items to be considered can be put into effect consistently with the
caretaker conventions. Cabinet will not normally meet until after the election
and when the caretaker period is over.
7.4 Cabinet and Other Documents
7.4.1 Cabinet documents are the property of the State and must be dealt with
properly as public records. Successive Governments have accepted the convention
that Ministers do not seek access to documents recording the deliberations of
Ministers in previous Governments. Cabinet documents, in particular, are
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considered confidential to the Government that created them. In this context,
all Cabinet documents, including files, Submissions, Memoranda, Agenda and
Minutes (decisions) should be returned to the custody of the Cabinet Secretariat,
for storage until the result of the election is known. If such documents are
required in the day to day administration of an Agency, they may with the
agreement of the Cabinet Secretariat, be kept in secure conditions with the
Agency; however, they must be returned on the day preceding election day.
7.4.2 The Cabinet Secretariat may issue further procedural guidelines on the
handling of Cabinet documents before or at the commencement of the caretaker
period. The Cabinet Secretariat is the appropriate contact for further advice on
such matters. Advice on the security and handling of Cabinet documents is also
contained in the Cabinet Handbook.
7.4.3 In relation to other documents, should a Government not be returned, the
official (as distinct from party and personal) documents are also public records
and are to be kept in accordance with the requirements of the Public Records
Act 1973 and cannot be destroyed.
7.5 Consultation Between Officials and Non-Governmental
Parties
7.5.1 The Guidelines for consultation by officials with non-government parties
are as follows:
i. The Guidelines for consultation apply from a date three months prior to
the expiry of the Legislative Assembly or, if the Assembly is being
dissolved, the date of the announcement of the election, whichever date
comes first.
ii. Leaders of non-government parties may make a request for consultation
with officers through the Premier. Similarly, Shadow Ministers may also
request access to officers through the relevant Minister so long as the
Premier is informed of the request and whether it has been agreed. Approval
may be given to have discussions with appropriate officials of Government
Agencies.
iii. Shadow Ministers may have other Members of Parliament or their staff
members present at such meetings. A Departmental Secretary may have
other officials present. It is not appropriate for Ministers’ Private Office
staff to be present.
iv. The request procedure and discussions will be at the initiative of the
non-Government parties, not officials. Officials will inform their Ministers
when the discussions are taking place. Departmental heads are to ensure
that officers authorised to conduct or attend briefings have a proper
understanding of the matters likely to be raised at such briefings.
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v. Officials will not be authorised to discuss Government policies or to give
opinions on matters of a party political nature. The subject matter of the
discussions should relate to the machinery of Government and
administration. The discussions may include the administrative and technical
practicalities and procedures involved in implementation of policies
proposed by the non-Government parties. If the non-government
representatives raise matters which, in the judgement of the officials, seek
information on Government policies or sought expressions of opinion on
alternative policies, the officials are to suggest that the matter be raised
with the Minister.
vi. The detailed substance of the discussions will be confidential but Ministers
will be entitled to seek from officials general information on whether the
discussions kept within agreed purposes and the Guidelines for consultation.
8. Forms of Address
8.1 Addressing Members during the Caretaker Period
8.1.1 To avoid confusion, and as a matter of courtesy, members of the Legislative
Assembly and Council who are standing for re-election should continue to be
addressed as ‘MP’ or ‘MLC’ respectively until it is known whether they have
been re-elected. Newly elected members should be addressed as ‘MP’ or ‘MLC’
respectively as soon as it is known that they are elected. Members who are not
standing for re-election (including Ministers) are not to be so addressed following
the expiry or dissolution of the Legislative Assembly/ proroguing of the Council.
8.1.2 However, a Minister who is retiring from Parliament continues to hold his
or her position as Minister (as distinct from MP or MLC) pending the swearing
in of the incoming Government.
9. Conclusion
9.1 Agency heads are responsible for appropriate action to ensure that Agencies
and associated Agencies observe the conventions during the caretaker period.
9.2 Agency heads need to be familiar with the caretaker conventions. However,
any queries they may have as to the operation of the conventions in any
particular case are to be referred to the Secretary of Department of Premier and
Cabinet or any staff members nominated by the Secretary.
9.3 To ensure the consistent application of caretaker conventions within Agencies
and to minimise the number of requests for advice to the DPC, Agencies should
appoint one or two senior officers to be the initial contact for caretaker enquiries.
If further advice is required in relation to particular issues that arise during the
caretaker period, Agencies should contact Mr Ian Killey PSM, General Counsel
in the DPC on (03) 9651 5644.
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ENDNOTES
1  All references to Ministers should be read as including Parliamentary Secretaries.
152
Different approaches – what the jurisdictional guidances say
Western Australia
Premier’s Circular
Number: 2005/01, Issue Date: 23/01/2005, Review Date:
31/03/2005
Guidelines Applying in Western Australia during the State
General Election Period (Caretaker Conventions)
Policy
The Government assumes a ‘caretaker’ role in the period immediately before a
State General Election. This role commences from the date of the dissolution of
the Legislative Assembly and continues until the election result is clear, or in
the event of a change of government, until the new government is formally
sworn in.
Background
It is recognised that every general election carries the possibility of a change of
government. In the caretaker period, efforts are made to ensure that decisions
are not taken that would bind an incoming government and/or limit its freedom
of action.
The practices associated with the caretaker role are directed at protecting the
apolitical nature of the Public Sector, and avoiding the use of State Government
resources in a manner to advantage a particular party. The arrangements also
aim to prevent controversies about the role of the Public Sector during an election
campaign.
Attached is a copy of the Guidelines that will apply to the forthcoming election
period.
A copy of the document has been made available to the Leader of the Opposition,
minor parliamentary parties, independent Members, and secretaries of the
parliamentary parties. It is also available on the Department of the Premier and
Cabinet website at www.dpc.wa.gov.au
DR GEOFF GALLOP MLA
PREMIER
For enquiries contact: Lynsey Warbey 9222 9401
Principal Policy Officer, Office of the Director General
Department of the Premier and Cabinet
Other relevant Circulars: 2001/2 (expired)
Circular/s replaced by this Circular:
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1. Introduction
1.1 By convention, the Government assumes a ‘caretaker’ role in the period
immediately before a State General Election as it is recognised that every general
election carries the possibility of a change of government. This role commences
from the date of the dissolution of the Legislative Assembly and continues until
the election result is clear, or in the event of a change of government, until the
new government is formally sworn-in.
1.2 In the caretaker period, efforts are made to ensure that decisions are not
taken that would bind an incoming government and/or limit its freedom of
action. The practices associated with the caretaker role are directed at protecting
the apolitical nature of the Public Sector and avoiding the use of State
Government resources in a manner to advantage a particular party. The
arrangements also aim to prevent controversies about the role of the Public
Sector during an election campaign.
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1.3 These guidelines are intended to explain the conventions and practices in
more detail and to provide guidance for the handling of business during the
caretaker period. The conventions are neither legally binding nor inflexible
rules. Their application in individual cases requires judgement and common
sense. While the Department of the Premier and Cabinet is able to provide
information and advice to agencies, responsibility for observing the conventions
ultimately rests with Chief Executive Officers or, in cases where they are
involved, with the Premier and Ministers.
1.4 Generally, the arrangements are intended, wherever possible, to ensure that:
1.4.1 significant appointments are not made;
1.4.2 major policy decisions are not taken which would be likely to commit an
incoming government (including the implementation of new policies or approval
of major projects within government agencies);
1.4.3 no commitments are made to major contracts or undertakings;
1.4.4 electioneering is not undertaken through government advertising,
publications or electronic communications;
1.4.5 Members of Parliament do not undertake air travel at public expense for
electioneering purposes; and
1.4.6 Public Sector officers are not involved in party political activities.
1.5 While the conventions and practices have developed primarily in the context
of the relationship between Ministers and their agencies, other bodies, such as
government trading enterprises, should observe them unless to do so would
conflict with their legal obligations or compelling organisational requirements.
1.6 It is important to note that the conventions are directed to the taking of
decisions and not their announcement. Accordingly, they do not apply to new
policy promises that a government or opposition may announce as part of its
election campaign.
1.7 To ensure the consistent application of these guidelines, agencies should
appoint one or two senior officers to be the initial contact for inquiries.
2. Significant Appointments and Contracts of Employment
2.1 Significant appointments and reappointments should be deferred during the
caretaker period. When determining whether an appointment or reappointment
is ‘significant’, consideration should be given to the importance of the position
and whether the proposed appointment is likely to be controversial.
2.2 Where the proper function of a Public Sector agency requires a significant
position to be filled, acting arrangements or a short-term appointment should
be used.
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2.3 No action should be taken in relation to contracts of employment for senior
officer positions (generally, no appointments or reappointments should occur
for positions classified at PSA Level 8 and above (or equivalent)). Where a
decision needs to be made in relation to a reappointment, and reappointment is
proposed, the contract should be for a period ending no more than three months
from the date of the election.
3. Major Contracts, Undertakings and Policy Decisions
3.1 The broad rule is for the Government to avoid entering into major contracts
or undertakings or making major policy decisions, during the caretaker period,
including commitments that would be politically contentious or likely to commit
an incoming government. Major project approvals or policy decisions should
be deferred unless there is appropriate consultation with the Opposition parties.
3.2 Whether a particular decision qualifies as ‘major’ is a matter for judgement.
Relevant considerations include not only the significance of the decision in terms
of policy and resources but also whether the issue is a matter of contention
between the Government and Opposition parties in the election campaign.
3.3 If it is not possible to defer the commitment until after the caretaker period
for legal, commercial or other reasons, further advice should be sought from the
Director General, Department of the Premier and Cabinet.
4. Advertising, Publications and Information Campaigns
4.1 In general, government advertising, information campaigns and publications,
except work commissioned by the Western Australian Electoral Commission,
are to be deferred during the caretaker period. However, exemption from this
requirement may be sought from the Chief Executive Officer, State Supply
Commission in respect of the following instances:
• advertisements relating to public inquiries;
• advertising of commercial services provided by agencies; and
• community service announcements.
4.2 In addition, Chief Executive Officers are authorised to approve the
advertising/publication of information in the areas listed hereunder:
• changes to statutes and delegated legislation;
• vacant positions which are of a minor professional, administrative or technical
nature;
• calling of tenders for minor works; and
• notices required pursuant to any statute.
4.3 No government agency should publish pamphlets, brochures, leaflets or
reports that advocate or criticise the election policies of any political party.
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Publications should not promote any politician or political candidate, including
Ministers.
4.4 Agencies should avoid active distribution of material during the caretaker
period if it promotes the Government’s policies or emphasises the achievements
of the Government or a Minister.
4.5 Should there be any doubt about any advertising or publication issues, the
matter should be referred to the Chief Executive Officer, State Supply
Commission.
5. Internet and Electronic Communications
5.1 During the caretaker period, agencies need to take additional steps to ensure
that electronic resources are not used to support any particular political party.
Agencies should therefore review their websites at the beginning of the caretaker
period.
5.2 Agency websites may retain material placed on the website before the
commencement of the caretaker period. Exceptions might be recent Ministerial
statements that criticise the Opposition or other parties in strong terms. Agencies
should review the content of any icons and links on their websites to ensure
that they cannot be interpreted as promoting a particular government policy.
5.3 Agencies should not add material to their websites during the caretaker
period unless it can be demonstrated that there is a clear public interest in doing
so. Additional material may include:
5.3.1 necessary portfolio-related announcements, if that is the usual practice.
The definition of ‘portfolio-related’ will require judgement in each agency. By
way of example, election promises should not be placed on an agency website
but a media release relating to a public health warning might be appropriate;
5.3.2 purely factual material; and
5.3.3 essential updates on existing policies and outputs, unless the information
includes electioneering material or attacks on political opponents.
5.4 Agencies should not publish material on their websites that advocates or
criticises the election policies of any political party or candidate or which
promotes any politician or political candidate, including Ministers.
5.5 In the case of Ministerial websites (including the Leader of the Opposition
website), the Department of the Premier and Cabinet will continue to maintain
and fund the maintenance of the website during the caretaker period. Material
placed on a Minister’s website before the caretaker period may be retained, as
may links between the Minister’s and his/her agencies’ websites.
5.6 In relation to the addition of new material to Ministerial websites:
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5.6.1 Only necessary material relating to matters of existing policy or purely
factual material can be added to websites. Material concerning future policies,
election commitments or media releases and speeches that criticise opponents,
promote the Government or pursue contentious issues, cannot be added.
5.6.2 The Department of the Premier and Cabinet will place a notice on the
Ministerial website indicating that election-related material is not available on
the website. The notice may refer visitors to the Government’s party website or
include a link to that website.
5.6.3 If an agency or Ministerial website contains links to websites outside the
wa.gov.au domain, such as political party websites, appropriate entry/exit
messages should be added. Such messages should be along the lines of ‘You are
now leaving the website of X’ or ‘The website you are now entering is not
maintained or funded by the Government of Western Australia’.
5.7 Websites for Members of Parliament maintained using public funds must
not be used for electioneering purposes. Notices referring visitors to the party’s
website or links to that website are permissible.
5.8 Electronic bulletin boards and e-mail systems provided by agencies should
not be used for electioneering purposes. Information from political parties and
election material, whether produced by an individual or organisation, should
not be published or distributed using agency systems.
6. Travel
6.1 During that portion of the caretaker period from the date of the dissolution
of the Legislative Assembly until the close of polling on election day, no Member
of Parliament shall travel by air at the expense of the State, except:
• the Premier;
• the Deputy Premier;
• the Leader of the Opposition in the Legislative Assembly;
• Members of Parliament nominated by the Premier or the Deputy Premier to
attend official functions;
• Members of Parliament nominated by the Leader of the Opposition in the
Legislative Assembly to attend official functions;
• a Minister traveling to respond to an emergency or disaster where the
presence of the Minister is necessary or desirable;
• any Minister or Member of Parliament in the course of a journey to or from
a destination outside the State;
• any Member of Parliament, so entitled, traveling between the Member's
electorate and Perth, or within that Member’s electorate;
• any Member of Parliament utilising an entitlement determined by the Salaries
and Allowances Tribunal.
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6.2 The Premier, Deputy Premier, Leader of the Opposition in the Legislative
Assembly, or a Member of Parliament nominated to represent them at an official
function, may be accompanied by their spouse.
6.3 The Premier, Deputy Premier, Leader of the Opposition in the Legislative
Assembly, or a Member of Parliament nominated to represent them at an official
function, may be accompanied by members of their staff, if necessary, to assist
them in the performance of their duties.
6.4 Travel under this provision shall be by regular passenger transport airline
services, unless there is no scheduled service operating at a reasonably convenient
time. In such cases, a charter may be used.
6.5 If it is considered appropriate by the Premier, Deputy Premier, or Leader of
the Opposition in the Legislative Assembly, Members of Parliament may
accompany them, or a nominated Member, on a charter flight at no cost provided
vacant seats are available and such travel does not increase charter costs.
6.6 If it is considered appropriate by the Premier, Deputy Premier, or Leader of
the Opposition in the Legislative Assembly, media representatives and candidates
who are not Members of Parliament may accompany them or a nominated
Member on a charter flight provided vacant seats are available and such travel
does not increase charter costs. Where media representatives or candidates who
are not Members of Parliament travel on charter flights, they shall be charged
for the cost of their travel on the following basis:
Cost of Travel = Hourly Charter Rate x No of Hours Passenger on the Charter
Seat Capacity of Charter Aircraft
6.7 The lmprest System for Members of Parliament Travel is suspended for the
period between the issue of the writs for a general or conjoint election and the
day fixed by those writs for taking of the poll.
7. Operations of Public Sector Agencies and Relationships
with Ministers
7.1 The normal business of government should continue but Public Sector
agencies should avoid partisanship and ensure the impartiality of the Public
Sector. Communication arrangements between Ministerial offices and agency
employees should continue to be in accordance with section 74 of the Public
Sector Management Act 1994.
7.2 Material concerning the day-to-day business of Public Sector agencies should
be supplied to Ministers in the usual way.
7.3 Ministers should sign only the necessary minimum of correspondence during
the caretaker period. Departmental officers or Ministerial staff can respond to
some correspondence normally signed by Ministers.
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7.4 Ministers may choose not to attend intergovernmental meetings, meetings
of Ministerial councils and the like. Public Sector officers, when attending such
meetings, should make it known that they are constrained by the caretaker
conventions and confine themselves to seeking and providing information
without making any policy commitments that might constrain an incoming
government.
7.5 Ministers may ask relevant Public Sector agencies to cost government and
non-government party policy proposals.
7.6 Under the Government Financial Responsibility Act 2000, the Treasurer is
to release a Pre-Election Financial Projections Statement within 10 days after the
Legislative Assembly is dissolved.
8. Legislation
8.1 Bills introduced into the Legislative Assembly but not passed will lapse when
the Legislative Assembly is dissolved.
8.2 Bills that have completed their passage through Parliament may be presented
for Royal Assent if essential, notwithstanding the dissolution of the Legislative
Assembly and the prorogation of the Legislative Council. As a general rule
however, Bills will not be presented for Royal Assent during the caretaker period.
8.3 Bills assented to may be proclaimed where they come into operation during
the caretaker period.
9. Executive Council
9.1 The Executive Council will continue to meet during the caretaker period but
will only consider necessary and routine matters of government administration.
10. Cabinet
10.1 Cabinet will not normally meet during the caretaker period. Any
deliberations and decisions by Cabinet during this period must be made in the
context of the caretaker conventions.
10.2 Successive governments have accepted the convention that Ministers do
not seek access to documents recording the deliberations of previous
governments. Agencies should ensure that all Cabinet documents are adequately
secured throughout the caretaker period and after any change of government.
11. Consultation by Members of Parliament and Political
Candidates with Public Sector Officers
11.1 Members of Parliament and political candidates may wish to seek
consultations with appropriate Public Sector officers. In this respect, the
following practices and guidelines come into operation as soon as the election
announcement has been made:
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11.1.1 The procedure must be initiated by an approach by the relevant Member
of Parliament or political candidate through the appropriate Minister. The
Minister shall refer the request to the relevant Chief Executive Officer. Public
Sector officers should not instigate discussions.
11.1.2 The Chief Executive Officer should notify the Minister, in writing, of the
details of when the discussions will take place. The Minister should then advise
the Premier of the discussions.
11.1.3 Public Sector officers are not authorised to discuss government policies
or to give opinions on matters of a party political nature. The subject matter of
the discussions must be restricted to the machinery of government and
administration. The discussions may include the administrative and technical
practicalities and procedures involved in the implementation of policies proposed
by the non-government parties.
11.1.4 Public Sector agencies will be represented in such discussions by the
Chief Executive Officer or his/her nominated representative and appropriate
officers with relevant expertise.
11.1.5 The detailed substance of the discussions will be confidential but Ministers
will be entitled to seek general information on whether the discussions kept
within the agreed purposes.
11.1.6 Any requests for consultation that involve an unreasonable amount of
work by a Public Sector agency may properly be denied.
11.2 As part of the process of preparing the way for any incoming government,
Public Sector agencies may prepare general briefing papers on the implications
of major stated policies, to present to incoming Ministers subsequent to the
election.
12. Visits by Members of Parliament and Political
Candidates to Government Facilities
12.1 Where Members of Parliament or political candidates wish to visit
government facilities for campaigning purposes, the Chief Executive Officer
must be notified and that officer, or a nominated representative, will accompany
the Members or political candidates during the visit.
13. Political Participation by Public Sector Officers
13.1 Subject to 13.3, Public Sector officers should not use agency resources or
their positions to support particular political parties during the election campaign.
The provisions of the Public Sector Management Act 1994 and the Western
Australian Public Sector Code of Ethics should act as a guide to officers in
performing their functions during the caretaker period.
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13.2 Whilst a Public Sector officer’s right to be involved in public life is
acknowledged, including participation in political parties, the underlying
principle is that such participation should not interfere with the performance
of the officer’s functions and government resources should not be used to this
end.
13.3 It is recognised that Ministerial officers appointed under the Public Sector
Management Act 1994 to assist political office holders, may become involved in
activities of a party political nature when undertaking functions specified by
the political office holder.
13.4 Public Sector officers need to exercise judgement if they are scheduled to
speak at public functions during the caretaker period. In the case of controversial
issues, officials should decline invitations to speak. In the case of
non-controversial issues, officials may speak but should explain that the
Government is in caretaker mode and that they will limit their statements to
factual issues and matters of administration. Officials should avoid publicly
explaining or promoting policies during the caretaker period.
14. Hospitality
14.1 Agencies should exercise care in hosting official functions during the election
period to avoid any perception that the function is for electioneering or party
political purposes.
14.2 In the case of official functions involving the use of agency resources, it
may be appropriate for the Opposition parties’ spokesperson/s, Members of
Parliament or political candidates to be given the opportunity to be present.
14.3 Consideration should be given to deferring official visits by dignitaries
from outside Western Australia, particularly where there is an expectation that
agreements will be signed or negotiations concluded.
15. Public Records
15.1 All official documents are to be maintained in accordance with the provisions
of the State Records Act 2000. The provisions of the Department of the Premier
and Cabinet Records Keeping Plan 2004 also apply to the handling of Ministerial
office records.
16. Coat of Arms and Common Badge
16.1 The Coat of Arms of the State of Western Australia (Coat of Arms) may be
used by the Government and the Opposition for purposes associated with their
official functions, including correspondence sent pursuant to 7.3.
16.2 Except for advertisements/publications provided for in 4.2, the Common
Badge or the Coat of Arms (Seal Form) should NOT be used on any government
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advertisements published during the caretaker period without the approval of
the Director General, Department of the Premier and Cabinet.
16.3 The Common Badge or the Coat of Arms (Seal Form) may be used on
correspondence sent in accordance with 7.3 of these Guidelines.
17. Inquiries
17.1 All inquiries concerning these arrangements should be referred in the first
instance to the Director General, Department of the Premier and Cabinet.
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ATTACHMENT
REQUEST FOR APPROVAL TO ADVERTISE OR PUBLISH DURING STATE
GENERAL ELECTION PERIOD 2005/06
Mr Phil Turner
Acting Chief Executive Officer
State Supply Commission
Level 5, Dumas House
2 Havelock Street
WEST PERTH WA 6005
Department/Agency: _________________________________________________
Contact Person: _____________________________________________________
Telephone: ___________________________Fax: __________________________
Email: _____________________________________________________________
Subject: ___________________________________________________________
Advertising Commences:____/ /____ends ___/_____/_ _(dates inclusive)
Where advertising through an advertising agency is proposed, the following
information is required:
Advertising Agency: _________________________________________________
Advertising Media: __________________________________________________
Please explain why an exemption should be granted:
________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Please note: A copy of the advertising/publication for which exemption is
requested must accompany all applications. Videos, CDs and DVDs are also
acceptable.
Declaration:
I certify that the advertising material/publication that is the subject of this
application does not advocate or criticise the election policies of any political
party nor does it personally promote any Member of Parliament (including a
Minister) or political candidate.
Chief Executive Officer: __________________________Date: ___/___/___
This form may be faxed to the State Supply Commission on 9222 5760
This form is also available on the State Supply Commission website
SSC use only:
Request No:.……………….
164
Different approaches – what the jurisdictional guidances say
New Zealand
CABINET MANUAL 2001
Cabinet Office, Department of the Prime Minister and
Cabinet
Wellington, New Zealand
Transitions Between Administrations Elections
4.3 The term of Parliament is three years from the date fixed for the return of
the writs issued for the previous general election (section 17 of the Constitution
Act 1986). Parliament may, however, be dissolved before the three year term
finishes, under section 18 of the Constitution Act. When the term of Parliament
has ended, or Parliament has been dissolved, a general election is held to
determine the composition of the next Parliament and the next government.
4.4 The Governor-General has the formal power to dissolve, prorogue (that is,
discontinue without dissolving) and summon Parliament, under section 18 of
the Constitution Act. By convention, the Governor-General exercises this power
on the advice of the Prime Minister (so long as that Prime Minister has the
support of a majority of the House of Representatives).
4.5 Elections are held in accordance with the Electoral Act 1993. New Zealand's
proportional representation electoral system lessens the likelihood that one party
will win enough seats to be sworn in as a single party majority government. The
election may well result in a minority single party government, or a majority
coalition government, or a minority coalition government.
4.6 The formation of a government following a general election is the usual
process by which executive power is transferred from one government
administration to another. (For information on mid-term changes of government,
see paragraphs 4.12 - 4.13.)
4.7 Following an election, the Governor-General will appoint a Prime Minister
and a government in accordance with the principles and processes set out in
paragraphs 4.32 - 4.43.
Mid-Term Transitions
4.8 Some transitions between administrations may occur during the electoral
term. There may be a transition to a new Prime Minister, or to a new governing
party or coalition. In these situations, established constitutional principles and
processes apply (see paragraphs 4.9 - 4.13).
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Mid-term Change of Prime Minister with no Change of
Government
4.9 A change of Prime Minister may occur because the incumbent Prime Minister
loses the support of his or her party and resigns, or as a result of the retirement,
incapacity or death of the incumbent Prime Minister.
4.10 Constitutional convention requires the Governor-General to appoint as the
new Prime Minister the person who has, or appears to have, the support of a
majority of members of the House. The Governor-General will therefore accept
the decision of the party or group of parties that has the support of the House,
as to which individual will lead the government as Prime Minister. That decision
is likely to be reached in accordance with internal party processes (that is,
political party rules) and, in a coalition or minority government context, clear
expressions of support for the new leader by parties representing a majority in
the House.
4.11 In some cases (for example, in the event of the sudden death or incapacity
of a Prime Minister), until the leadership of the government is determined,
another Minister may act as Prime Minister in a temporary capacity.
Mid-term Change of Government
4.12 A basic principle of New Zealand's system of responsible government is
that the government must have the confidence of the House of Representatives
to stay in office. A government may lose the confidence of the House during its
parliamentary term. Where loss of support is clear (for example, where the
government has lost a vote of confidence in the House), the Prime Minister will,
in accordance with convention, advise that his or her administration will resign.
In this situation, either an alternative administration may be appointed from the
existing Parliament (if an alternative administration that has the support of the
House is available - see the information about government formation at
paragraphs 4.32 - 4.43) or an election may be called. The Governor-General may
act in this case under the reserve powers (see paragraph 1.10). Until a new
administration is appointed, the incumbent government continues in office,
governing in accordance with the caretaker convention (see paragraphs 4.16 -
4.31).
4.13 In some cases, however, the support of the House may become unclear (for
example, in the case of a change in coalition arrangements). The Governor-General
has previously indicated that, in that situation, the incumbent government will
need to clarify, within a fairly short timeframe (allowing a reasonable period for
negotiation and reorganisation), where the confidence of the House lies. The
caretaker convention applies in the mid-term context only when it becomes clear
that the government has lost the support of the House.
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The Pre-Election Period
4.14 In the period immediately before a general election, the government is not
bound by the caretaker convention (see paragraphs 4.16 - 4.31) unless the election
has resulted from the government losing the support of the House. But successive
governments have chosen to restrict their actions to some extent at this time, in
recognition of the fact that an election, and therefore potentially a change of
government, is imminent. For example, significant appointments have been
deferred, and some government advertising has been thought to be inappropriate
during the election campaign (that is, where it might create a perception that
public funds are being used to finance publicity for party political purposes —
see the Guidelines for Government Advertising at appendix 2 for general
guidance). In practice, restraints have tended to be applied from approximately
three months before the general election is due, or (if the period between the
announcement of the election and polling day is less than three months) from
the announcement of the election.
4.15 The Secretary of the Cabinet is available to provide advice on decision
making during the pre-election period.
Caretaker Convention
4.16 On occasion, it may be necessary for a government to remain in office for
some period, on an interim basis, when it has lost the confidence of the House,
or (after an election) when it is unclear whether it has retained the confidence
of the House. During such periods the incumbent government is still the lawful
executive authority, with all the powers and responsibilities that go with
executive office. However, governments in this situation have traditionally
constrained their actions until the political situation is resolved, in accordance
with what is known as the convention on caretaker government.
4.17 There are two circumstances in which the government would see itself
bound by the caretaker convention:
After a general election: The convention applies until a new administration is
sworn in or it becomes clear that the incumbent government continues to have
the support of the House necessary to govern.
If the government has clearly lost the confidence of the House: The convention
guides the government's actions until either it is confirmed in office or a new
administration takes office. This confirmation or change of government may
arise either as a result of negotiations between the parties represented in the
current Parliament or as a result of a new general election.
4.18 In both situations the government is likely to state explicitly that it is to
operate as a caretaker government until the political situation is resolved.
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Main Principles of the Caretaker Convention
4.19 There are two arms to the convention, each of which has its own set of
constitutional principles:
• where it is clear who will form the next government, but they have not yet
taken office;
• where it is not clear who will form the next government.
Where it is clear who will form the next government, but they have not yet
taken office
4.20 In this situation the outgoing government:
• should undertake no new policy initiatives; and
• should act on the advice of the incoming government on any matter of such
constitutional, economic or other significance that it cannot be delayed until
the new government formally takes office - even if the outgoing government
disagrees with the course of action proposed.
4.21 Situations of this kind are likely to be relatively short-lived, as the
Constitution Act 1986 enables a swift transition between administrations once
the composition of the new government has been confirmed.
Where it is not Clear who will form the Next Government
4.22 This situation could arise after a general election, or if a government has
clearly lost the confidence of the House part way through the term of Parliament.
The following principles apply to government business (at every level) in these
circumstances:
• Decisions taken and specific policy determined before the start of the
caretaker period may be implemented by a caretaker government.
• In general terms, the normal business of government and the day to day
administration of departments and agencies in the wider state sector may
continue during the caretaker period.
However, where matters arise that would usually require decisions, concerning:
• significant issues;
• issues with long-term implications that would be likely to limit the freedom
of action of an incoming government (such as signing a major contract or
making a significant appointment);
• new policy initiatives; or
• changes to existing policy;
• decisions relating to those matters should:
• be deferred, if possible, until the political situation is resolved; or
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• if deferral is not possible (or is no longer possible), be handled by way of
temporary or holding arrangements that do not commit the government in
the longer term (that is, by extending a board appointment or rolling over
a contract); or
• if neither deferral nor temporary arrangements are possible, be made only
after consultation with other political parties.
(Note: consultation would be required to establish whether the proposed action
had the support of a majority of the House. The level of consultation might vary
according to such factors as the complexity, urgency and confidentiality of the
issue.)
4.23 The convention colours the whole conduct of government, and requires
careful judgement by Ministers, public servants, Crown entities and other Crown
agencies as to whether particular decisions are affected.
4.24 No hard and fast rules are possible. In the end, Ministers may need to take
into account various considerations (including political considerations), both on
whether it is appropriate or necessary to proceed on a matter and on how it
should be handled. Decisions will also be considered against the background
that the incumbent caretaker government has lawful executive authority, until
replaced or confirmed in office.
Decision Making Process during Periods of Caretaker
Government
4.25 It is important for Ministers and departmental officials to be clear about
their respective roles in the decision making process during a caretaker period:
Decisions Within Departments, Crown Entities and Other
Crown Agencies
General: The day to day administration of departments and agencies in the wider
state sector will (in general terms) continue during the caretaker period. However,
departmental officials and board members or employees of Crown entities,
state-owned enterprises and other Crown agencies should always take into
account the fact that they are operating in a caretaker environment and exercise
special care when making decisions during this time.
Departments: As a rule, all issues arising within departments that have caretaker
convention implications should be referred to the Minister, who will decide (in
consultation, if appropriate, with ministerial colleagues and/or the Prime Minister)
how the convention applies and how the decision should be handled. This should
not involve any departure from usual practice, because most decisions to which
the convention applies (that is, those relating to significant issues, issues with
long-term implications, new policy initiatives or changes to existing policy)
would, in the usual course of events, be referred to the Minister.
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Where an issue is referred to a Minister, the department should be ready to
provide advice (if required) as to the application of the caretaker convention,
and the options for handling the decision in terms of the convention (note: the
Secretary of the Cabinet is available for guidance — see paragraph 4.26).
On rare occasions, caretaker convention issues may arise in relation to matters
that, under statute, fall solely within the decision making authority of a chief
executive or statutory officer. Where appropriate, chief executives and statutory
officers should observe the principles of the caretaker convention (see paragraph
4.22) when making those decisions. In such cases, it may be helpful or prudent
to contact the Secretary of the Cabinet for guidance.
Crown entities, state-owned enterprises and other Crown agencies: The statutory
provisions governing decision making within Crown entities, state-owned
enterprises and other Crown agencies impose different obligations from those
applicable to decision making within departments. Cabinet expects, however,
that agencies in the wider state sector will apply the principles of the caretaker
convention (see paragraph 4.22) to decision making during the caretaker period,
as far as is possible (taking into account their legal obligations and statutory
functions and duties). Cabinet also expects that agencies in the wider state sector
will discuss with their Responsible Ministers any issues that have caretaker
convention implications. For general guidance on the application of the caretaker
convention, the heads of Crown entities or other Crown agencies may wish to
contact relevant departmental chief executives or the Secretary of the Cabinet.
Ministerial Decisions
As a general rule, Ministers should put before their colleagues the sorts of issues
on which they themselves would wish to be consulted (see paragraphs 3.13 -
3.14). Ministers may well wish to discuss with their Cabinet colleagues whether
the caretaker convention applies to a particular decision and how it should be
handled. If Ministers are in any doubt about whether the caretaker convention
applies to a particular matter, they should err on the side of caution and raise
the matter with the Prime Minister or at Cabinet. If a Minister considers that a
matter requires consultation with other political parties, the proposed
consultation must be approved in advance by either Cabinet or the Prime Minister
(see subparagraph (c) below).
Coordination and the Prime Minister's Role
In cases where any doubt arises as to the application of the caretaker convention,
Ministers should consult the Prime Minister. Final decisions concerning the
caretaker convention rest with the Prime Minister.
All approaches to other political parties must be cleared in advance with the
Prime Minister or Cabinet. Ministers should ensure that they notify the office
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of the Prime Minister as early as possible of all matters that may require
consultation and action during periods of caretaker government.
4.26 For guidance about the application of the caretaker convention and the
decision making process during the caretaker period, Ministers, departments
and Crown agencies may contact the Secretary of the Cabinet for assistance in
the first instance.
Guidance on Decisions Concerning Expenditure and the
Official Information Act
4.27 During a caretaker period, particular attention should be paid to the
following types of decisions:
• Decisions on expenditure: The government must have authority from
Parliament to spend money. Departments must always check that adequate
authority exists before expenditure is incurred. This means that departments
should check that proposed spending has been authorised either by an
Appropriation (Main or Supplementary Estimates) Act or a Cabinet minute
authorising expenses to be met from Imprest Supply pending passage of an
Appropriation Act.
• Decisions under the Official Information Act 1982: The Official Information
Act continues to operate during the caretaker period. In general, responding
to requests for information should be seen as part of the day to day business
of government, and should be dealt with in the ordinary way. On rare
occasions, however, requests may raise issues that are likely to be of long-term
significance for the operation of government and that require ministerial
involvement. In this situation, it may be necessary to consider extending
the time limit in order to consult with the incoming Minister. Any such
extension must comply with section 15A of the Official Information Act.
Planning Ahead
4.28 In practical terms, a general election creates the potential for a significant
period during which it is difficult for Ministers to take decisions, for several
reasons:
A general election always results in a period of reduced decision making capacity
at the ministerial and Cabinet level, while Ministers are occupied with the election
campaign.
Immediately after the election, the caretaker convention is likely to apply, and
Ministers may be involved in coalition negotiations.
4.29 It is difficult to predict how long the caretaker period may last after an
election. In 1996, for example, the caretaker period lasted for approximately
nine weeks, while in 1999 it was much shorter. Departments and agencies that
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plan and prepare for a protracted caretaker period of weeks or even months are
likely to experience few real problems. The importance of planning cannot be
overstated.
4.30 An additional practical consideration is the need to take significant decisions
in time for them to be taken account of in the pre-election economic and fiscal
update, which the Treasury is required to prepare under the Fiscal Responsibility
Act 1994. This update is published four to six weeks before the election. It must
include information on all government decisions and circumstances that may
have a material effect on the fiscal and economic outlook.
4.31 It is therefore important for Ministers, departments, Crown entities and
other Crown agencies to ensure that all significant matters that will require
ministerial attention in the course of the election year are dealt with well in
advance of a general election. In particular, departments and agencies in the
wider state sector should consider the effect of a general election on the timing
of any regular or annual processes that require ministerial decision or
parliamentary action, on processes with statutory deadlines and on the passage
of legislation. Throughout the election year, the state sector as a whole should
strive to ensure that matters are brought to the attention of Ministers in a timely
fashion.
Government Formation
Contexts in Which Governments may be Formed
4.32 The government formation process will usually occur after elections, as is
reflected in the following paragraphs. However, there may be a mid-term change
of government (see paragraphs 4.12 - 4.13), in which case the general principles
and processes set out below will also apply.
Single Party Majority Outcome
4.33 Where an election results in a clear majority for a single party, no
government formation negotiations will be necessary. If the incumbent
government has been confirmed in office, it can simply resume normal
government business, perhaps appointing some new Ministers (if required).
4.34 If the election results in a change to a new single party majority
administration, the outgoing government continues in office, governing under
the first arm of the caretaker convention (see paragraphs 4.20 - 4.21), until the
incoming government can be appointed. Under the Constitution Act 1986, this
transition can occur swiftly.
Minority or Coalition Outcome
4.35 Under a proportional representation electoral system, it is likely that two
or more parties will negotiate so that a government can be formed (whether a
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majority coalition government, a minority single party government, or a minority
coalition government). This process is political, and the decision to form a
government must be arrived at by politicians.
4.36 Any agreement reached by the parties during their negotiations may need
to be confirmed subsequently by the political parties involved, each following
its own internal procedures.
4.37 Once the political parties have reached an adequate accommodation, and a
government is able to be formed or confirmed, it is expected that they will make
that clear by appropriate public announcements of their intentions. Where
parties have agreed to form a coalition government, they may sign a written
coalition document setting out the political arrangements for the formation and
maintenance of the government.
4.38 By convention the task of the Governor-General in the government formation
process is to ascertain where the support of the House lies (or appears to lie), so
that a government can be appointed or confirmed in office. It is not the
Governor-General's role to form the government or to participate in any
negotiations (although it is possible that the Governor-General might wish to
talk to party leaders if there were no clear outcome from the talks).
4.39 Accordingly, the Governor-General will, by convention, abide by the
outcome of the government formation process in appointing a new ministry or
accepting the right of the incumbent government to remain in office for a further
term. The Governor-General will also accept the decision of the party or group
of parties as to which individual will lead the government as Prime Minister.
4.40 If, at the end of the government formation process, the incumbent
government is confirmed in office, it will continue to govern and the caretaker
period will end.
4.41 If a new administration is to assume office, the incumbent government will
continue in office, operating in accordance with the first arm of the caretaker
convention (see paragraphs 4.20 - 4.21), until the new government takes office.
The formal procedures for appointing a new government are set out in chapter
1.
4.42 If the situation is still unclear by the time that Parliament has been
summoned to meet, the address in reply debate may resolve matters because
there is an early opportunity for a confidence vote. In the unlikely event that
the confidence vote fails to resolve the situation, another election may be
required.
4.43 During the government formation process, the Clerk of the Executive Council
provides official, impartial support to the Governor-General, including liaising
with party leaders as required on behalf of the Governor-General. The Clerk
facilitates the transition between administrations (in particular, assisting the
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outgoing and incoming Prime Ministers if there is a change of government). See
paragraphs 1.22 - 1.26 for further information about the Clerk of the Executive
Council's role.
Provision Of Information by the Public Service to
Negotiating Parties
4.44 Inter-party negotiations to form a government are the business of politicians,
but negotiating parties may seek access to the public service or agencies in the
wider state sector for information and analysis on issues that might form part
of a coalition agreement.
4.45 Departmental officials may provide information to political parties for the
purposes of government formation negotiations only when authorised by the
Prime Minister to do so, and must follow the relevant guidance (as approved by
Cabinet and issued by the State Services Commission — see the Commission
website at www.ssc.govt.nz). Agencies in the wider state sector are also expected
to observe the State Services Commission guidance.
Briefing an Incoming Government
4.46 During the government formation period, the incoming government (or the
party or group of parties that seems likely to be the incoming government) may
seek official advice on specific issues, pending appointment to office.
4.47 If portfolio allocations have not yet been announced, chief executives may
provide advice to the incoming government, through the Prime
Minister-designate, only after the express consent of the incumbent Prime
Minister has been obtained and a process has been agreed with the State Services
Commissioner.
4.48 If portfolios have been allocated but the incoming Ministers have not yet
been formally appointed, chief executives may, with the knowledge of the
incumbent Minister and the State Services Commissioner, offer to brief new
Ministers on their portfolio responsibilities. Further guidance on briefing
incoming Ministers can be found at paragraphs 2.155 - 2.157, and on the State
Services Commission website — see Public Servants, Political Parties and
Elections at www.ssc.govt.nz.
Incoming Ministers
4.49 Section 6(2)(a) of the Constitution Act 1986 enables a swift transition between
administrations. It provides that any candidate at a general election can be
appointed as a Minister, before being confirmed as elected, so long as that
Minister is confirmed as a Member of Parliament within 40 days of being
appointed to the executive.
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4.50 Further information on the appointment of Executive Councillors and
Ministers can be found at paragraphs 1.15 - 1.17, and paragraphs 2.14 - 2.17.
4.51 Section 6(2)(a) does not apply to Parliamentary Under-Secretaries, who
cannot be sworn in until their election as Members of Parliament has been
confirmed.
4.52 Incoming Ministers have access (subject to certain conditions and to the
rights and duties set out in the Official Information Act 1982) to the Cabinet
records of previous administrations, for continuity of government purposes.
(See paragraphs 6.64 - 6.69 for further information.)
Outgoing Ministers
4.53 Where a general election results in a change of administration, Ministers
usually remain in office in a caretaker capacity until the new government is
ready to be sworn in, at which time the outgoing Prime Minister will advise the
Governor-General to accept the resignations of his or her entire ministry.
4.54 Section 6(2)(b) of the Constitution Act 1986 may require some Ministers in
the caretaker government to resign before the government formation process
has concluded. Section 6(2)(b) requires any Minister who has not been re-elected
to Parliament to resign from the executive within 28 days of ceasing to be a
Member of Parliament. In this event, the Prime Minister may ask another Minister
in the caretaker government to be acting Minister in the relevant portfolio(s),
or may appoint a new Minister to the portfolio(s) (albeit in a caretaker capacity).
4.55 Ministerial Services provides practical assistance to outgoing Ministers in
relation to staff, office and other practical arrangements. The Cabinet Office and
Archives New Zealand provide guidance on the storage and disposal of Ministers'
official papers (see paragraphs 6.70 - 6.91 for further information). The Cabinet
Office also seeks information from outgoing Ministers concerning gifts they have
received while in office, in accordance with the Guidelines on Ministers' Interests
(see also paragraphs 2.68 - 2.70).
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